University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship

1981

Trading on Material Non-Public Information on
Impersonal Stock Markets: Who is Harmed, and
Who can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule 10b-5?
William K.S. Wang
UC Hastings College of the Law, wangw@uchastings.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Securities Law Commons
Recommended Citation
William K.S. Wang, Trading on Material Non-Public Information on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who is Harmed, and Who can Sue Whom
Under SEC Rule 10b-5?, 54 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1217 (1981).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship/777

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.

Faculty Publications
UC Hastings College of the Law Library
Wang

William

Author:

William K.S. Wang

Source:

Southern California Law Review

Citation:

54 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1217 (1981).

Title:

Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Markets:
Who is Harmed, and Who can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule 10b-5?

Originally published in SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW. This article is reprinted with
permission from SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW and University of Southern California
School of Law.

TRADING ON MATERIAL
NONPUBLIC INFORMATION ON
IMPERSONAL STOCK
MARKETS: WHO IS
HARMED, AND WHO CAN SUE
WHOM UNDER SEC RULE 10b-5?
K.S.

WILLIAM

WANG*

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

1219

INTRODUCTION ............................

A. WHO Is

HARMED BY STOCK MARKET INSIDE

1221

TRADING ................................

B.

PROPER PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS UNDER

RULE
C.

SEC
1224

10b-5 ..............................

SOLUTION PROPOSED BY THE

ALI

FEDERAL

SECURITIES CODE ..........................

II. THE ALLEGED BENEFICIAL AND HARMFUL
EFFECTS OF INSIDE TRADING ON SOCIETY .....
A.
B.

ALLEGED BENEFITS ........................
ALLEGED DETRIMENTS ......................

1225

1225
1225
1227

III. INDIVIDUAL HARM FROM INSIDE TRADING ON
THE IMPERSONAL STOCK MARKET ............
A. ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE ISSUER ................

1230
1230

*
Professor, Hastings College of the Law. B.A. 1967, Amherst College. J.D. 1971, Yale
Law School. Member, California Bar. This Article was written primarily while the author was a
professor of law at the University of San Diego.

Roger Blanc, Esq., and Professors Joseph Bishop, Louis Loss, Grant Morris, Mike Navin,
and David Ratner made helpful comments on portions of the drafts of this Article. The author is
especially grateful to Professor Homer Kripke for thoroughly reviewing the manuscript and suggesting numerous improvements, and to Professor Lawrence Alexander for acting as a sounding
board throughout the writing of this Article. Valuable research assistance was provided by Gerald
Sims, Edwin F. McPherson, and Cheryl Peterson.

1217

HeinOnline -- 54 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1217 1980-1981

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1217

1218

B.

HARM TO SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALS CAUSED BY A STOCK

TRADE ON NONPUBLIC INFORMATION .............

1230

1. How the Stock Market Functions ............
1231
2. Who Might Be in Privity With an Inside Trader .. 1232
3. Why the Party in Privity Is Not Necessarily Harmed
by an Inside Trade ......................
1233
4. The Law of Conservation of Securities .........
1234
5. Who Bears the Net Loss Causedby an Inside
Trade ................................
1235
a. Induced adverse trades .................
1235
b. Preemptedtraders .....................
1236
c. The practicaldig'culy of identifying those
harmedby an inside trade ...............
1236
6. Price Change Effects on Those TradingAbout the
Same Time as the Inside Trade ..............
1239
C.

HARM TO SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALS CAUSED BY THE

1240
1. Moral or Legal Causation .................. 1240
2. CausationAnomaly ......................
1241
NONDISCLOSURE ..........................

D. WHY BUSINESSMEN MIGHT NOT CONSIDER INSIDE
TRADING IMMORAL ........................

E.

1245

WHY MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC MIGHT CONSIDER

INSIDE TRADING IMMORAL .....................

IV. APPLICATION OF SEC RULE 10b-5 TO INSIDE
TRADING ON IMPERSONAL STOCK MARKETS...

1247
1248

A.

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION-To WHOM IS THE

B.

1248
1. Duty To Disclose to the Partyin Privity ........
1249
2. Duty To Disclose to the Individual to Whom the
Partyin Privity May Transmit the Harm of
Nondisclosure ..........................
1250
3. Duty To Disclose to the Victims of the Inside Trade
Itself ................................
1251
4. Duty To Disclose to the World ..............
1255
DEFINING THE CLASS OF RULE lOb-5 PLAINTIFFS
DUTY To DISCLOSE OWED?

. .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .

WHO CAN DEMONSTRATE CAUSATION WHEN SUING

1255
1. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc . ................................. 1256
2. Fridrich v. Bradford .....................
1262
3. Chiarella v. United States ...................
1269

A STOCK MARKET INSIDE TRADER FOR DAMAGES...

HeinOnline -- 54 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1218 1980-1981

IMPERSONAL STOCK MARKETS

19811

1219

a. Specialrelationship ....................

1269

b. Misappropriation......................

1271

c. Concluding comments on Chiarella .........

1274

4. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc ..............

1274

5. Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp... 1279
6. Reflections on the Proper Class of Plaintiffs ...... 1282
C. DEFENDANTS .............................
1285
1. Requirement of a Relationship of Trust and
Confidence ............................

2. The MisappropriationTheory ...............
3. Blackmun's Chiarella Dissent ...............
4. Reflections on the Proper Class of Defendants ....
D.

THE APPROACH OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S
FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE ..................

1285

1294
1298
1300

1304

1. Defendants." Insiders, Outsiders, and Their

Tippees ..............................
2. Dening the Class of Plaintiffs ...............

1304
1306

a. The distinction betweenfortuitous/market

transactionsandnonfortuitous/nonmarket
transactions ......................... 1306
b. Practicalproblems of distinguishingbetween

fortuitous andnonfortuitous transactions .....

1309

3. Reflections on the Approach Proposedby the Code. 1311

V. SUMMARY .................................
CONCLUSION ..................................

1311
1321

I. INTRODUCTION
This Article analyzes stock market' inside trading on the basis of material nonpublic information.2 Part II of the Article considers inside
1. The term "stock market" refers to both organized stock exchanges and the over-thecounter market. For a brief discussion of how these markets function, see notes 49-52 and accompanying text infra. The distinction between exchanges and the over-the-counter market is eroding. See note 52 infra. Whether on a stock exchange or in the over-the-counter market, trading
on nonpublic information poses the same issues. In the over-the-counter market, however, the
party in privity with the insider can be identified more frequently.
2. In this Article, the term "inside trading" refers to trading by anyone (corporate insider or
outsider) on any type of material nonpublic information about the issuer's profits or about the
market for the security. For more precise definitions of such terms as "market" information and
"outside" information, see text accompanying notes 293-97 infra. The term "insider" will refer to
employees of a corporation or those in an equivalent position. See note 270 and accompanying
text infra. To avoid confusion, the term "insider trading" will not be used, and insider will always
be italicized.
Discussion of the measure of damages and of definitions of "nonpublic," "material," and
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trading's supposed beneficial and harmful effects on society as a
whole.3 Part III attempts to identify who specifically is harmed4 by
those who would have an implied
stock market inside trading5-e.,
cause of action available under a hypothetical statute reading: "Thou
shalt not trade on the stock market based on material nonpublic information." Part IV of the Article considers the identity of proper plaintiffs and defendants under section 10(b)6 of the Securities Exchange Act
"dissemination" is beyond the scope of this Article. For discussion of the definition of "nonpublic," see Jennings & Smith, Insider Trading and the Analyst, in FIFTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON
SECURITIES REGULATION 262-67 (R. Mundheim, A. Fleischer, Jr., & J. Schupper eds., transcript
ser., 1974) [hereinafter cited as FIFTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE].
For a discussion of the definition of "material," see Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d
175, 187 (3d Cir. 1981); Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 543-44 (5th Cir. 1981);
Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 166-67 (2d Cir. 1980); Vaughn v. Teledyne, Inc.,
628 F.2d 1214, 1221 (9th Cir. 1980); Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 1979); In
re Dirks, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 17480, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,812, at
83,946-47 (1981); ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE §§ 202(56), 202(92), 1603(a) and accompanying Comments (1st Supp. 1980) [hereinafter cited as ALI CODE]; 3A H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW §§ 9.21[1]-[3] (rev. ed. 1980); 3 A. BROMBERO & L.
LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD § 8.3 (1981); 5 A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT
OF RULE lOb-5 § 61.02 (1974); Pitt, After the Fal: The Ins and Outs oRule 10b-, in TWELFTH
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 607, 636-38 (A. Fleischer, M. Lipton & R.
Mundheim eds. 1980); Note, Recent Ninth Circuit Developments in SecuritiesLaw, 13 Loy. L.A.L.
REv. 985, 1025-31 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Recent Developments].
For a discussion of the definition of "dissemination," see ALI CODE, supra, § 1603, Comment
(5); 3A H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra, § 9.20[10]; 2 A. BROMBERO & L. LOWENFELS, stpra, at
§ 7.4(7)(a); W. PAINTER, THE FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE § 5.04
(1979); Pitt, supra, at 636-37.
For a discussion of damages, see Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d at 553-60; ALl
CODE §§ 1708, 1723(e), Comments; W. CARY & M. EISENBERO, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 790-93 (5th ed. unabr. 1980); 5B A. JACOBS, supra, at § 260.03; Mullaney, Theories of
Measuring Damages in Security Cases and the Effects of Damages on Liability, 46 FORDHAM L.
REV. 277 (1977); Reder, MeasuringBuyers' Damages in Job-5 Cases, 31 Bus. LAW. 1839 (1976);
Note, The MeasureofDamagesin Rule 10b-5 Cases Involving Actively TradedSecurities, 26 STAN.
L. REv. 371 (1974); Note, Rule 10b-5 Damages: The Runaway Development of a Common Law
Remedy, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 76 (1975); Annot., 29 A.L.R. FED. 646 (1976). For an inside trading
case which reached the issue of damages, see Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 123,
129-36 (S.D;N.Y. 1978), rev'd in part,aJ'din part on othergrounds, 635 F.2d 156, 168-73 (2d Cir.
1980).
This Article does discuss whether the civil liability of an inside trader should be limited to his
profits. See text accompanying notes 219-32 infra.
This Article does not discuss an inside trader's possible liability under § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933.
3. See text accompanying notes 20-44 infra.
4. This Article frequently uses the terms "harm," "causation," and "victim." Almost always, "harm" and "causation" mean "but for" causation. When such concepts as legal or moral
causation are discussed, specific reference will be made to these principles. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 65-67 infra.
5. See text accompanying notes 45-72 infra.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
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of 1934 and SEC rule lOb-5 7 when inside trading has taken place, and
discusses the solution proposed by the American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code. The Article does not address the issue of whether
inside trading should be prohibited or discouraged.

A. WHO Is

HARMED BY STOCK MARKET INSIDE TRADING

An inside trade has two aspects: the trade itself and the nondisclosure
of the inside information that prompted the trade. Part III of this Article identifies those harmed by stock market inside trading and by nondisclosure. These victims could be private plaintiffs for damages under
a hypothetical statute that explicitly prohibits stock market inside trading without indicating whether the gravamen of the offense is the trade
or the nondisclosure. This distinction is usually unimportant when an
inside trader engages in a face to face transaction in the stock of a
closely held corporation. In such transactions, the victim of both the
trade and the nondisclosure is almost always the party in privity with
the defendant. Had the inside trader abstained from the transaction,
the other party could not have traded because no other buyer or seller
would have been available. If the defendant had a duty to disclose to
the party in privity, the latter would be the victim of the nondisclosure.
This Article will not discuss causation problems in face to face transactions.' Nevertheless, examination of some transactions in closely held
shares will illustrate similar causation problems in stock market transactions.
In rare situations, even in the closely held context, the trade and
the nondisclosure may have different victims. Possibly the person in
privity would have traded with a third party had the defendant not
traded. Under these circumstances, the party in privity is not harmed
by the trade; the real victim is the third party whose transaction was
preempted by the defendant's trade. The party in privity remains the
victim of the nondisclosure, however, if the defendant had an absolute
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980). The rule states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a miterial fact or to omit to state a material fact
7.

necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or

(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.
Rule lOb-5 was promulgated pursuant to § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
8. But see text accompanying notes 64-72 infra.
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duty to disclose to the person with whom he transacted. If the party in
privity resells or repurchases before disclosure, however, he may have
no damages.
For example, suppose a corporation has ten shareholders, one of
whom, the president, knows secret, material, adverse news about the
corporation. X, an existing shareholder, is interested in buying 100
more shares in the corporation, and contacts both the president and.A,
another shareholder. A offers to sell 100 shares for $11 per share, but
the president offers to sell for $10 per share. X buys from the president.
One week later X sells the 100 shares to Y, a nonshareholder, for $12
per share. When the adverse news becomes public, Y is still holding
the shares, which are worth only $8 per share. The following diagram
illustrates these transactions:
sells to
sells to
Y
X
President
(preempting A)
The victim of the president's trade is,4, whose transaction with X was
preempted. Had the president not sold, A would have 100 fewer
shares. X would have purchased A's shares and then resold to Y. The
victim of the president's nondisclosure, however, is X who passed the
harm along, and possibly Y, if the president had a duty to disclose to X
and Y. The president may have a higher duty to X because, unlike ,
X is an existing shareholder.
In practice, the president might be forced to disclose to the world
to avoid any liability. If the president were to disclose only to X and X
in turn were to sell his own shares to an ignorant purchaser, the president might be liable as an aider and abettor of X's misconduct. Thus,
an officer of a closely held corporation might face a hopeless dilemma.
If he sells without disclosing to the buyer, he commits fraud. If he
discloses and his buyer trades on the basis of the information, the officer is liable as a tipper. This dilemma is compounded when full disclosure to the world is infeasible, unless outsiders are to be held to
constructive notice9 or to a standard of due care.' 0
9. See generally 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 2, § 64.01[b][ii], at 3-246 to -252.
10. For discussions of the plaintiff's duty of care under rule lOb-5, see Mallis v. Bankers
Trust Co., 615 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 938 (1981); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun
Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); Hirsch v. du Pont, 553

F.2d 750, 762-63 (2d Cir. 1977); Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1013-24 (5th Cir.), ceri. denied,
434 U.S. 911 (1977); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 692-97 (10th Cir. 1976); Straub v. Vaisman, 540 F.2d 591, 596-98 (3d Cir. 1976), notedin 50 Taap. L.Q. 124 (1976); Dura-Bilt v. Chase
Manhattan, 89 F.R.D. 87, 95-96 & n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); 3A H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 2,
§ 9.21[6]; 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 2, § 64.01[b][ii], at 3-248 to -252; W. PAINTER, supra note 2,
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Although it might be wise for the president, if possible, to disclose
to the world, he would not be liable to the world if he sold to X without
disclosing his information to anyone. At most he would be liable to Y,
and possibly to A, if A had standing. Thus, if the president does not
disclose his information to anyone, he may be liable to both Y and A,
but he will not be liable to an outsider, Z, who purchased shares from
some other shareholder, B, during the period between the president's
sale and public dissemination of the material information.
Similar results can occur when, instead of seeking to sell on nonpublic adverse information, the president of the ten-shareholder corporation wishes to buy 100 shares based on secret good news. An
outsider, X, is also interested in purchasing 100 shares at $10 per share.
An existing shareholder, A, is willing to sell. The president outbids X
by offering $11, so A sells his 100 shares to the president. One week
later, A fortuitously decides that it was a mistake to sell the 100 shares
and purchases 100 shares at $11 from B, another shareholder. When
the good news is disclosed, B holds 100 fewer shares, and X still holds
no shares. The stock is now worth $14 per share. The following diagram illustrates these transactions:
buys from
buys from
President <
A
B
(preempting X)
The victim of the president's trade is X, whose purchase was preempted. Had the president not bought, X would have purchased from
A, who in turn would still have repurchased from B. The victim of the
president's nondisclosure is A, who unknowingly transmitted the harm
to B.

Disclosure by the president to A alone might itself be misconduct
if A trades on the information disclosed. If the president purchased
from A without disclosure, however, he might be liable for damages to
B, and possibly to X, if X has standing. The president might also be
liable to A for rescission. Thus, the president could theoretically be
liable to A, B, and X, although his trade harmed only X The president
would not be liable to some other shareholder, C, who sold shares after
the president's sale and before public dissemination.
The closely held corporation example illustrates causation
§ 7.02; Note, A ComparativeFaultApproach to the Due Diligence Requirement of Rule lob-5, 49
FoiRim L. REv. 561 (1981); Note, PlaintiffsDuty of CareAfter Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 73
Nw. U. L. REv. 158 (1978); Note,A Reevaluation of the Due Dilgence RequirementforPlaintiffsin
PrivateActions Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 904.
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problems that also arise in stock market transactions. When inside
trading takes place on a stock market, the victims of the nondisclosure
and the victims of the trade are almost always different and are usually
impossible to identify. Those injured by the trade are investors whose
transactions were either preempted or induced, in accordance with the
Law of Conservation of Securities."I These victims are generally not in
privity with the defendant. Those harmed by the nondisclosure are
those who can demonstrate the two elements of moral or legal causation: 2 a duty to disclose owed to them, and a breach of that duty.
B.

PROPER PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS UNDER SEC RULE

lOb-5

No federal provision expressly prohibits the general practice of trading
on nonpublic information; therefore, the federal judiciary has relied on
section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, discussed in Part IV of this Article. Rule
lOb-5 is an imperfect weapon against stock market inside trading because of the restrictive deceit' 3 and standing' 4 requirements. Four circuit court opinions have attempted to define the class of rule lOb-5
plaintiffs able to demonstrate that damages were caused by a stock
market inside trade: Shapiro v. MerrillLynch, Pierce,Fenner & Smith,
Inc. ;15 Fridrich v. Bradford;'6 Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc. ;17 and
Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp."8 All four decisions are
overshadowed by contrary dicta in the recent Supreme Court decision
of Chiarella v. United States. 9 Surprisingly, Elkind and Wilson are
contrary to Chiarellaeven though these two circuit court opinions came
after it. All four circuit court opinions seem to have been frustrated
and possibly confused by the fact that the victims of a stock market
inside trade are different from the victims of the nondisclosure.
Chiarella reversed the criminal conviction of an individual who
had purchased shares on the stock market based on nonpublic information. The issue before the Supreme Court was the class of inside trading defendants subject to rule lOb-5. The Court held that a special
11. See text accompanying notes 56-57 infra.
12. See text accompanying notes 64-67 infra; f. text accompanying notes 98-262 infra (discussing the class of plaintiffs who can demonstrate causation when suing a stock market inside
trader for damages).
13. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
14. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
15. 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
16. 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
17. 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980).
18. 648 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1981).
19. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
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relationship of trust and confidence must exist between the defendant
and the party in privity for criminal liability to be imposed. Justice
Powell seemed to extrapolate from face to face deals to stock market
transactions. The Supreme Court apparently intended to employ the
same rationale to impose liability on insiders of both closely held and
publicly traded corporations. Although Powell's special relationship
test satisfies the deceit requirement of rule lOb-5, his approach is inadequate to deal with the complex realities of the stock market.
C.

SOLUTION PROPOSED BY THE

ALI

FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE

This Article concludes with a discussion of the American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code, which codifies the civil liability of
corporate insiders and their tippees. These provisions avoid the limitations of rule lOb-5 and provide an expedient and practical solution to
the problems of causation and definition of proper parties. The Federal Securities Code, however, deliberately leaves other areas of inside
trading in limbo.
II.

THE ALLEGED BENEFICIAL AND HARMFUL EFFECTS
OF INSIDE TRADING ON SOCIETY
A.

ALLEGED BENEFITS

Professor Henry Manne contends that inside trading by top management is an essential incentive for entrepreneurs.2 0 This thesis has been
extensively criticized.2" It is unlikely that inside trading is an incentive,
much less an essential one, for top corporate executives.
In an article on unilateral mistakes and nondisclosure in contract
law,2 2 Professor Kronman argues that the law should encourage the
deliberate search for information that reveals a change in circumstances affecting relative values, because expediting such information
20. H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 111-58 (1966).
21. W. PAINTER, supra note 2, at 235-50; B. RIDER & L. FFRENCH, THE REGULATION OF
INSIDER TRADING 5, 6 (1979); Hetherington, Insider Tradingandthe Logic of the Law, 1967 Wis.
L. REV. 720, 725-30; Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, 53 VA. L. REv. 1425,
1454-56 (1967); Mendelson, Book Review, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 470, 486-90 (1969). For Manne's
rebuttal, see Manne, InsiderTradingandtheLaw Professors,23 VAND. L. REv. 547,578-88(1970).
22. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure,Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD.
1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Mistake]. See also Kronman, ContractLaw and DistributiveJustice,
89 YALE LJ. 472,489-90 (1980), discussed and criticized in Wang, Relections on ContractLaw and
DistributiveJustice: A Reply to Kronman (forthcoming) (on file with Southern CaliforniaLaw Review); Alexander & Wang, NaturalAdvantagesand ContractualJustice-A Response to Kronman
(forthcoming) (on file with Southern CaliforniaLaw Review).
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to the market promotes allocative efficiency.23 Therefore, KIonman argues, in cases of unilateral mistake, disclosure should not be required
when the information was acquired by a deliberate and costly search.
On the other hand, when the information has been acquired casually,
disclosure should be required.24 Kronman's theory has certain weaknesses.
Because he assumes that unilateral mistakes are socially wasteful, 25 he starts with a presumption against unilateral mistake contracts,
which is overcome by the need for an incentive to discover information
and thereby correct mistakes. However, many unilateral mistakes only
enrich the knowledgeable party at the cost of the mistaken party without affecting production or resource allocation. Furthermore,
Kronman himself concedes that his standard is difficult to apply in
practice.26 Instead of a case-by-case application of the standard, he
suggests a blanket rule of disclosure or nondisclosure for each class of
cases involving the same type of information. The choice of rule would
be based on the likelihood that the information would be discovered by
chance or by deliberate searching.27
It is uncertain whether most material information regarding securities is discovered casually or by deliberate search, or whether the
search for material information is socially useful. Those who discover
the information may trade and then passively wait for the information
to be disclosed. Even then, inside trading may enhance the efficiency
of the market by making prices more accurate. 28 Under classical theory, this would benefit the market by improving capital allocation and
dampening price fluctuations.29 This decreased volatility would enhance the overall appeal of stocks to risk-averse investors.30 Moreover,
undeserved windfall gains and losses would decrease. 31 Some commentators have suggested, however, that inside trading would not have
a significant effect on stock prices. 32 They argue that even if prices are
23. Mistake, supra note 22, at 12-13.
24. Id. at 15-16.
25. Id. at 12-13.
26. Id. at 17.
27. Id. at 17-18.
28. Lone, Inside Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure, and CorporatePrivacy: A Comment, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 819 (1980). See also Wu, An Economist Looks at Section 16 of the Securities ExchangeAct of 1934, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 260, 264-66 (1968).
29. Wu, supra note 28, at 264-66.
30. Lorie, supra note 28, at 819.
31. See text accompanying note 63 infra.
32. Mendelson, supra note 21, at 474 (arguing that those who sell to an insider will use the

proceeds to purchase other securities, so that the price of the stock bought by the insider "will not
be relatively higher than the price of the stock of other companies" (emphasis in original)); Schot-
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affected, resource allocation is not directly affected by trades of existing

securities.33 As Homer Kripke has noted: "The influence of the trad34
ing market on the allocation of funds is very remote and indirect.
B.

ALLEGED DETRIMENTS

Investors may be deterred from participating in the market if they
know that others are trading on nonpublic information; the investing

public could feel that the odds are stacked against them. 35 This would
decrease the liquidity of the stock market and also make it harder for

firms to raise capital. On the other hand, investors already disregard a
large body of evidence indicating that it is difficult for even the most
sophisticated institutions to outperform the stock market averages.36
Greed may be the primary motive for stock market investment. Investors may be convinced that certain stocks will make them rich; the occurrence of inside trading may have little effect on investment so
motivated.37
land, supra note 21, at 1442-46 (suggesting that insider trading does not have a significant impact
on market prices).
33. See A. Berle, ModernFunctionsof the CorporateSystem, 62 COLUM. L. REV.433, 445-47
(1962).
34. H. KRiPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A
PURPOSE 137 (1979). But see Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders,and InformationalAdvantages Under
the FederalSecurities Law, 93 HARv. L. REV.322, 341 (1979); Note, 28 OHIO ST. L.L 472, 478
(1967).
The rationale for the prohibition of inside trading seems to be not economic efficiency but
moral or equitable principles, such as the principle that a person should not profit from undeserved information advantages. In an excellent article, Professor Victor Brudney utilized both
efficiency and fairness principles to determine what forms of inside trading should be permitted.
Brudney, supra. See note 331 infra.
35. Faberge, Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10174, [1973 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP.(CCH) 79,378; B. RIDER & L. FFRENCH, supra note 21, at 6-7; Brudney, supra note
34, at 357; Schotland, supra note 21, at 1440-42, 145 1-52, 1475; Insider Tradingin Stocks, 21 Bus.
LAW. 1009, 1010 (1966) (W. Carey, panelist); Note, Rule 10b-4 and the Trading FairnessDoctrine,
26 WAYNE L. REV. 193, 197 (1979); Note, RationalizingLiabilityforNon-Disclosure Under lOb-5:
EqualAccess to Informationand United States v. Chiarella, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 162, 182-83; see 92
HARV. L. REV. 1538, 1543 (1979). But see 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 2, § 6.08, at 1-146 ("Building
investor confidence has gained little acceptance as an underlying theory" of rule lOb-5.). See also
Hetherington, supra note 21, at 733-34.
36. For discussions of various hypotheses about how quickly information is impounded in
market prices, see V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE 1176-91 (2d ed. 1979); T. COPELAND & J. WESTON, FINANCIAL THEORY AND CORPORATE

POLICY 221-48 (1979); R. HAGIN, MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY 37-80 (1979); H. KRiPKE, supra
note 34, at 84-86; B. MALKIEL, THE INFLATION-BEATER'S INVESTMENT GUIDE 56-65 (1980); B.
MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DowN WALL STREET 136-72 (1973); Cohen, The SuitabilityRule and
Economic Theory, 80 YALE LJ. 1604, 1614-17 (1971).
37. Herman, Equity Funding,Inside Information and the Regulators,21 U.C.L.A. L. REV.1,
17 (1973). Cf.Manne, supra note 21, at 577 (pointing out that the public's percentage participa-
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Assuming the corporate issuer has no affirmative duty to disclose
material developments,38 permitting inside trading might cause members of corporate management to delay public announcements until after trading. This would extend the period during which public traders
incur beneficial or adverse windfalls. Even assuming that society
should concern itself with minimizing such windfalls, inside trading
may not actually cause delay in publication. One survey of all the reported inside trading cases concluded that, with one possible exception,
inside trading39 did not have an effect on the timing of publication of the
information.
tion in the stock market was quite high in the 1920's despite notorious manipulation and inside
trading).
38. An issuer's rule lOb-5 affirmative duty to disclose material corporate developments is
unclear. Note, Disclosure ofMaterialInside Informatiorn An Affirmative CorporateDuty?, 1980
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 795. See generally State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., [Current] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,005 (2d Cir. 1981); SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976);
Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 874 (1973); Segal v. Coburn Corp. of America, [1973] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 94,002
(E.D.N.Y.); Matarese v. Aero-Chatillon Corp., [1971] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,322
(S.D.N.Y.); Securities Act Release No. 5092 (Oct. 15, 1970); 3A H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 2,
§§ 9.10-.14; V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 36, at 1066-70; SA A. JACOBS, supra note
2, § 88.04; Allen, The Disclosure Obligationof Publicly Held Corporationsin the Absence of Inside
Trading, 25 MERCER L. REv. 479 (1974); Bauman, Rule 10b-5 and the Corporationr Affirmative
Duty to Disclose, 67 GEO. L.J. 935 (1979); Talesnick, CorporateSilence andRule JOb-: Does a
Publicly Held CorporationHave an Affirative Obligation to Disclose?,49 DEN. L.J. 369 (1973);
Vaughan, Timing ofDisclosure, 13 REv. SEC. REo. 911 (1980).
A footnote in the recent decision of Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., cited with approval the
FinancialIndustrialFund case and then suggested that whether the issuer should disclose material
developments is a matter for its "business judgment." 635 F.2d at 169 n.26. Elkind's earlier discussion of Liggett's obligation to correct investment community expectations also seemed to assume no affirmative duty to disclose. Id. at 162-64. Citing Elkind, another Second Circuit
opinion also seemed to assume no affirmative duty to disclose. The court held that "[a] company
has no duty to correct or verify [accurate] rumors in the marketplace unless those rumors can be
attributed to the company." State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., [Current] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 198,005, at 91,204 (2d Cir. 1981). The plaintiff in State Teachers also argued that
once an issuer decides to withhold material information, the corporation must try to halt trading
in its stock. The court did not reach this issue because the defendant lacked scienter and because
the plaintiff could not possibly demonstrate causation. Id. at 91,204-05.
Rules of the organized stock exchanges and of the National Association of Securities Dealers
impose on the issuer an obligation under certain circumstances to disclose material corporate developments promptly. 3A H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 2, § 9.09. The court in State Teachers
held there is no private cause of action under the New York Stock Exchange Company Manual
provisions dealing with prompt disclosure of material corporate developments. State Teachers
Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH), at 91,204-05. See generally
Bauman, supra, at 978-88.
39. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REv. 1, 34 (1980); Cf
Scott, InsiderTrading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosureand CorporatePrivacy, 9 J. LEGAL SrUD. 801, 81011 (1980) (admitting the plausibility of the proposition that insiders might release favorable information more promptly if they could not profit from it, but arguing that insiders would be less
likely to release unfavorable news if they could not trade upon it).
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One commentator has advanced an ingenious argument that the
cost of capital of a corporation with a management that trades on inside information will be higher that that of a corporation with a management that does not engage in such trading.4" In his example,
corporations A and B are identical in all respects except that A's management trades on nonpublic information and B's does not. The
outside shareholders of A gain less than B's outside shareholders because the management of A collects a disproportionate share of the
earnings stream of A. If the behavior of A's management becomes
known, A's stock price will fall relative to B's. Because A and B are
identical economic units, the relative rise in A's cost of capital would
result in a misallocation of resources.4 Professor Brudney argues that
if outside investors do not know which corporations have managers
who trade on inside information, some members of the public will refrain from investing altogether, while others will incur costs to avoid
dealing with executives with nonpublic information. This would raise
the cost of capital for public corporations generally.42
Although these theories seem plausible, another commentator
points out that ethical managers do not publicize their abstention from
inside trading.4' Moreover, companies do not vigorously monitor employee trading on nonpublic information, much less publicize such efforts.44 If the above theories are correct, it seems curious that
companies are not using these methods to decrease their relative cost of
capital. A possible explanation is that public investors are really not so
averse to dealing with inside traders.
In summary, the supposed beneficial and harmful effects of inside
trading on society are quite speculative. Therefore, the controversy has
shifted to its effect on individuals. If stock market inside trading does
harm individuals, that may be sufficient reason for prohibiting such
trading, and the debate over the indirect societal effects is less important.
40. Mendelson, su.pra note 21, at 477-78.
41. Id.
42. Brudney, supra note 34, at 355-56.
43. Dooley, supra note 39, at 48.
44. See note 73 and accompanying text infra.
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III.

INDIVIDUAL HARM FROM INSIDE TRADING ON THE
IMPERSONAL STOCK MARKET
A.

ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE ISSUER

Although the New York Court of Appeals in Diamond v. Oreamuno
suggested that trading by corporate executives harmed the reputation
of the corporation, a5 this harm is highly speculative. 6 It is unclear why
customers or suppliers would be less willing to deal with a firm whose
executives have traded on nonpublic information. Stock transactions
take place between outside parties, with no effect on the business opera4
tions of the issuer of the security being traded.
Nevertheless, as previously mentioned,4 8 if corporate executives
acquired a reputation for inside trading, public investors might feel that
management was collecting more than its share of the earnings (or capital gains) of the stock. The price of the stock would tend to fall, and
the firm's cost of capital would rise relative to that of other companies.
The corporation would be worse off if it issued new shares. In short,
the issuer may be adversely affected by inside trading in its stock.
B.

HARM TO SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALS CAUSED BY A STOCK TRADE
ON NONPUBLIC INFORMATION

This section briefly describes how the stock market functions; discusses
who might be in privity with an inside trader; explains why the party in
privity is not necessarily harmed; and analyzes who is damaged by an
inside trade.
45. 24 N.Y.2d 494, 499, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 81 (1969) (suggesting that the
company may be injured but not premising liability on the injury). This case is discussed in Note,
A Re-Evaluation ofFederaland State Regulation ofInsider Tradingin the Open SecuritiesMarket,
58 WASH. U.L.Q. 915, 920-22 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Re-Evaluation]. See also Schein v.
Chasen, 478 F.2d 817, 822-23 (2d Cir. 1973) ("IThe prestige and goodwill of the corporation may
be tarnished by the public revelation that the director has been involved in unethical conduct."),
vacatedandremandedsubnom. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974); Note, Common Law
CorporateRecoveryfor Trading on Non-Public Information, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1974).
46. See Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F.2d 796, 799 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that
Diamond predicated an accounting of profits upon a fiduciary duty without an allegation and
showing of injury); f Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 196 (7th Cir. 1978) (rejecting Diamond);
Schein v. Chasen, 313 So. 2d 739, 746 (Fla. 1975) (rejecting Diamond); B. RIDER & L. FFRENCH,
supra note 21, at 4-5; Re-Evaluation,supra note 45, at 922-24.
47. But cf. Scott, supra note 39, at 814-15 (Employee trading on nonpublic information may
sometimes harm the issuer by feeding the rumor mill at a time when the issuer's purposes require
secrecy.).
48. See text accompanying notes 40-41 supra.
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1. How the Stock Market Functions

An organized stock exchange is not really a continuous auction market.
When a member of the public gives his broker an order to buy or sell
"at the market," that order may be executed with a specialist dealing

for his own account.49 Specialists and their over-the-counter50 counter-

parts, market-makers, make a living by dealing in certain stocks, much
like dealers in used cars, rare coins, or art." If a public investor wants

to buy, the specialist or market-maker sells at his "ask" price quotation;
if a public investor wants to sell, the specialist or market-maker buys at
his "bid" price quotation, which is lower than his ask price. With both
over-the-counter and exchange-listed stocks, usually more than one

market-maker or specialist trades in a given stock. For example, stocks
listed on the New York Stock Exchange are traded by specialists on

regional exchanges as well as market-makers in the over-the-counter
52
market.
49. For general descriptions of specialist activities, see IIA E. GADSBY, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: THE FEDERAL SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 § 2.01[] (1980); G. LEFFLER, THE
STOCK MARKET 203-18 (3d ed. 1963); 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1201-08 (2d ed. 1961 &
Supp. 1962); 5 id. at 3206-25 (2d ed. Supp. 1969); NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, THE SPECIALIST
AND His JOB (1978); NEw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, UNDERSTANDING THE NEW YORK STOCK
EXCHANGE (1976); S.ROBBINS, THE SECURITIES MARKETS 191-201 (1966); B. SCHULTZ, THE SECURITIES MARKET-AND How IT WORKS 124-52 (rev. ed. A. Squier 1963); D. VAGTS, BASIC
CORPORATION LAW 544-50 (2d ed. 1979) (excerpts from Special Study of the Securities Markets,

H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 40-48 (1963)); Hearingson Sef-Regulation in the
Securities Industry Before the Subcomm on Securities ofthe Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing
and UrbanAffairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 4, at 1-216 (1972) (Case Study on Regulation of Specialists on the New York and American Stock Exchanges); Fiske, Can the Specialist System Cope
With theAge ofBlock TradingZ 3 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Aug. 1969, at 29, reprintedin 2 SEC.
L. REv. 599 (1970); Wolfson & Russo, The Stock Exchange Specialist, 4 REv. SEC. REG. 897
(1971); Wolfson & Russo, The Stock Exchange Specialist: An Economic andLegalAnalysis, 1970
DUKE L.J. 707; Note, The DownstairsInsider: The Specialist andRule JOb-S 42 N.Y.U. L. REv.
695 (1967).
50. For a description of the over-the-counter market, see 1IA E. GADSBY,supra note 49,
§9 2.01[2], .04[l]; 3B H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 2, § 12.03; D. VAGTS, supra note 49, at 550-57.
51.

For a general description of how American securities markets function, see W. CARY,

CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS app. E (4th ed. 1969); W. ErrEMAN & C. DICE, THE
STOCK MARKET (4th ed. 1966); SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITIES, SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 93D CONG., IST SESS., SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY 89-94

(Comm. Print 1973), reprinted in R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES
AND MATERIALS 9-14 (4th ed. 1977).
In his pathbreaking discussion of the market effects of inside trading, Professor Henry Manne
ignored the role of specialists and market-makers, presumably for simplicity. See H. MANNE,
sIupra note 20, at 77-110.
52. Over-the-counter trading in New York Stock Exchange listed stocks is called the third
market. For a discussion of the third market, see N. WOLFSON, R. PHILLIPS & T. RUSSO, REGULATION OF BROKERS, DEALERS, AND SECURITIES MARKETS § 12.20 (1977 & Supp. 1979); Pozen,
Competition andRegulation in the Stock Markets, 73 MICH. L. REv. 317, 379-82 (1974). See also
SEC Release No. 34-17744 (April 21, 1981), reprintedin [1981] SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) #600,
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In addition, a specialist frequently trades not for his own account
but on behalf of some public customer who has entered a limit order to
buy or sell at a certain price. Finally, floor brokers with public orders
to "buy at the market" sometimes trade with each other around the
specialist's booth rather than with the specialist himself. This phenomenon is known as "trading in the crowd."
2. Who Might Be in Priviy With an Inside Trader
When an inside trader telephones his stockbroker with an order to buy
a New York or American Stock Exchange listed stock "at the market,"
the party in privity could be: 3
1. A member of the public who has left a limit order with a New
York or American Stock Exchange specialist to buy or sell at a certain
price;
2. A member of the public who gave a market order and whose
floor broker traded with the inside trader's floor broker around the
New York or American Stock Exchange specialist's booth;
3. The New York or American Stock Exchange specialist for his
own account;
4. A specialist on a regional stock exchange for his own account;
or
5. An over-the-counter market-maker who buys and sells stock
listed on the New York or American Stock Exchange (a so-called third
market-maker). 4
If the inside trader gives his broker a market order to purchase a
stock listed only on a regional exchange, the party in privity might be a
member of the public, the regional specialist, or an over-the-counter
market-maker. With an inside trade in a stock traded only over-thecounter, the party in privity would be a market-maker.
at G-1; SEC Release No. 34-17516 (Feb. 5, 1981), reprintedin [1981] SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
#590, at H-i; SEC RULE 19c-3, announcedin SEC RELEASE No. 34-16888 (JuNE 11, 1980), reprintedin [1980] SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) #558, at F-I; SEC Reg. § 240.19c-3 (1980), reprinted
in 3 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 26,298C; [1980] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,608; 1IA E. GADSBY, supra note 49, § 2.05[4]; SEC Chief Urges Computer Linkup in '81 to Hep Broker-Dealersin
Stock Trades, Wall St. J., Oct. 6, 1980, at 5, col. 1.

53. See note 49 supra.
54.

See note 52 supra.
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Why the Party in Privity Is Not Necessarily Harmed by an Inside
Trade

Whether the party in privity with an inside trader is a member of the
public or a specialist/market-maker, the party in privity may not be
damaged by an inside trade. If the inside trade is executed over-thecounter, the party in privity is a market-maker. If the trade is on a

stock exchange, the party in privity will be in one of the first four
classes listed above. The public investor with a market order (class
two) would definitely have traded with someone else-probably the
specialist-in the absence of the inside trade. The public investor with
a limit order (class one) might also have traded with someone else ab-

sent the inside trade, depending on how prices moved subsequently.55

If the party in privity is a specialist or market-maker, his damage
is determined by comparing his actual inventory at the time of disclo-

sure with the inventory he would have had in the absence of the inside
trade. Unfortunately, the second figure is impossible to determine.

Unlike a public investor, a specialist/market-maker does not have
complete control over his inventory. Because more public investors
will sell and fewer will buy when there is an increase in the bid and ask
prices quoted by the intermediary, the specialist/market-maker's in-

ventory will be increased. Similarly, because fewer investors will sell
and more will buy, a decrease in the specialist/market-maker's prices
will tend to decrease his inventory. Nevertheless, the intermediary

does not know exactly what effect a price change will have.
The following example demonstrates the difficulty of determining
55. After transacting with an inside trader, a public investor may reinstate his original position by selling the shares he purchased or buying back the same type of shares he sold. If so, a
fallback argument can be made that the party in privity was not damaged. Assuming that the
inside trader induced the party in privity to trade, the latter has transferred the harm to someone
else. This argument assumes that the party in privity's first transaction was a but for cause of the
second transaction. With a publicly traded security, this possibility is overwhelmingly likely. For
example, someone with no previous holdings may buy 100 shares from the inside trader and then
sell at a slight profit. The second sale is obviously connected to the first.
Even if the party in privity already owned 1000 shares prior to buying 100 shares from the
inside trader, a subsequent decision to sell 100 shares is logically linked to the earlier purchase. A
rational investor has a certain inventory with which he feels comfortable. The second transaction
indicates that the party in privity felt comfortable with 1000 shares. Had he not purchased the 100
shares from the inside trader, increasing his inventory to 1100, he would not have sold, since he
would already hold his desired number of shares.
Similarly, if the party in privity had prior holdings of 1000 shares, bought 100 shares (from
the inside trader), and then sold 300 shares, the sale would indicate that the party in privity felt
comfortable with 800 shares. Had he not bought the 100 shares (increasing his inventory to 1100),
he would have sold only 200 shares, to reduce his inventory to the 800-share level at which he felt
comfortable.
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whether an inside trade has helped or harmed a specialist/marketmaker. Suppose that the inside trader bought 100 shares from a specialist, thereby reducing the latter's inventory from 1100 shares to 1000,
and that the specialist kept his prices absolutely stable. Purchases and
sales cancel each other, so that at the time of disclosure of the good
news the specialist's inventory was 1000 shares.
The following are two scenarios that might have happened absent
the inside trade. Because the specialist wanted to decrease his inventory to 1000 and because there was no inside trade resulting in that
reduction, the specialist lowered his prices. His inventory could have
been 800 at the time of disclosure of the good news. Alternatively, after
the specialist lowered his prices, his inventory could have initially decreased to 800; but before disclosure he could have compensated for the
excess decrease by raising his prices, and his inventory could have unexpectedly risen to 1300 by the time of disclosure.
In the first case, the inside trade has made the specialist considerably worse off. Indeed, the harm to the specialist exceeds the gain to the
inside trader. In the second case, the inside trade has made the specialist better off. This hypothetical situation is quite simple; in reality the
specialist will have altered his prices many times between the time of
the inside trade and the time of the public disclosure.
The problem is that the inside trade changes the specialist/marketmaker's inventory. This change in inventory may create a pattern of
price quotations different from the one that would have existed absent
the trade. Such an altered pattern will create different reactions by the
public and by competing specialists and market-makers. To determine
the effect of this new price pattern on the intermediary in privity with
an inside trader, it is necessary to recreate the pattern that would have
prevailed absent the inside trade and to ascertain the consequence of
that pattern on the intermediary's inventory. Unfortunately, this is impossible. Therefore, a specialist/market-maker cannot demonstrate
harm from an inside trade.
4. The Law of Conservation of Securities

Despite the suggestions of some commentators that market participants
are generally not harmed by inside trading,56 each act of inside trading
56. Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 315 F. Supp. 42, 44 (1970);
rev'd on othergrounds, 474 F.2d 514 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973); 3 A. BROMBERO &
L. LOWENFES, supra note 2, § 8.7(2), at 217 & nn.75-76 ("[Inside] trading causes no damage",

Bromberg makes almost the opposite statement later on the same page, however: "Except for
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does in fact harm other individuals. 7 With a purchase of an existing
issue of securities, someone has less of that issue; with a sale of an existing issue, someone ultimately acquires more of that issue. This phenomenon is labeled "The Law of Conservation of Securities." This law
has three corollaries:
1. When someone trades on nonpublic information, the group of
all other investors suffers a net loss. (Some members of this group gain,
others lose; but the losses will exceed gains.)
2. The group's net loss is equivalent to the inside trader's gain.
3. To the extent that some outside investors gain from an inside
trade, those harmed by the trade will lose more than the inside trader's
gain.
5.

Who Bears the Net Loss Caused by an Inside Trade

The Law of Conservation of Securities could work in one or both of
two ways. The inside trade could induce opposite trade transactions
that otherwise would not have occurred, or preempt trades of the same
type that otherwise would have occurred. Thus, there are at least two
categories of people harmed by an inside trade: those who would not
have made bad purchases or sales but for the inside trade; and those
who would have made good purchases or sales but for the inside
trade.5
a. Inducedadverse trades: An inside purchase could be a but for
cause of many different transactions. Sellers in these induced transacwhat insiders as a group take out, the net effect on the market. . . is zero."); Dooley, supra note
39, at 33, 36, 55, 68; Note, Damages to Uninformed Traders/orInsider Trading on Impersonal
Exchanges, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 299, 310, 316, 317 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Damages to Uninformed Traders];Note, Civil Liability Under Section lob and Rule 10b-5: A SuggestionforReplacing the DoctrineofPrivity, 74 YALE L.J. 658, 675-76, 679 (1965). Cf. H. MANNE, supra note 20, at
93-104 (outsiders as a group do not necessarily suffer a net loss as a result of insider trading);
Ratner, Federaland State Roles in the Regulation of Insider Trading, 31 Bus. LAW. 947, 966-67
(1976) (Mundheim discussion following article) (market participants generally not harmed); W.
PAINTER, supra note 2, § 5.10, at 249 ("[In a perfectly functioning econometric model, investors
. . . might realize that insider trading does not really "hurt" them directly.. .), 195 ("open market investors are not even hypothetically harmed by insider trading in a monetary sense, assuming
of course that the insider trading does not somehow induce public trading by its effect on the
market price .
.
57. Comment, InsiderTrading Wfithout Disclosure-TheoryofLiability, 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 472,
477 (1967); Note, Insider's Liability UnderRule lOb-Sfor the Illegal PurchaseofActively Traded
Securities, 78 YALE L. 864, 872 (1969). See Scott, supra note 39, at 807, 809.
58. See H. MANNE, supra note 20, at 103; Whitney, Section 10b-S: From Cady, Roberts to
Texas Guf: MattersofDisclosure, 21 Bus. LAW. 193, 201 (1965); Note, supra note 57, at 872 n.45.
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tions are adversely affected because they miss the increase in value after the public announcement of good news. Similarly, an inside sale
could be a but for cause of transactions in which buyers suffer a windfall loss when the bad news is announced.
There are many ways by which an inside trade could directly or
indirectly induce transactions that otherwise would not have occurred.
If the party in privity had a limit order, there is a remote possibility
that the order would not have been executed but for the inside trade.
The most common way by which an inside trade induces transactions,
however, is by altering the behavior of a specialist or market-maker.
Whether or not the party in privity is a specialist/market-maker, the
inside trade probably affects an intermediary's inventory. If the inside
trader is in privity with the specialist/market-maker, the intermediary's
inventory is directly affected. Even if the inside trader deals with a
public investor, a trade has probably been diverted from a specialist or
market-maker. This direct or indirect change in the intermediary's inventory may precipitate a different pattern of price quotations and
transactions by him. In transactions that otherwise would not have occurred, either the buyer or seller is harmed-depending upon whether
the nonpublic information is good or bad.
Although it is unlikely, the additional volume or price movement
caused by a large inside trade conceivably might attract trend-riding
speculators and create an avalanche effect that would harm all those
who sold into good news or bought into bad news.
b. Preempted/raders:Instead of inducing opposite trade transactions, an inside trade may preempt trades of the same type. 9 When an
inside trade directly or indirectly changes a specialist/market-maker's
inventory, the new pattern of quotations may either induce new transactions or deter ones that would otherwise have occurred. For example, if an inside trade increases a market-maker's inventory, he may
lower his price quotations to encourage purchases from him and deter
sales to him. If an inside trade decreases the market-maker's inventory,
he may increase his prices to encourage sales to him and deter
purchases from him.
c.

The practicaldifculty of identfying those harmed by an inside

trade: The foregoing analysis demonstrates that after an inside trade,
59. H. MAtN, supra note 20, at 103; Whitney, sufra note 58, at 201; Note, supra note 57, at
872 n.45.
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the universe is different than it would have been in the absence of the
trade. In practice, however, it is virtually impossible to recreate the
universe that would have existed had there been no inside trade.
If the party in privity, P, is a specialist/market-maker, S/M, his
inventory is directly affected by the trade. If P is a member of the
public, a S/M's inventory is indirectly affected by the trade for one of
the following reasons: (1) P would otherwise have traded with a
S/M; (2) P would have traded with X, who instead traded with a
S/M; (3) P would have traded with X, who instead traded with Y,
who would have traded with a S/M, and so on.
It is impossible to determine how the inside trade's direct or indirect effect on an intermediary's inventory altered the intermediary's
price quotations, and how these in turn affected the behavior of public
investors. The following diagram illustrates the problem (the arrows
indicate the direction of the stock transfers):
trades with
P
-E
1. T (an inside trader)
(directly or indirectly
affecting the
inventory of S/M)
2. SIM alters his price
quotations and either:
a. S/M (sells)

> B1, B 2 . . .

(preempting X1 , X2
...
who otherwise
would have sold)
OR
b. SIM (buys)

(who otherwise
would not have
bought)
S1, S2...

(preempting Y, Y2 (who otherwise
...
who otherwise
would not have
would have bought) sold)
It is therefore extremely difficult to allocate an inside trade's harm between intermediaries, outside marginal buyers or sellers, and outside
marginal nonbuyers and nonsellers.
Such difficulty is not confined to securities markets. Suppose .4
owns a small car rental agency and secretly learns that a certain make
of car has a serious defect. A owns five cars of this make and sells all of
them to a large used car dealer, who still owns these cars at the time the
defect is made public and prices drop. It is possible that in both the
universe in whichA sold the five cars and the one in which he did not,
the dealer would have the same inventory at the time of the public

HeinOnline -- 54 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1237 1980-1981

1238

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA L4WREVIEW

[Vol. 54:1217

announcement of the defect. In the first universe, prior to the announcement, the dealer may have lowered his prices or raised them less

than he otherwise would have. These lower prices may have attracted
purchasers or deterred sellers or both. Thus, in the first universe, some

members of the public may find themselves owning defective cars who
would not have owned them in the second universe.
Recreating the hypothetical second universe, however, is almost

impossible. Both the used car dealer and his purchasers will give selfserving testimony. Regardless how low the level of his inventory was at
the time of the announcement, the dealer will claim that his inventory
would have been even lower hadA not sold him the five cars. Regardless how high the prices actually charged by the dealer were during the
period between A's sale and the public announcement, outside buyers

will claim that A's sale caused the dealer to charge lower prices than
otherwise, and that but for these lower prices, the outsiders would not
have bought. Outside nonsellers will claim that A's sale caused the

dealer to charge lower prices than otherwise, and that but for these
lower prices, the nonsellers would have sold. In summary, the Law of

Conservation of Securities indicates that although an inside trade does
harm specific individuals, identifying them is almost impossible.6"
60. In unusual situations, it may be possible to identify the probable victims of an inside
transaction in a publicly traded stock. When the stock is very thinly traded, transactions may be
so isolated that a plaintiff could argue persuasively that, but for defendant's trade, plaintiff would
have had a smaller (or larger) holding of the stock. In addition, institutions and block-trading
firms dealing in large amounts of shares occasionally may operate in what is in effect a separate
market with isolated transactions. In this block-trading market, a plaintiff might be able to
demonstrate that but for the defendant's trade the plaintiff would have had a smaller (or larger)
holding of stock. Cf. ALI CODE, supra note 2, § 1702(b), Comment (4) (observing that many
institutional trades are negotiated "offboard" and "crossed" on the floor, and that such trades
would fall within the Federal Securities Code provision covering nonfortuitous transactions not
effected in a stock market).
Calls are options to buy stock; puts are options to sell. Both types of options are issued or
written by private individuals who obligate themselves to buy or sell at a certain price. An option
trade based on nonpublic information also harms specific individuals. If a person buys a call
based on inside information, the purchase either preempts another purchase or elicits the writing
of a new call by someone (not necessarily the party in privity) who would not have done so
otherwise.
In the first case, the person whose purchase is preempted is harmed. In the second case, the
person who writes the additional call is worse off unless he purchases additional shares to "cover"
the call. If the writer's call is "covered," the option buyer (on inside information) in effect has
bought shares with the option writer acting as intermediary. The option writer is not harmed, but
the inside trader's de facto purchase is subject to the Law of Conservation of Securities. Either the
stock purchase preempts another buyer or it attracts a seller of the stock.
The analysis of puts is similar. When a person buys a put based on inside information, the
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6. Price Change Effects on Those TradingAbout the Same Time as
the Inside Trade

If a substantial purchase or sale based on nonpublic information causes
the specialist or market-maker to change his price quotations, those en-

gaging in the same type of transaction at approximately the same time
as the inside trade (the "same type" class) will either pay more or re-

ceive less than they otherwise would. For example, after selling to an
inside trader, a specialist or market-maker might increase price quota-

tions; after buying from an inside trader, a specialist or market-maker
might decrease his prices. On organized stock exchanges, changes in
specialist price quotations would affect the prices of brokers "trading in
the crowd" around the specialist's booth. In short, if an inside purchase
increases the market price, those purchasing at about the same time

will pay more. If an inside sale decreases the market price, those selling at about the same time will receive less.

1

Although the members of the same type class are unquestionably

worse off, those with whom they transact (the "opposite type" class) are
purchase either preempts another option purchase or causes a new put to be written by someone.
The writer of the new put may or may not cover himself by short selling the stock.
When a person trades in puts or calls based on nonpublic information, the harm is especially
difficult to trace. It may fall on: (1) a person who has been induced to write an option, (2) a
preempted would-be option purchaser, (3) someone who would not have traded the stock but for
a stock trade by the option writer, or (4) someone who would have traded the stock but for a stock
trade by the option writer. For a simpler discussion of insider purchases of calls omitting the
"crowding out" complication, see H. MANNE, supra note 20, at 90-91.
For a general discussion of option trading, see SEC, Report of the SpecialStudy of the Options

Market (Committee Print for the use of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 1979), Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15569, ch. II (Feb. 15, 1979); G. GASTINEAU,
THE STOCK OPTIONS MANUAL (2d ed. 1979); OPTION TRADING (L. Merrifield, chairman, 1974)
(PLI Course Handbook No. 146); Johnson, Is It Better To Go Nakedin the Street? A Primeron the
OptionsMarket, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW 7 (1979); Lipton, The SpecialStudy ofthe OptionsMarkets:
Its Findings andRecommendations, 7 SEC. REG. L.J. 299, 305-07 (1980).

61. This phenomenon is sometimes called loss causation, as distinguished from transaction
causation. Cf. Falls v. Fickling, 621 F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1980) (Public announcement of material
information prior to sheriff's sale would have brought substantially higher bids than those actually
received absent the disclosure; therefore, nondisclosure by bidders in actual sheriff's sale harmed
plaintiff.). See also Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (bond purchaser has
cause of action if he can prove that he reasonably relied on integrity of market to protect him from
bonds not entitled to be marketed); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906-08 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380-81 (2d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975); 3A H. BLOOMETHAL, supra note 2, § 9.21[5][b]; 3 A.
BROMBERO & L. LOWENFELS, supra note 2, § 8.7(1), at 216; 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 2, § 64.03, at
3-226 to -227; R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 51, at 1066; W. PAINTER, supra note 2, at 187,
206-07; Note, The Reliance Requirement in PrivateActions Under SEC Rule lOb-i, 88 HARV. L.

RaV. 584, 592-96 (1975).
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better off.62 Members of the same type class, however, are unsympathetic figures. Along with the inside trader, they are either buying into a windfall gain or selling into a windfall avoidance of loss. On
the other hand, members of the opposite type class are selling into a
fortuitous avoidance of gain or buying into a fortuitous loss. The price
change induced by the inside trade decreases the extent of these various
undeserved fortuities. Arguably, this is beneficial.63
C.

HARM TO SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALS CAUSED BY
THE NONDISCLOSURE

1. Moral or Legal Causation
A stock market inside trader fails to disclose the nonpublic information
to both the party in privity and the world. As noted in Part III(B)
above, the typical inside trade harms neither the party in privity nor the
overwhelming majority of investors. Normally, the inside trader is a
total stranger to the party in privity and other investors. If the inside
trader were to disclose to a stranger who would be unharmed by the
trade, the inside trader would be acting like a Good Samaritan.64 If the
inside trader had disclosed to the party in privity, the latter would have
traded at a different price or not at all. Had the inside trader decided to
be a quasi-Samaritan and disseminated the secret information to the
investing public, the universe would have been dramatically different.
In the case of favorable information, the price would have been higher.
Sellers would have benefited, and buyers would have been harmed.
Many individuals would have abstained from selling once they knew
the good news. With adverse news, the price would have dropped.
Buyers would have been better off, and sellers would have been
harmed. Many investors would have abstained from buying once they
knew the bad news.
If the inside trader does not engage in any quasi-Samaritan disclosure, the question is whether he has morally or legally harmed all those
who would have been better off had he disclosed. This is the issue of
62. See Manne, In Defense of Insider Trading 44 HARV. Bus. REV. 113 (1966), reprintedin
130,
132 (1980). Cf.Stromfeld v. Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 484 F. Supp. 1264, 1270, 496 F. Supp.
1084, 1086 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (amended complaint) (If the price of A & P common stock was artifidally depressed by defendants' section 10(b) and 13(d) violations, plaintiff buyers actually benefited by paying less for the stock than it was actually worth.).
63. See text accompanying notes 28-31 supra. But see note 32 and accompanying text supra
R. POSNER & A. SCOTT, ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION

(suggesting that inside trading would not have a significant effect on stock prices).
64.

Henceforth, such an obligation to disclose will be referred to as a "quasi-Samaritan"

duty.
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moral or legal causation. An individual's inaction can be said to cause

harm to another if there is a preexisting duty to act.65 For example,
because a parent has a duty to care for his child, if he does not feed his

child he is said to have morally or legally caused the infant's subsequent death. A next door neighbor who knows of the starvation may or

may not have caused the death, depending upon whether he owes a
duty to the child. An affluent American may be said to have caused the
death of starving children in developing nations only if it is determined
that he has a duty to save them.6 6 Thus, whether an inside trader morally or legally causes harm to those who would have been better off

with earlier disclosure depends upon whether it can be said that the
67
inside trader has a quasi-Samaritan duty to rescue total strangers.

2.

CausationAnomaly

If the quasi-Samaritan duty to disclose or to rescue is not absolute, but

is contingent on some act by the information possessor, a causation
anomaly arises. The information possessor may claim that his choice
was between two courses of conduct, one illegal and one legal, both of
which would result in the same harm to the plaintiff. Indeed, the illegal
course of conduct might result in less harm. Arguably then, choosing
the illegal course of conduct did not cause harm to the plaintiff.
The following hypothetical illustrates this causation problem.
Suppose a physician sees an injured person on the street. He has three

alternatives:
65. One commentator labels this approach the "responsibility"

thesis. Mack, Bad

Samaritanismand the Causationof Harm, 9 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF. 230, 235-41 (1980), citing
Casey, Actions and Consequences, in MORALITY AND MORAL REASONING (J. Casey ed. 1971); E.
D'ARCY, HUMAN ACTS (1963); R. NOzIcK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 191-92 (1974); J.
THOMPSON, ACTS AND OTHER EVENTS 212-17 (1977).
66. Cf. Gregory, GratuitousUndertakingsand the Duty of Care, 1 DEPAUL L. REv. 30, 34-35
(1951) (discussion of duty of passerby to assist stranger in distress on the street).

67. This analysis is analogous to the distinction between but for cause and proximate cause.
Out of the vast array of but for causes of an injury, liability is imposed only where there is proximate cause, which could be described as existing in those situations where the defendant owes a
legal duty of care to the plaintiff. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 42, at 244
(4th ed. 1971); Mack, supra note 65, at 244-45.
Mack rejects the notion that a failure to rescue causes harm when the harm would have
occurred without the rescue. He defines as the but for causes of an event all those conditions
jointly and individually necessary to it. If A, B, and C are sufficient and necessary to cause Y
Mack argues that it is meaningless to say that failure to prevent B is a cause of Y. Mack, supra
note 65, at 257-59. Similarly, in the criminal law, inaction alone is not sufficient to impose liability
"unless: (a) the omission is expressly made sufficient by the law defining the offense [e.g. failing
to register for the draft]; or (b) a duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law."
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(3), Illustrations (1962).
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1. Stop and give adequate medical care;
2. Stop and give inadequate medical care;
3. Not stop.

In Anglo-American jurisprudence, options one and three are permissible, but option two is not.68 Suppose the physician chooses option two,
and the injured person is permanently handicapped. Had the physician chosen option one, the injured person would have fully recovered.

Had he chosen option three, the injured person would have died.
It is not clear, then, that he caused the harm to the injured person.
The physician could claim that had he not chosen option two, he would

have chosen option three over option one. The actual choice was between options two and three; by choosing option two, he made the injured person better off. The victim could still demonstrate but for
causation if he could prove that the physician would have chosen op-

tion one over option three despite his allegation to the contrary. The
victim could demonstrate moral or legal causation if it were conclusively presumed that the physician would have chosen option one over
option three, or that the physician's stopping triggered a duty to choose
option one. Although the law could create bootstrap causation by either a conclusive presumption or a triggered duty approach, the claim
that the injured person is no worse off and, perhaps, even better off,
69
than if the physician had failed to act at all, would still be troubling.

Similarly, suppose that someone with nonpublic information
about a security has no absolute duty to disclose the news to anyone, 0
just as the doctor had no duty to rescue. If he trades, however, he must
disclose, just as the physician must be diligent if he renders assistance.

An information possessor who trades without disclosing might argue
68. W. PROSSER, supra note 67, § 56, at 343-48; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 323,
324 (1965).
69. For discussions of the tort liability of Good Samaritans, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 323, Illustrations (1965); Note, GoodSamaritansandLiabiliyfor MedicalMapractice, 64
COLUM. L. Rnv. 1301, 1301-15 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Good Samaritans and Liability]; Comment, GoodSamaritan Laws-GoodorBad, 15 MERCER L. REV. 477 (1964); Comment, Criticism
of Existing Good Samaritan Statutes, 42 ORE. L. REV. 328 (1963); Note, Good Samaritansand
HospitalEmergencies, 54 S. CAL. L. Rv. 417, 419-23 (1981); Note, The Good Samaritan and the
Law, 32 TENN. L. Rnv. 287, 288 (1965); Note, Florida'sProposed Good Samaritan Statute-It
Does Not Meet the Problem, 17 U. FLA. L. REV. 586, 588-90 (1965); Comment, Pennsylvania'r
Good Samaritan Statute-An Answer to the MedicalProfession's Dilemma, 10 VILL. L. REv. 130
(1964); Note, Good SamaritanStatutes: Timefor Unformity, 27 WAYNE L. REV. 217 (1980); Comment, Physicians--CivilLiabiliayforTreatmentRendered at the Scene of Emergency, 1964 Wis. L.
Rnv. 494 (1964).
70. For discussions of an issuing corporation's possible affirmative duty to disclose material
corporate developments, see sources cited in note 38 supra.
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that had he not utilized the information he would have done nothing,
and the various plaintiffs would have been harmed to the same extent
anyway, just as the injured person in the street would have been no
better off had the physician not stopped. The law could answer such a
contention by asserting either that there is a conclusive presumption
that the information possessor would have disclosed rather than do
nothing, or that the trade triggered an absolute duty to rescue some or
all of those who would be better off with disclosure. This bootstrap
causation would still not eliminate the anomaly.
This causation anomaly may be more readily understood in the
close corporation context. Suppose the president and majority shareholder of a farming corporation knows that oil is likely to lie under the
property owned by the company. Coincidentally, F, who owns five
percent of the company, announces that all his stock is for sale. Several
neighboring farmers offer to pay F's asking price. F is about to accept
one of the neighbor's offers, when the president X offers more than the
asking price. Although the two are enemies, F sells to X. Arguably, F
is benefited rather than harmed by X's purchase because otherwise F
would have sold at a lower price.
X had three choices upon learning about the oil:
1. Buy the shares without disclosure, thereby enriching himself at
of either F or one of the neighbors;
cost
the
2. Do nothing and allow one of the neighbors to buy the shares,
thereby enriching one of the neighbors at the cost of either X or F;
3. Disclose the oil potential to F thereby enriching F at the cost
of either X or one of the neighbors.
Options two and three are clearly permissible. By choosing the
first option rather than the second or third, X has harmed either F or
one of the neighbors. If option one were eliminated, and X had chosen
option two, the harm would have fallen on one of the neighbors rather
than on F X has an incentive so to testify, because he can then advance a harmless error defense against F by claiming that option two
would have produced the same loss to F. The neighbors lack standing
to sue under rule 10b-5, 7 ' but even without the standing problem, it is
impossible to know which of the neighbors was harmed unless F can
specify the neighbor to whom he would have sold. If Fs decision depended on which neighbor was willing to sweeten terms, the answer
71.

Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
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would depend on the self-serving testimony of the neighbors as to what
they would have done had X not preempted them. The analysis becomes even more complicated if after X bought, one or more of the
neighbors purchased shares in a nearby incorporated farm on which oil
was subsequently discovered.
All these problems are avoided if it is conclusively presumed that
X would have chosen option three over option two (were option one
eliminated); or if X's choice of option one triggered a quasi-Samaritan
duty to have already performed option three (disclosure to F). In either event, F could recover.
The same anomaly occurs with sales on adverse nonpublic information. Suppose A is one of ten shareholders in a corporation that
owns one resort hotel. The other shareholders are allA's good friends.
A is the only person who knows there is a landslide problem on the site
of the hotel. B is seriously considering buying shares from either of
two of A's fellow shareholders. Without revealing the landslide problem, A offers to sell at a lower price. B buys A's shares.72 After the
deal is closed, a heavy rain causes major landslide damage to the hotel.
.4 had three choices:
1. Sell his shares, thereby enriching himself at the cost of either
the buyer or one of the two fellow shareholders;
2. Do nothing to interfere with the buyer's purchase from one of
the two fellow shareholders, thereby enriching one of the two fellow
shareholders at the cost of either the buyer or himself; or
3. Disclose the landslide problem to the prospective buyer,
thereby enriching the prospective buyer at the cost of either himself or
one of the two fellow shareholders.
As before, options two and three are clearly permissible. By
choosing the first option rather than the second or third, A harmed
either the buyer or one of the two fellow shareholders, but it is difficult
to identify which. A has an incentive to state that if option one were
precluded, he would have chosen option two over three. Then the victim of option one would be one of the two fellow shareholders, both of
72. This hypothetical assumes that the sale is covered by the federal securities laws. See
Mitffin Energy Sources, Inc. v. Brooks, 501 F. Supp. 334 (W.D. Pa. 1980). But e. Frederiksen v.
Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3006 (1981) (When purchaser of stock

obtains control of a company, the stock purchased is not a "security" under the federal securities
laws.). To bring the hypothetical more clearly within the federal securities laws, the percentage of
the corporation sold could be lowered further.
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whom lack standing to sue under rule lOb-5. Again, B would have
difficulty demonstrating causation unless it were conclusively presumed

that A would have chosen option three over option two (if option one
were precluded); or unless A's choice of option one triggered a quasi-

Samaritan duty already to have performed option three (disclosure to
B).
The farm and resort hotel hypotheticals demonstrate that a causa-

tion anomaly can arise in face to face transactions as well as in impersonal stock market trading. With the latter, however, the problem is

more serious and more likely to occur. A publicly traded security has
more potential buyers and sellers than the farm or resort hotel of the
previous hypotheticals. Also, it is far more likely that if there were no
inside trade, the defendant would have pursued the perfectly legal
course of remaining silent. There is a difference of degree and not of

kind between the occasional causation anomaly in face to face transactions and the inevitable anomaly in stock market trades.

D.

WHY BusINESSMEN MIGHT NOT CONSIDER INSIDE

TRADING IMMORAL

A 1961 survey of 1700 American corporate executives indicated that a
large number of these executives do not consider inside trading to be
particularly immoral.73 There are two principal reasons why a busi73.

Baumhart, How Ethicalare Businessmen, 39 HARV. Bus. REv. 6, 16 (July-Aug. 1961).

When asked what they would do if given material inside information, the response was: 42%
would buy securities themselves, 2% would inform their broker, 14% would tell a friend, 56%
would do nothing. Id. When asked what they thought their colleagues would do in the same
position, those polled felt that: 61% would buy for themselves, 11% would inform their broker,
46% would tell a friend, 29% would do nothing. Id.
For discussion of Baumhart's study, see 2 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note 2,
§ 7.4(4)(b); 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 2, § 6.07, at 1-145 n.5 (1980); B. RIDER & L. FFRENCH, supra
note 21, at 1; Cary, The Direction of Management Responsibility, 18 Bus. LAw. 29, 33 (1962). See
also Note, A Frameworkfor the Allocation of Prevention Resources With a Specfc Application to
Insider Trading 74 MICH. L. REv. 975, 1015-16 (1976). Cf. SEC Cracks Down on Insider Trades,

But Violations.Are Difficult to Prove, Wall St. J., Nov. 12, 1980, at 33, col. 4 ("[SEC suits] represent
a miniscule portion of all infractions"; discussing Lehman Brothers study showing a clear pattern
of pre-announcement buying in stocks of companies that have become targets of tender offers or
are involved in merger negotiations). See also Note, Rule 10b-3 and the Duty to DiscloseMarket
Information: It Takes a Thief, 55 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 93, 94 n.9 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Duty to
Disclose]. But see Takeover Tips." A Sly Scheme to Profitfrom Leaks on MergersRocks Securities

Firms, Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 1981, at 1,col. 6.
Studies of public filings indicate that corporate insiders consistently out-perform the market.
See Finnerty, InsidersandMarketEfficiency, 31 J. FINANCE 1141, 1148 (1976) ("Insiders can and
do identify profitable as well as unprofitable situations within their corporations."); Jaffe, The
Effect ofRegulation Changeson InsiderTradin& 5 BELL J. ECON. & MANAGEMENT ScI. 93, 101-15
(1974); Pratt & DeVere, Relationsho Between Insider Tradingand Rates of Return/orNYSE Coin-
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nessman might not consider inside trading unethical. First, since several commentators have erroneously concluded that such trading
causes no harm to other traders,74 businessmen may be subject to the
same illusion. Second, even if a businessman is vaguely aware that
someone is harmed, the stock market is so impersonal that it is easy to
ignore any harm or to persuade oneself that no one is harmed. If the
victim is someone whose transaction was preempted, the inside trader
could also rationalize that the victim has only been deprived of an undeserved windfall gain or avoidance of loss.
To illustrate, suppose X contracts to purchase a house in a new
development. Subsequently, X learns the secret information that a volcano may erupt nearby and decrease real estate values. X offers the
developer a small amount of cash to rescind the purchase. Because of a
strong demand for units, the developer accepts X's offer. X's unit is
allocated by lottery together with 1000 other remaining units. Only one
out of four prospective home purchasers is able to buy. While X's rescission resulted in someone else owning X's unit, X might rationalize
that the new owner would have bought another unit had X's unit not
been available. If someone pointed out to X that his rescission must
have resulted in one more person's being able to purchase a unit and
losing money when the volcano erupts, X might rationalize that the
lottery is really responsible for the loss or that the homes will eventually go up in price after a delay. Because X never meets any of the
homeowners in the development, and because X cannot know which of
them he actually harmed, X may not feel as unethical as he would if he
were the face to face seller of an older home in the same area.
Moreover, inconsistent ethical standards are often followed in impersonal as opposed to personal dealings. For example, some persons
take improper deductions on income tax returns, 75 while others scrupulously avoid doing so. If a bank credit card company makes an error in
one's favor, some will report the error, while others will remain silent
and feel no guilt. Although it is clear that someone must be worse off
because of the error, the customer who takes advantage of it may rationalize that the bank is rich, that it expects to lose money on errors, or
that it passes the costs on to all customers. Because dealing with a large
mon Stocks, 1960-1966, in MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 268-79 (J.
Lorie & P, Brealey eds. 1972); Scott, supra note 39, at 807-08 & n.24.
74. See note 56 supra.
75. Indeed, many Americans fail to report income. See How Tax Evasion Has Grown, N.Y.

Times, Mar. 15, 1980, § 3, at 1, col. 2.
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bank or the Internal Revenue Service is so impersonal, some individuals feel less guilt or no guilt about cheating these entities.
E.

WHY MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC MIGHT CONSIDER INSIDE
TRADING IMMORAL

The lack of uniformity in the ethics of Americans can be illustrated by
the following hypotheticals, which are listed in increasing order of reprehensibility:
1. A large bank's credit card division underbills a customer. The
customer does not volunteer to pay the extra amount.
2. A bank teller gives a customer too much change. Even though
the customer knows the loss will fall on the teller, the customer does
not correct the error.
3.
bank.

A bank teller embezzles a small amount of cash from the

Almost all Americans would condemn the conduct in hypotheticals two and three. The second involves cheating another individual,
and the third involves a breach of trust or fiduciary duty. By contrast,
the first hypothetical involves an arm's length relationship rather than a
fiduciary one, and the victim is a large institution rather than an individual. American attitudes toward the conduct in hypothetical one are
surprisingly divergent.7 6
Inside trading seems closer to hypotheticals two and three than to
hypothetical one. Although a businessman might rationalize that inside trading causes no harm, he would be wrong. If a corporation's
management has a reputation for inside trading, the company's cost of
capital will rise.7 7 Furthermore, at dissemination, under the Law of
Conservation of Securities, someone has more of a security if an inside
trader has sold, and someone has less of a security if an inside trader
has bought.7" That person is harmed by the inside trade.79 The victim
may be a large institution or a small investor. Thus, even people who
tolerate the conduct in the first hypothetical might disapprove of inside
trading.
Analogously, suppose A is an employee of a whiskey bottler. If he
76. See note 75 and accompanying text supra.
77. See note 40 and accompanying text supra.

78. See text accompanying notes 56-59 supra.
79. The particular victims of inside trading would be harmed even if the presence of inside
trading caused the overall price of equity securities to fall or the price of a specific issue to decline.
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sneaks several bottles of whiskey home and covers the shortage by
short-filling each bottle in one case, A is better off and some consumers
are worse off, even if they do not realize it, and even if overall retail
whiskey prices are somewhat lower because of the possibility of shortfilling. A has more whiskey, and someone else has less. The person
harmed may be a huge hotel chain or an ordinary consumer. Because
A's conduct is more like hypotheticals two and three than hypothetical
one, his behavior would be unanimously condemned.
Although the average American may not think in terms of the cost
of capital or the Law of Conservation of Securities, he probably has a
visceral reaction that inside trading definitely harms someone else in
the market and may harm the issuer. This reaction is absolutely correct. In short, any public antipathy toward inside trading has a valid
foundation.
Even if inside trading were unanimously considered unethical, a
separate question is the extent of an inside trader's civil liability. The
next part of this Article considers the application of SEC rule lOb-5 to
stock market trading on material nonpublic information.
IV. APPLICATION OF SEC RULE lOb-5 TO INSIDE
TRADING ON IMPERSONAL STOCK MARKETS

A.

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION: To WHOM IS THE

DUTY

To DISCLOSE OWED?
SEC rule lOb-5 applies only to fraud. 80 Although an act of stock market inside trading unquestionably harms someone, the inside trader has
no contact with the victim. For an inside trader to violate rule lOb-5,
he must have a duty to disclose before trading. The duty to disclose
could be owed to: the party in privity with the inside trader; the individual to whom the party in privity transmits the harm, if the party in
privity reinstates his original position by repurchasing or reselling; the
victims of the inside trade itself; or the entire world. If an inside trader
cannot identify in advance the potential party in privity or the potential
80. Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). Actually, this case held that rule
lOb-5 requires either manipulation or deceit. Id. at 473-74. Manipulation, however, is a term of
art used to refer to practices intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity
(e.g., wash sales, matched orders, and rigged prices). Id. at 476-77; Hundahl v. United Benefit
Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1349, 1359-62 (N.D. Tex. 1979). The typical trade would not involve
market manipulation in this sense. Therefore, under Sante FeIndustries, an inside trader must be
deceitful in order to violate rule lOb-5. See notes 57-59 supra;notes 178-81, 191-92, and accompanying text infra. See generally Note, Suitsfor Breach of FiduciaryDuty Under Rule 10b.5 After
Sante Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1874 (1978).
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victims of his trade, the duties to the first three possible parties may in
practice require a potential inside trader to disclose to the world first.
If the inside trader does not disclose, however, duties to any of the first
three parties would create a much smaller group of plaintiffs than
would a duty to the world.
1. Duty To Disclose to the Party in Privity
If the potential inside trader is able in advance to identify and disclose
to the potential party in privity, the other individual either would not
trade or would demand a more attractive price. This would eliminate
the advantage of dealing with this particular party. The inside trader
would encounter the same problem if he turned to another potential
buyer or seller. In each case, disclosure would eliminate the benefit of
trading on nonpublic information. Ironically, each revelation to a potential party in privity might itself be grounds for rule 1Ob-5 liability, if
the recipient of the information traded on the basis of the revelation.
By attempting to avoid liability, the initial information possessor would
have incurred it. If the selective revelation is a per se violation even in
the absence of a trade by the tippee,8 1 the initial information possessor
is in violation of the rule whether or not he discloses the information.
Even if the selective revelation is a violation only if the tippee trades,
the initial information possessor risks liability by disclosing to a potential party in privity. On the other hand, selective revelation in the
course of a bona fide attempt to purchase or sell may not violate rule
lOb-5, even if the information recipient trades on the basis of the information.8 2
If the potential party in privity cannot be identified in advance, the
potential inside trader must disclose to the world before trading.
Again, this eliminates the advantage of trading on the information. If
the inside trader transacts without disclosing, however, he will be liable
only to the party on the other side of the transaction.83
Part III(B)(3) of this Article demonstrates that the party in privity
is not necessarily harmed by the inside trade itself. For example, if an
inside trader, T, transacts with 4, the party harmed by the trade might
be X, a preempted trader. The Law of Conservation of Securities does
not preclude harm to both A and X. In fact, X is the only victim of the
81. See notes 125-26, 207 and accompanying text infra.
82. See text accompanying notes 9-10 supra.
83. This assumes that the plaintiff can demonstrate causation. For a discussion of a causation anomaly, see text accompanying notes 68-72 supra.
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transaction,andA is the victim of T's nondisclosure. Had T disclosed,
A would not have traded. By trading without disclosing, T engaged in
both action and inaction. His action was the trade. His inaction was
the failure to disclose. Both the action and the inaction influenced the
universe, which was changed by the trade and would have been different had T disclosed to A.
Two hypotheticals illustrate this point. Suppose that after watching a blackjack dealer, A realizes that the remaining deck is disproportionately rich in high cards, which is advantageous to the player. There
is only one vacant seat at the table, and A takes it just before another
individual is about to sit down. The dealer busts (goes over twentyone) four times in a row and then runs out of cards. Everyone at the
table wins all four times. A's playing harmed the gambler whom A
preempted. A's nondisclosure harmed the casino. Had 4 disclosed to
the dealer that the deck was rich in high cards, he would have reshuffled, and the casino would not have lost repeatedly.
Suppose B has secret information that in one day Rolls Royce Ltd.
will announce it is discontinuing production forever. B goes to a Rolls
Royce dealer and buys a car off the floor. His purchase preempts that
of another customer who was eyeing the same floor model and would
have bought had B not acted first. Because the other floor models do
not interest him, the other customer goes home. The next day, Rolls
Royce Ltd. makes its public announcement, and the prices of all its cars
rise dramatically. B's purchase harmed the other customer; B's nondisclosure harmed the dealer.
These two hypotheticals raise another difficult issue. Had A disclosed to the blackjack dealer, the casino would have avoided losses to
all those sitting at the table. Had B disclosed to the Rolls Royce dealer,
he would have raised all his prices or refused to sell to anyone until the
announcement. In either case, the nondisclosure was a but for cause of
losses far in excess of the gains. Whether it should create liability for
all these losses is an intriguing question. The same situation could easily develop in the stock market when the inside trader deals with a
specialist, market-maker, or other active trader.
2. Duty To Disclose to the Individual to Whom the Party in Privily

May Transmit the Harm of Nondisclosure
Suppose a stock market inside trader deals with someone who, before
public disclosure, regains his original position by reselling or repurchasing. It is extremely likely that the first transaction of the party in
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privity was a but for cause of the second reverse trade. 84 In other
words, the individual in privity with the inside trader has transmitted
the harm of nondisclosure to someone else, who in turn may retransmit
the harm. Because this transmission of the harm is reasonably foreseeable, the inside trader might owe a duty to disclose to the person to
whom the harm has been transmitted at the time of public dissemination. For example, suppose an inside trader, T, trades with A, who
then engages in a reverse transaction with B. T might owe a duty to
disclose to B. Had B known the nonpublic information, he would not
have traded with A, or he would have demanded a more attractive
price.
Even if T's duty to disclose were owed only to A, initially one
might think that B could recover as an indirect but foreseeable victim
of T's nondisclosure. B is not necessarily harmed by the nondisclosure
to A, however. Although disclosure to A might have precluded A's
trades with both T and B, B might have traded with someone else.
Under the Law of Conservation of Securities, someone must be harmed
by A's repurchase or resale, but it is difficult to identify who. In other
words, A's repurchase or resale creates its own trade victim, who is
different from the victim of the inside trade itself. This phenomenon is
illustrated in the following diagram:
trades with
trades with
B
A
T
(preempting or
(preempting or
inducing Y)
inducing X)
Again, the Law of Conservation of Securities does not preclude
there being two victims of T's conduct. X is the victim of T's transaction. Y is the victim of T's nondisclosure to A. Had T disclosed to A,
the latter would not have traded with T, traded with B, and preempted
Y. Y would have held more of a good security or less of a bad security.
3. Duty To Disclose to the Victims of the Inside Trade Itself
If it were possible to disclose only to the potential victim of the inside
trade itself, there would be some curious results. The inside trade
could either induce or preempt a transaction by the potential victim
(Trade Victim One). If Trade Victim One were an induced trader, as
opposed to a preempted trader, he would abstain from trading if the
inside trader disclosed the information to him alone. This in turn
might transfer the potential harm to another victim (Trade Victim
84. See note 55 and text accompanying notes 9-10 supra.
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Two). Disclosure to Trade Victim Two would transfer the potential
harm to a third victim, and so on. At first, this chain might seem to go
on indefinitely. Complications would arise, however, if any potential
trade victim in the chain, including Trade Victim One, were a preempted trader, rather than an induced trader. Such a potential victim
probably would himself violate rule lOb-5 by utilizing any information
selectively revealed to him by the inside trader. s5 Therefore, individual
disclosure would not make this potential victim better off. There is no
way that an inside trader can save a potential preempted trade victim
through individual disclosure-although the inside trader can save this
potential victim from harm by abstaining from trading.
This discussion is academic, however, because the inside trader
usually cannot identify his potential victim and therefore cannot disclose only to him. If the potential inside trader were to disclose to the
world, he would help any potential trade victim whose trade would
have been induced by the inside trade. After disclosure, this potential
victim either would not trade or would trade at a better price. On the
other hand, public disclosure would not improve the position of a potential trade victim whose transaction would have been preempted, because this potential victim's transaction still could be eliminated by the
new transactions precipitated by disclosure. Even if the potential victim is able to trade, the price he pays or receives will be accurate. The
potential harm of the inside trade was the loss of opportunity to trade
at an advantageous but inaccurate price. In short, public disclosure
improves the position of one type of potential victim but not the other.
The following analogy illustrates this point. Suppose .4 has nonpublic information that a company has made a major mineral discovery. On behalf of an undisclosed principal, a block of the company's
shares is to be sold at an auction by sealed bid. The seller reserves the
right to reject any bid not higher than an undisclosed minimum-$ 100
per share. A's bid of $110 is the highest, and he buys the shares. An
hour after his purchase, the mineral discovery is made public, and the
market price of the stock climbs to $120. If the second highest bid was
$99, and if this bid would have been rejected, A's trade victim was the
seller of the block, an induced trader. Had A not bid $110, no bid
would have met the secret minimum. When the news was announced,
the seller of the block would still own the shares.
85. See text accompanying notes 104-26 infra; notes 277, 288-89 and accompanying text in.
fra. But see notes 275-76 and accompanying text infra (uncertain impact of Chiarella on tippee
liability).
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Suppose prior to submitting the bid, A tried to disclose the nonpublic information to the undisclosed principal of the auctioneer, but
was told that the only way A could disclose to this undisclosed principal was to disclose to the world. A's disclosure to the world would
have benefited the potential seller, because he presumably would have
stopped the auction or increased the minimum bid. Even if he did
neither, the seller still would have benefited because A's disclosure
86
would have generated much higher bids from third parties.
On the other hand, if the second highest bid was $105 per share,
A's trade victim would be the second highest bidder, a preempted
trader. Had A not bid $110, the second highest bidder would have
bought the stock and reaped the windfall gain. A did not know the
identity of the second highest bidder, so he could not have disclosed his
information only to him. Had A disclosed his information to the
world, another group of bids and bidders would have been attracted.
The winning bidder in this hypothetical auction may not even have
been a bidder in the auction without disclosure. Even if the winning
bidder in the auction after public disclosure happened to be the second
highest bidder in the actual auction (for $105), his bid in the hypothetical auction would be so high that he would be deprived of the very
windfall gain of which A deprived him by submitting a higher bid in
the actual auction.
Although the stock market is not an auction, an inside trade induces or preempts transactions.87 To the extent that an inside trade
fulfills the Law of Conservation of Securities by preempting a trade,
the inside trade substitutes a knowing undeserved windfall gain (or
windfall avoidance of loss) for an unknowing undeserved windfall gain
(or windfall avoidance of loss). With a publicly traded security, individual disclosure to this type of potential victim is impossible, and public disclosure is not helpful. Even if individual disclosure were
possible, this type of potential victim would not be better off because he
probably could not utilize the information without violating rule lOb-5
himself.8 8 In either event, the inside trade would be objectionable not
because of any harmful fraud, but because of the harmful effects of the
act itself.
86. See note 61 supra. See generaly Falls v. Fickling, 621 F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1980).
87. See text accompanying notes 58-60 supra.
88. See text accompanying notes 104-26 infra; notes 277, 288-89 and accompanying text infra. But see notes 275-76 and accompanying text infra (uncertain impact of Chiarella on tippee
liability).
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Under Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,8 9 the gravamen of an

inside trader's lOb-5 violation must be fraud. If nondisclosure does not
harm a civil plaintiff, he can recover only if the causation requirement

is waived. The current status of the causation requirement in private
lOb-5 actions for nondisclosure is unclear.90 Even if the harmful fraud
requirement could be avoided, a preempted potential trader would lack
standing to sue civilly.9 ' It is unclear whether there can be a criminal
violation of rule lOb-5 when no orie has civil standing. In his concurring opinion in Chiarella v. United States, Justice Stevens raised this
issue without resolving it.92
As mentioned earlier, in practice there is no way of identifying the

victims of a stock market inside trade. 93 Thus, it is impossible to know
whether the victims are induced or preempted traders. The victims of a
large inside trade need not include some induced traders. A large inside trade may only preempt another single large inside trade.

If the type of victim of an inside trade cannot be identified, and if
rule lOb-5 is not violated when the victim is a preempted trader, it is
impossible to know whether a rule lob-5 violation has occurred. In

other words, because of the limitations placed on rule lOb-5 by Santa
Fe Industries,Inc. v. Green94 (requiring fraud) and Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores9 5 (limiting civil standing), it is difficult to apply
89. 430 U.S. 462 (1977). See note 80 supra.
90. See notes 115-18, 138 and accompanying text infra. Compare Zweig v. Hearst Corp.,
594 F.2d 1261, 1271 (9th Cir. 1979); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495
F.2d 228, 238, 240 (2d Cir. 1974); State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 500 F. Supp. 278,
297 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd in part,rev'd in part, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,005 (2d
Cir. 1981) with Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 186-87 (3d Cir. 1981); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 283 (7th Cir. 1981); Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d
534, 547-49 (5th Cir. 1981); Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 319-20 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1053 (1977). See also ALI CODE, supra note 2, § 202(19), Comment 4; 3A H. BLOOMtNTHAL, supra note 2, § 9.2115][c]; W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 2, at 788-90; 1IA E.
GADsBY, supra note 49, § 5.04[4], at 5-116 to -117; 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 2, § 64.01[6][i]; R.
JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 51, at 1060-66; W. PAINTER, supra note 2, at 203-07; Recent
Developments, supra note 2, at 1037-42; Re-Evaluation, supra note 45, at 932-35.
91. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); see Stromfeld v. Great
AtIL & Pac. Tea Co., 496 F. Supp. 1084, 1087 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Brooks, Rule 10b-5 in the Balance:
An Analysis of the Supreme Court'sPolicy Perspective, 32 F-ASTNGS L.J. 403, 417-19 (1980); ReEvaluation,supra note 45, at 929-31.
This discussion ignores another causation anomaly faced by both induced and preempted
traders. For a discussion of this causation anomaly, see text accompanying notes 68-71 supra.
92. 445 U.S. at 237-38 (Stevens, J., concurring); see note 194 and accompanying text infra.
For a discussion of this case, see text accompanying notes 170-344 infra.
93. See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
94. 430 U.S. at 473-74. See note 80 supra.
95. 421 U.S. at 736-41 (1975).
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rule lOb-5 to stock market inside trading if the duty to disclose is owed

to the victims of the trade itself.
4. Duty To Disclose to the World

If the potential inside trader on the stock market has a duty to disclose
to the world before transacting, his liability for breaching the duty may
be enormous, because several classes of plaintiffs could claim harm
from the nondisclosure: those who would not have traded to their dis-

advantage; those who would have traded to their advantage; and actual
traders who would have traded at a more attractive price. Plaintiffs in
the second class lack standing to sue under Blue Chp Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores.96 Nevertheless, if trading in the security is active, and if
there is a significant delay between the commencement of the defend-

ant's duty to disclose and public dissemination of the information, the
potential number of plaintiffs in the other two classes is large and the
potential liability enormous.
Anomalies, practical difficulties, and theoretical problems in finding harmful deceit exist in a stock market inside trade. Nevertheless,

the courts have been willing to hold that such trading violates rule lOb5. 97

Parts IV (B) and (C) of the Article will explore how the courts

have dealt with the issues of defining plaintiffs and defendants.
B.

DEFINING THE CLASS OF RULE lOb-5 PLAINTIFFS WHO CAN
DEMONSTRATE CAUSATION WHEN SUING A STOCK

MARKET INSIDE TRADER FOR DAMAGES

Four circuit court decisions have considered the class of lOb-5 plaintiffs
that can demonstrate causation when suing a stock market inside trader
for damages:98 Shapiro v. MerrillLynch, Pierce,Fenner& Smith, Inc.; 99
96. Id.
97. See notes 98-103 and accompanying text infra.
98. For discussions of some of the early court and SEC inside trading decisions, such as in
re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961) and SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833
(2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied sub non. Kline v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), see 3A H.
BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 2, § 9.08; W. PAINTER, supra note 2, at 152-57, 423-91; W. PAINTER,
FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING (1968); N. WOLFSON, R_ PHILLIPS & T. Russo,
supra note 52, T2.14-.16 (1977); Bunch, Chiarella: The Needfor EqualAccess Under Section
10(b), 17 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 725, 732-44 (1980); Goolrick, Insider Tradingby CorporateManagers, 25 MERCER L. REV. 453, 455-67 (1974); Peloso & Krause, Tradingon Inside Information, 14
REv. SEC. REG. 941, 942-46 (1981); Ratner, supra note 56, at 954-55; Whitney, supra note 58;
Insider Trading. Some Questions and.Answers, 1 SEC. REG. L.J. 328, 333-34 (1974) (reprinting
Comment Letter from the Subcommittee on Broker-Dealer Matters and the Subcommittee on
Rule lOb-5 of the Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities of the Section of Corporation,
Banking, and Business Law of the American Bar Association (Oct. 15, 1973)) [hereinafter cited as
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Fridrichv. Bradford;" Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc.,-10 and Wilson v.
Comtech Telecommunications Corp.102 All four of these decisions have
been overshadowed by contrary dicta in the recent Supreme Court decision of Chiarella v. United States.10 3 Although Elkind and Wilson

were decided subsequently to Chiarella, both are inconsistent with the
rationale of the Supreme Court opinion. This Article discusses these
five decisions in chronological order. The proper class of plaintiffs depends upon whether the gravamen of the offense is a trade or a duty to
disclose; and, if the latter, to whom the duty to disclose is owed.
1. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
In the Shapiro1o case, Merrill Lynch was the managing underwriter of

a proposed offering of Douglas Aircraft debentures. Because of Merrill
Lynch's position, it received certain material adverse nonpublic information about Douglas' earnings prospects from its management. Merrill Lynch disclosed this confidential information to certain of its
customers, most of which were institutional investors. Prior to the public announcement of the adverse news, these tippees sold their holdings

of Douglas Aircraft, made short sales, or both. Once the adverse news
became public, the stock price dropped sharply.10 5

The plaintiffs brought a class action in the Southern District of
New York against Merrill Lynch and its tippees on behalf of themA.B.A. Letter]; Note, Regulation of Insider and Ttopee Trading in Minnesota, 59 MINN. L. REV.
223, 228-31 (1974); Duty to Disclose, supra note 73, at 100-10; Re-Evaluation, supra note 45, at
1015-19; Comment, RationalizingLiabilityfor Nondisclosure Under Rule 1ob-5: EqualAccess to
Information and United States v. Chiarella, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 162, 167-77; 71 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 474, 480-82 (1980); 47 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 965, 971-74 (1979); 10 SETON HALL L.
REv. 720, 728-31 (1980); 26 WAYNE L. REV. 193, 200-07 (1979); 3 W. NEw ENO. L. REV. 99, 10508 (1980). Cf. Cann,A Duty to Disclose? An Analysis of Chiarella v. United States, 85 DICK. L.
REv. 249, 256-69 (1981) (discussing Chiarella'rcompatibility with prior lob-5 opinions). For a
table listing all cases initiated by the SEC since Texas GulfSulphur, see Dooley, supra note 39, at
74-83. For a survey of all reported inside trading cases (private and SEC initiated) since Texas
GulfSulphur, see id at 8-17. For a numerical tabulation of all rule 1Ob-5 inside trading cases (by
type of information and category of defendant), see Scott, supra note 39, at 815-16.
99. 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
100. 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
101. 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980).
102. 648 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1981).
103. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
104. 495 F.2d 228. Shapiro is noted in 16 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 503 (1975); 41 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1302 (1975); 5 CuM.-SAM. L. REV. 354 (1974); 24 DRAKE L. REV. 444 (1975); 12
Hous. L. REv. 283 (1974); 6 SETON HALL L. REV. 186 (1974); 29 Sw. L. J. 469 (1975). The district
court decision, 353 F. Supp. 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), is noted in 4 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 171 (1973); 5
RuT.-CAM. L.J. 256 (1974); 6 U. TOL. L. REV. 291 (1974); 30 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 527 (1973).
105. 495 F.2d at 231-33.
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selves and all others similarly situated who bought Douglas common
shares during the period between the first trade by a Merrill Lynch
tippee and public dissemination of the adverse news. After the pleadings, the plaintiffs moved for an order declaring that the action could
be maintained as a class action. The defendants moved for judgment
on the pleadings. The trial judge denied both motions but granted the
to renew their motion when sufficient facts could be
plaintiffs leave
06
presented.'
The only issue before the Second Circuit was whether the trial
court had properly denied the defendants' motion for judgment on the
pleadings. 10 7 In an opinion by Judge Timbers, the Second Circuit affirmed the trial court ruling that, based on the pleadings, the defendants had violated section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 and were liable for
damages to the plaintiffs. The Second Circuit quoted its earlier decision in SEC v. Texas Guf Sulphur Co.:"0 s "[A]nyone in possession of
material inside information must either disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it. . . , must abstain from trading in or recommending the securities concerned while such inside
information remains undisclosed."' 1 9 Thus, an individual with material nonpublic information has no per se duty to disclose. His trade
while in possession of the information triggers a duty to have already
disclosed.
Judge Timbers held that the duty to disclose (triggered by the
trade) runs
not only to the purchasers of the actual shares sold by the defendants
(in the unlikely event they can be identified) but to all persons who
during the same period purchased Douglas stock in the open market
inside information which was in
without knowledge of the material
110
the possession of the defendants.
In other words, the defendants' trade triggers a quasi-Samaritan duty
to all investors throughout the world.1 1 '
Because no class had yet been certified, the Second Circuit did not
precisely define the class of plaintiffs, but held the defendants liable to
106. Id. at 231.
107. Id.
108. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
109. 495 F.2d at 236 (quoting Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848).
110. 495 F.2d at 237.
111. The district court judge actually mentioned Good Samaritan duties and analogized an
inside trader to one who negligently comes to the aid of a drowning man. Shapiro v. Merrill

Lynch, 353 F. Supp. at 278.
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"all persons who during the same period purchased Douglas stock in
the open market."' "1 2 On remand, the district court sustained
plaintiffs' request that the class be certified to include all persons who
purchased Douglas stock in the open market without benefit of inside
information from the time of the first allegedly illegal sale by a defendant, June 21, 1966, through June 24, 1966, the day of Douglas'
public announcement of the information. Liability begins at the time
material
lOb-5 is violated.. . and continues until the non-public
1
information is effectively publicly disseminated. 3
The defendants claimed that their conduct had not caused harm to
the plaintiffs. Judge Timbers rejected this argument because the defendants had a duty to disclose the adverse news and the plaintiffs alleged that they would not have purchased Douglas stock had they
known of the adverse developments."14 The Second Circuit had to accept the plaintiffs' allegations as true. Therefore, Judge Timbers stated
that the complaint could not be dismissed even on the basis of the law
beforeAffiliated Ute Citizens v. United States."5 The court interpreted
Affiliated Ute as having created a presumption of reliance and causation in fact in material nondisclosure cases. 1 6 This interpretation of
Affiliated Ute would be relevant at trial if the defendants questioned
the plaintiffs' allegations that they would not have bought had they
known the adverse information. HoweverAffiliated Ute deals not with
the issue of moral or legal causation but with whether the plaintiff must
demonstrate reliance or causation after it has been found that the defendant breached a duty to disclose.' 17 Therefore, Affiliated Ute was
not relevant to defendants' motion to dismiss on the pleadings. It is
112. 495 F.2d at 237.
113. [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,377 (S.D.N.Y.).
The Shapiro case was eventually settled for $2,012,250, with $1,500,000 contributed by Merrill Lynch. Dooley, supra note 39, at 22 n.106 (citing Affidavit in Support of Proposed Settlement
at 32-49, Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 70 Civ. 3653 (C.L.B.) (S.D.N.Y.
April 11, 1979) (final judgment)).
A subsequent opinion in the Southern District of New York held a tipper liable to all those
who traded between the time "when inside information was tipped ... [and the time] when this
situation was cured by public release of the same information." Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc.,
472 F. Supp. 123, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), rev'dinparton othergrounds, 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980).
See notes 201-11 and accompanying text infra.
A recent Second Circuit decision interpreted the Second Circuit Shapiro phrase "during the
same period" to mean "contemporaneous." Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp., 648
F.2d at 94-95. See text accompanying notes 233-49 infra.
114. 495 F.2d at 240.
115. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
116. 495 F.2d at 240. See Zweig v. Hearst, 594 F.2d 1261, 1271 (9th Cir. 1979); Note, supra
note 61, at 591 & n.37. See also W. PAINTER, supra noie 2, at 203-04 & n.141.
117. See note 90 supra.
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difficult to understand why the court regarded "Affiliated Ute .. .as
controlling on the issue of causation in the instant case,"' 1 8 unless the
court was anticipating issues that would arise at trial.
The Shapiro defendant tippees resisted the imposition of an obligation to "disclose or abstain," alleging that they would not have been
able to make effective public disclosure of information about a company with which they were not associated.119 The defendants may
have been attempting to suggest the previously discussed causation
anomaly. 2 ' The defendants had to choose from among three courses
of conduct: (1) disclosure to the world (assuming this were possible);
(2) nondisclosure, without trading; and (3) nondisclosure, with trading. The first two courses were legal, the third illegal. The tippees
claimed that option one was impossible. Had they called a press conference, no one would have come. Therefore, the actual choice was
between options two and three, both of which would have caused equal
harm to the defendants. Although he could have simply refused to accept this allegation and left the issue for the trial judge, Judge Timbers
chose to address the issue directly, and concluded that if tippees are
unable to disclose, they must abstain from trading. 2 '
In answer to the tippee's claim that disclosure was impossible, the
court might instead have responded that each Merrill Lynch tippee was
affluent enough to have purchased, for example, a Wall Street Journal
advertisement disclosing the adverse news. A more satisfactory answer
is that the defendants could have disclosed to the New York Stock Exchange, on which Douglas Aircraft was listed.' 22 To avoid rule lOb-5
tippee/tipper liability, the Exchange actually might have been forced to
suspend trading; to issue a press release; and to notify the regional exchange specialists and over-the-counter broker-dealers who made a
market in Douglas securities.
A troubling issue arises if an information possessor actually makes
a good faith and "reasonable," but unsuccessful effort to disclose, e.g.,
(1) by purchasing a regional newspaper advertisement, which goes unnoticed; (2) by sending out press releases which are ignored; or (3) by
118. 495 F.2d at 240.
119. Id. at 238. See generally 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 2, § 66.02[g], at 3-321 to -322.
120. See text accompanying notes 68-72 supra.
121. 495 F.2d at 238.
122. In its release accompanying rule 14e-3, the SEC expressly approved the following form
of public disclosure: "notice to the exchange on which the security is listed or to the National
Association of Securities Dealers if the security is traded through NASDAQ." 45 Fed. Reg.
60410, 60414 (Sept. 12, 1980). See note 322 infra; Pitt, supra note 2, at 695.

HeinOnline -- 54 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1259 1980-1981

1260

SOUTHERN CALIFORNTIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 54:1217

calling a press conference which no one attends. The commentators
are split on whether insider and tippee trading should be permitted after reasonable but unsuccessful attempts to publicize. 123 This question
was not reached in Shapiro.
Other questions are left unanswered by the Shapiro series of decisions, including whether the class of plaintiffs against a tipper should
open when the tipper tips rather than when the first tippee trades, 124
and whether a tipper is liable even when his tippee does not trade. 125
The answers to these questions may depend upon whether the tipper's
duty to disclose is triggered by the tip or the tippee's trade. If the former, the class of plaintiffs would open earlier and a tipper could incur
enormous liability even if no use was ever made of the nonpublic information. For example, in the Shapiro fact situation, even if none of its
tippees had traded, Merrill Lynch would have been liable to all those
who bought Douglas aircraft shares from the time of its first tip to the
time of dissemination of the news. Actually, these two questions do not
necessarily involve the same issue. Conceivably, the class of plaintiffs
could open at the time of the tip rather than2 6at the time of the tippee's
trade, but only if in fact the tippee traded.1
Despite the many questions Shapiro left open, including the issue
of damages, the opinion was far reaching. An analogy will illustrate its
broad scope. Suppose A is a typist for a professor who has secretly
developed a winning blackjack system and plans to publish it in a
book. A divulges the system to B. The strategy is so simple that any
reasonable player would probably adopt it. B has no duty to disseminate the blackjack system. If he goes to Las Vegas, however, and plays
even a few rounds of blackjack using the system, this triggers a quasiSamaritan duty to rescue blackjack players throughout the world from
their current suboptimal strategy. B would be liable for all blackjack
player losses until the strategy is published. It would make no difference that B could not possibly have disclosed the strategy to the entire
world. B's liability would be enormous. He might win $10 playing
blackjack and be liable to tens of thousands of blackjack players for
hundreds of millions of dollars of losses. In addition, A, who gave B
the system, might be liable jointly and severally.
123. 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 2, § 66,02[g], at 3-328 & n.38.
124. See notes 204-07 and accompanying text infra.
125. See 5 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note 2, § 62, at 3.175-.176, § 167; 5 A.
JACOBS, supra note 2, § 167, at 7-5, 7-8. See also ALI CODE, supra note 2, § 1604, Comment (6):
W. PAiNTER, supra note 2, at 164 & n.31; note 207 and'accompanying text infra.
126. See notes 204-08 and accompanying text infra.
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Judge Timbers realized that his decision might create "Draconian
liability,"'" 7 and intimated that the trial court might limit the extent of
defendants' liability. 28 This approach does not make sense.' 29 The
liability is "Draconian" because the quasi-Samaritan duty is so broad.
If someone owes a legal duty, he is responsible for the consequences of
the breach. If one has a duty to rescue a stranger from danger, and
does not, his liability may be enormous. If this seems unfair, the logical solution is to limit the extent of the moral duty rather than the damages for which one is liable.
By analogy, if B owes a quasi-Samaritan duty to rescue blackjack
players throughout the world from their suboptimal strategies, B is liable for all their losses. There is no logical reason to limit his liability to
his paltry winnings, which have no relationship whatsoever to the harm
which resulted from the breach of his duty to rescue.
The Shapiro court's obligation to disclose to a huge class of total
strangers seems contrary to normal moral principles. Imposition of
moral obligation to a stranger is usually predicated, in large part, upon
one's proximity to the stranger. Because of the total absence of contact
in the stock market context, it is difficult to understand why one investor should ever have a moral obligation to other investors who are total
strangers.
Even if at times a moral obligation to aid other investors generally
did exist, it would violate American legal norms to impose a legal obligation to rescue absent some special relationship between the parties. 130
Indeed, in American legal tradition, there is generally no civil or criminal liability for failure to save the life of a stranger in obvious peril. 3
127. 495 F.2d at 242. See generally W. PAINTER, supra note 2, at 187-88 & n.105.
128. 495 F.2d at 242.
129. See Damagesto Uninformed Traders,supra note 56, at 315 ("In effect, the courts would
be allowing recovery but stopping the dollar flow when the figures become too large."). See Parts
III(C)(1) and IV(A)(4) supra; notes 229-32 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of the
proposed ALI Federal Securities Code solution, see Part IV(D) infra.
130. See note 67 and accompanying text supra. See also ALI CODE, supra note 2, § 202(19),
Comment 5 (distinguishing between but for and legal cause).
Similarly, in the criminal law, inaction alone is not sufficient to impose liability "unless:
(a) the omission is expressly made sufficient by the law defining the offense [e.g., failure to register
for possible induction into military service]; or (b) a duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise
imposed by law." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(3) (1962). See generall J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 190-205, 208-11 (2d ed. 1960); S.KADISH & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL
LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 83-85 (1975); W. LA FAVE & A. SCOTT,JR.,
CRIMINAL LAW § 26 (1972); Frankel, Criminal Omissions: A LegalMicrocosm, I1 WAYNE L. REv.
367 (1965); Hughes, Criminal Omissions, 67 YALE L. J. 590 (1980).

131.

Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (no criminal liability for allowing
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If Americans have no duty to rescue strangers from death, it is incon-

gruous to create a duty to rescue investors from trading on imperfect
information.
Furthermore, if someone with nonpublic information were to disclose the news to the world, he would rescue some investors from a
fortuitous loss or avoidance of gain at the cost of preventing other in-

vestors from realizing a windfall gain or avoidance of loss. The individual benefits would be almost entirely cancelled by the individual
harms. It is illogical to create a duty to rescue at the cost of possible

injury to another stranger.
Another major problem with Shapiro is that there is no logical
reason why a trade by the defendant should create such an immense
The trade does not create any relationship
quasi-Samaritan obligation.
132
with all other investors.
2.

Fridrich v. Bradford

In Fridrichv. Bradford,13 3 the Sixth Circuit dealt with trading on noninfant in the house to die of starvation and neglect in the absence of some independent legal duty
to supply food and necessities to baby); People v. Lilly, 71 A.D.2d 393, 422 N.Y.S.2d 976 (1979)
(no criminal liability for failure to provide medical assistance to an infant in the house in the
absence of showing that the individual intended to assume all the obligations of parenthood). See
generally THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW (J. Ratcliffe ed. 1966); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.6, at 1044 (1956); W. LA FAVE & A. Scorr, JR., supra note 130, § 26; W.
PROSSER, supra note 68, § 56, at 340-43; Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97 (1908);
Bohlen, The MoralDuty To Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REV. 217 (1908);
Epstein,A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 189-90 (1973); Gregory, supra note 66,
at 34-36; Landes & Posner, Saviors, Finders, GoodSamaritans,and Other Rescuers: An Economic
Analysis of4trusim, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 89 (1978); Mack, supra note 65, at 230; Minor, Moral
Obligationas a Basis ofLiability, 9 VA. L. REV. 420, 422-23 (1923); Rudolph, The Duty To Act: A
ProposedRule, 44 NEB. L. REv. 499 (1965); Legislation, Good Samaritan Protection, 18 VAND. L.
REV. 323, 323-24 (1964); sources cited in note 69 supra.
For a discussion of criminal liability in Europe for refusing aid necessary to preserve human
life and health, see C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, CASES & MATERIALS ON TORTS 267 (1959)
(Dutch Penal Code); Hazard, Soviet Socialisa and the Duty to Rescue, reprintedin XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW 160 (1961); Dawson, Negotiorum Gestio: TheAltruistic Intermeddler (pt. II), 74 HARv. L. REv. 1073, 1101-06 (1961); Frankel,supra note 130, at 371
n.l; Hughes, supra note 130, at 632-34; Comment, Amendment ofthe Belgian Code Penal- The
Duty to Rescue Persons in Serious Danger, 11 AM. J. COMP. L. 66 (1962); Good Samaritansand
Liability,supra note 69, at 1317; Note, The Failureto Rescue: A Comparative Study, 52 COLUM. L.
REV. 631 (1952).
132. Cf. W. PAINrER, supra note 2, at 195 n.123 (criticizing the Good Samaritan analogy in
the district court decision in Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, 353 F. Supp. 264, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); see
note Ill supra). The Shapiro decision is not without its supporters--e.g., Rapp, Fridrich v.
Bradford and the Scope ofInsider Trading Liability Under SEC Rule lob-5: A Commentary, 38
Omo ST. L. J. 67, 88-90 (1977).
133. 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977). See generally W.
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public information, but interpreted rule lOb-5 differently than did the
Second Circuit in Shapiro.
In April 1972, the defendants bought stock in Old Line Life Insur-

ance Company based on favorable material nonpublic information.
The plaintiffs sold Old Line stock in June, prior to the public announcement of the news on June 29, 1972. One of the defendants, Mr.

James C. Bradford, was a director of Old Line; the other defendants
were his relatives or firms directly or indirectly controlled by him.134
Ironically, the defendants purchased shares from J.C. Bradford &

Co., a brokerage firm controlled by the Bradford family. J.C. Bradford
& Co. was the principal market-maker in Old Line stock, which was

traded over the counter. As Judge Celebrezze noted in his concurrence,
the defendants were in effect trading with themselves. 135 There was no

proof that the defendants' purchases affected the price of Old Line. Although the court noted that throughout 1972, J.C. Bradford and Co.
bought 169,054 shares and sold 170,685 shares of Old Line, the broker-

age firm's May and June inventory was not discussed. The plaintiffs'
transactions did not involve Mr. Bradford or any of his firms. Presumably, the plaintiffs dealt with another market-maker.

Although the district court had awarded damages to the plaintiffs,
the Sixth Circuit reversed, in an opinion by Judge Engel. Rejecting the

rationale of Shapiro, Judge Engel held that a retroactive duty to disclose is not triggered by a trade on nonpublic information. 13 6 Instead,

the trade itself constitutes the violation of rule lOb-5 when a condition
precedent is fufilled-the trader has not disclosed. 137 In effect, Judge

Engel held that a trade based on nonpublic information violates rule
lOb-5. If either the inside trader or someone else has already disclosed

the information, it is no longer nonpublic.
PAINTER, supra note 2, at 188-95; Rapp, supra note 132; Comment, PrivateRule lOb-SRecoveryfor
Open Market InsiderTrading. The Proprietyof PrivityandRelianceRequirements, 15 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 751, 756-70 (1978); Note, PrivateActions Under Rule lOb-5-DamageCausationforNonDisclosures in Open Market, 51 TUL. L. REv. 1293 (1977); Note, The Sixth Circuit Drowns the
Private 10b-5 Action, 39 U. PrrT. L. REv. 87 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Private 10b-5 Action];
Note, Causation,the Duty To Disclose and the Appropriate Bounds ofthe PlaintiffClassin Anonymous Market Insider Trading Cases-Fridrich v. Bradford, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 150; 11 SUFFOLK
U.L. REv. 1129 (1977); 46 U. CiNN. L. REv. 303 (1977); 30 VAND. L. REv. 122 (1977).
134. 542 F.2d at 309-11.
135. Id. at 324 n.4 (1976) (Celebrezze, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 319. See text accompanying notes 108-12 supra.
137. Judge Engel stated: "We conceive it to be the act of trading which essentially constitutes
the violation of Rule lOb-5, for it is this which brings the illicit benefit to the insider. If the insider
does not trade, he has an absolute right to keep material information secret." 542 F.2d at 318.
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Contrary to Shapiro, Judge Engel read the Affiliated Ute holding
as narrowly limited to its facts, which involved prior business dealings
between the plaintiffs and defendants and a deliberate scheme by the
defendants to induce the plaintiffs to sell their stock. 13 According to
Judge Engel, because the trade constitutes the violation, the plaintiff
must demonstrate it has been harmed by the defendant's transaction. 139
Thus, in order to prove harm from the defendants' trades, the plaintiffs
in Fridrich would have had to demonstrate: (1) that the purchases by
the defendants from the market-maker, J.C. Bradford & Co., induced
J.C. Bradford & Co. to increase its inventory above what it would
otherwise have been (or decrease it to less than otherwise); (2) that
these extra J.C. Bradford & Co. purchases preempted purchases by the
market-maker with which the plaintiffs dealt; (3) that these lost
purchases caused the plaintiffs' market-maker to increase its bid price
for Old Line Life Insurance Company; and (4) that this increase
in bid
14 0
price was a but for cause of the plaintiffs' decision to sell.
Judge Engel noted: "It is undisputed. . . that defendants' acts of
trading in no way affected plaintiffs' decision to sell."' 14 1 Therefore, the
court held, the defendants' violation did not cause harm to the plaintiffs. Judge Engel reserved the "question of availability of the remedy
to open market situations where the insider trading with resultant price
changes2 has in fact induced the plaintiffs to buy or sell to their in-

jury.'

14

Finally, the court buttressed its holding with policy considerations.
In Judge Engel's opinion, the primary rationale for rule lOb-5 private
causes of action is compensation, not deterrence. When the individual
who deserves compensation cannot be identified, criminal prosecution
and SEC actions are available. If these alternatives do not deter inside
trading, Judge Engel would leave the solution to Congress or to the
SEC rather than create
civil "punitive damages almost unlimited in
' 143
their potential scope."
In an open market transaction, it is almost impossible for a plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant's trade harmed him. Even the
party in privity with the defendant probably would have traded any138. 542 F.2d at 319. See notes 90, 115-18 and accompanying text supra.
139. 542 F.2d at 318.
140. See Rapp, supra note 132, at 86 n.70; text accompanying notes 55-58 supra.
141. 542 F.2d at 318.
142. Id. at 320 n.27. See W. PtrAER, supra note 2, at 193.
143. 542 F.2d at 321.
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way.'44 If the plaintiff is a market-maker in privity with the defendant,
the market-maker will have difficulty demonstrating that its inventory
disclosure than
would have been smaller or larger at the time of public
145
it would have been absent the defendant's trade.
At one point Judge Engel stated:
[E]xtension of the private remedy to impersonal market cases where
plaintiffs have neither dealt with defendants nor been influenced in
their trading decisions by any act of the defendants would present a
situation wholly lacking in the natural limitations on
46 damages present in cases dealing with face-to-face transactions.'
At least one commentator has interpreted this casual reference to privity to mean that the Sixth Circuit has adopted both privity and causation as de jure requirements for recovery. 47 Other writers have
concluded that although Judge Engel imposed a de jure requirement of
causation only, this has the effect of requiring privity. 14 Other commentators have concluded that causation is a necessary and sufficient
condition;149 that either causation or privity is necessary;15 0 or that the
opinion is ambiguous.'
It is most probable that the Sixth Circuit believed that, for stock
market transactions, causation is both a necessary and sufficient condi144. See Part III(B)(3) supra.
145. Id.
146. 542 F.2d at 321 (emphasis added).
147. Comment, supra note 133, at 757-58. Cf. Stromfeld v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 496 F.
Supp. 1084, 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (Fridrichheld duty to disclose runs only to party in privity).
148. 1IA E. GADSBY, supra note 49, § 5.04[3], at 5-77 ("Implicit in the Sixth Circuit's holding
on 'causation' is the assumption that a person purchasing or selling stock on the open market need
not disclose material inside information to other open market purchasers or sellers of the same
stock if he has not traded with them."); id. § 5.0412], at 5-57 n.107; Rapp, supra note 132, at 86
("Reintroduction of an element tantamount to traditional common-law privity . . . is clear in
Fridrich.");Private 10b-5Action, supra note 133, at 97 (The Fridrich "causation requirement ap-

...).
pears to reinstate, albeit in different verbal garb, a requirement of privity.
149. 46 U. CINN. L. REv. 303, 311 (1977) ("ITihe mere existence of privity . . . probably
would not be sufficient to support recovery. . . . [T]he strongest kind of evidence. . . would be
evidence that the defendant insider's trading activity affected stock prices sufficiently to induce the
plaintiff to trade."). See Brooks, supra note 91, at 416 n.65 ("[The] Sixth Circuit. . . requir[es] a
plaintiff to establish actual causation even in impersonal transactions .... It may be impossible
for any plaintiff to establish causation unless he or she purchased or sold in a limited market.").
150. 8 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 742, 745 (1977) ("This standard required the plaintiff to show that
either the insider purchased shares of stock from the plaintiff, or that the insider's act of trading
...). See 11 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1129, 1141 (1977)
affected the plaintiff's decision to sell.
("[P]laintiff must at least be able to show either that there was a transactional relationship between
the defendant and the plaintiff-as in Affiliated Ute- or that the trading of the defendant in an
impersonal market influenced the plaintiff's decision to trade.").
151. W. PAiNTER, supra note 2, at 193-94.
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tion for recovery. In other words, if the plaintiff can demonstrate harm
caused by the defendant's conduct, the plaintiff should recover. Conversely, even the party in privity should not recover if he cannot
demonstrate causation. Otherwise, the defendant could be subject to
double liability. Additionally, in many open market transactions, privity is fortuitous; allowing the party in privity to recover would give him
an undeserved windfall.' 52 On the basis of expediency rather than
logic, however, the Sixth Circuit might give the party in privity the benefit of a rebuttable or conclusive presumption of causation, thereby allowing at least someone to recover damages.
Ironically, although the party in privity may not be able to recover
under rule lOb-5 in the Sixth Circuit, he may have an action for rescission or damages under section 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act,' 3
which renders voidable any contract made in violation of the Act or
any rule promulgated thereunder.1 54 Because the Sixth Circuit treats
the inside trade as a violation of rule lOb-5, the contract between the
inside trader and the party in privity is arguably made in violation of
rule lOb-5. Therefore, in the Sixth Circuit an inside trader might be
liable in damages to one plaintiff and liable for rescission to the party
in privity. This double liability is theoretical, however, because the
person harmed will generally be unidentifiable, and the party in privity
will often be unascertainable as well.
Some anomalous situations could arise, however. Suppose an institution with material nonpublic information, A, had indicated an interest in purchasing a large block from a block-trading firm, which had
152. See Damagesto Uninformed Traders,supra note 56, at 312.
153. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 29(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1976).
154. See Gruenbaum & Steinberg, Section 29(b) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934 A
Viable Remedy Awakened, 48 Gno. WASH. L. REv. 1, 11-24, 29-30 (1979). Cf. Damages to Uninformed Traders,supra note 56, at 314 n.130 (suggesting that § 29(b) would allow a party to refuse
to complete a securities transaction when the other party had violated rule l0b-5). See generally
Gunter v. Hutcheson, 492 F. Supp. 546 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (discussing § 29(b) but denying relief);
Warshow v. H. Hentz & Co., 199 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (rescission); Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (damages); Geismar v. Bond & Goodwin, Inc., 40 F.
Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (rescission); 5B A. JACOBS, supra note 2, § 260.03[c][vil; I IA E. GADSBY, supra note 49, § 5.04[5][c]; 3 L. Loss, supra note 49, at 1793; W. PAINTER, supra note 2, at
183; W. PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING 114 (1968); Comment, Insider
Liability Under SecuritiesExchange Act Rule 10b-5: The Cady, Roberts Doctrine, 30 U. CHi. L.
REv. 121, 155 (1962); Note, supra note 57, at 873-74. See also Transamerica Mortgage Advisors,
Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18-19 (1979) (holding that § 215 of the Investment Advisers Act gives
private parties the right to sue for rescission; § 215 contains language similar to that of Exchange
Act § 29(b)). The Transamerica case is discussed in Note, The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94
HARv. L. REv. 75, 279-88 (1980). The impact of 2ransamerica on § 29(b) is discussed in
Gruenbaum & Steinberg, supra, at 25-27, 42-45.
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subsequently persuaded another institution, B, to sell an equivalent
block to it for resale to A. The party in privity with A, the inside
trader, would be the block trader; however, the party damaged would
be B, which sold to the block trader. B could sue for damages and the
block-trading firm could sue for rescission. This problem was created
not by Judge Engel, but by the overlap between section 29(b) and the
implied private cause of action for damages under rule lOb-5.
As a matter of logic, Judge Engel's opinion in Fridrich is superior
to the Shapiro opinion. There is no reason why a trade should trigger a
duty to disclose to the world. There is a practical problem with Judge
Engel's holding, however. Because it is usually impossible to identify
the victims of a stock market inside trade, 5 ' under Judge Engel's decision, a civil plaintiff could almost never successfully sue such an inside
trader for damages. If the party in privity is identifiable, he might be
able to obtain rescission under section 29(b). If the party in privity is
not identifiable,15 6 one solution would be to impose on the defendant
the burden of proving nonprivity, thereby allowing duplicate "rescission."
The major problem with Judge Engers opinion is the Supreme
Court's subsequent holding"5 7 that fraud is an essential element for
lOb-5 liability. 5 8 The trade itself would not be deceitful, so unless the
trade triggered a duty to disclose, rule lOb-5 may not have been violated at all.' 5 9
In his concurrence, Judge Celebrezze took a middle course between Judge Engel's position and that of Judge Timbers in Shapiro.160
Apparently, Judge Celebrezze agreed with Judge Engel that "[t]rading
is the gravamen of the offense."' 16 ' He apparently also believed that
those harmed by the trade must be among those engaging in the opposite type transaction "contemporaneously" with the defendant's
trade.' 62 Because it is impossible to identify who among that class is
actually harmed by the defendant's trade, Judge Celebrezze decided to
155. See text accompanying notes 59-60 supra.
156. For a discussion of the difficulty of identifying the party in privity, see Damagesto Uninformed Traders,supra note 56, at 312 n.120 (1974).
157. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). See note 80 supra.
158. See notes 178-81, 191-92, 310 and accompanying text infra.
159. See note 80 and accompanying text supra.
160. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
161. Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d at 326 (Celebrezze, J., concurring).
162. Id. at 326 & n.ll.
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accept partially the Second Circuit's "disclose or abstain" rule.'63 The
inside trade triggers a duty to have disclosed to those trading "contemporaneously" with the defendant.' 64 Furthermore, this class would receive the benefit of the relaxed causation standard of Affiliated Utle, 16
which Judge Celebrezze interpreted as a rebuttable presumption of
causation. 166
The logical problem with Judge Celebrezze's compromise is that
those harmed by the defendant's trade are not necessarily among those
trading contemporaneously. First, a defendant's purchase may preempt another purchase, so that the person harmed is not even a trader.
Second, a defendant's purchase may directly or indirectly lower the inventory of a market-maker or specialist, who might decide to compensate for this decrease at a time much later than the defendant's
transaction. For example, a week later the market-maker might react
to the small size of his inventory. To dissuade buyers, the marketmaker might increase the price at which he is willing to sell to them; to
encourage sellers, he might increase the price at which he is willing to
buy from them. Of course, such upward adjustments may have occurred somewhat later anyway. In fact, one possible result is that
throughout the period between the defendant's trade and the dissemination of the news, the bid and ask prices of the market-maker may be
somewhat higher than otherwise. Those harmed would be almost impossible to identify but they would not be among those trading contemporaneously with the inside trader.
In dictum, Judge Celebrezze noted that a person who tips rather
than trades "has set off a chain of events which perhaps may only be
remedied by full public disclosure."' 167 He suggested that when the gravamen of the offense is a tip rather than a trade, the tipper may be
liable to all those in the market up to the point of effective disclosure.
Judge Celebrezze did not address the issues of whether the class should
commence with the tip and whether a tipper should be liable even if no
163. Id. at 323.
164. Id. at 326-27.
Recently, a Second Circuit panel endorsed Judge Celebrezze's class of plaintiffs (those trading contemporaneously with the inside trader), and interpreted Shapiro as adopting the same class

of plaintiffs as had Judge Celebrezze. Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp., 648 F.2d at
94-95. See text accompanying notes 233-43 infra.
165.

542 F.2d at 326 (Celebrezze, J., concurring).

166. Id. at 325 n.8.

167. Id. at 327.
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tippee trades. 168 Judge Celebrezze's treatment of tippers suffers from
the same defects as the court's decision in Shapiro. There is no reason
an unknown
why a tip should trigger a quasi-Samaritan duty to rescue
1 69
and potentially immense number of total strangers.
3. Chiarella v. United States
a. Special relationship: In Chiarella v. United States, 170 the

United States Supreme Court addressed the application of rule lOb-5 to
stock market inside trading for the first time.
Chiarella worked for a financial printer. Among the documents he
handled were five announcements of takeover bids. Although the identities of the targets were concealed, Chiarella was able to deduce the
names from other information in the documents. Without disclosing
his knowledge, Chiarella bought stock in the targets and sold the shares
at a profit immediately after the tender offers were announced.' 7 '
Chiarella was convicted of violating section 10(b) and rule lOb-5,
and the Second Circuit affirmed. 7 1 In an opinion by Justice Powell,
the Supreme Court reversed the conviction.' 73 A trade per se does not
trigger a duty of prior disclosure. There must have been "an affirmative duty to disclose.

. .

before trading,"' 74 based on a "relationship of

trust and confidence between parties to a transaction."' I7 5 Because
168.

See notes 124-25 and accompanying text supra;notes 204-10,277 and accompanying text

infra.
169. See text accompanying notes 130-32 supra.
170. 445 U.S. 222 (1980), noted in 30 DRAKE L. REv. 663 (1980-1981); 71 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 474 (1980); 41 LA. L. REv. 1295 (1981); 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 93 (1980); 48 TENN.
L. REV. 161 (1980); 12 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 540 (1981); 58 U. DEr. URB. L.J. 320 (1981); 42 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 637 (1981); 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 1013 (1980); 3 WHrrIER L. REv. 129 (1981); 3 W.
NEW ENG. L. REv. 99 (1980).
171. Chiarella realized a gain of approximately $30,000 from his dealings. He returned his
profits to the sellers of the shares pursuant to a consent agreement with the SEC. Id. at 112-13.
172. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), rep'd 445 U.S. 222 (1980),
discussedin Bunch, supra note 98, at 725-32; Morrison, Silence Is Golden: Trading on Nonpublic
Market Information, 8 SEC. REG. L. J. 211, 213-15 (1980); notedin 10 CuM. L. REv. 275 (1979); 8
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 467 (1980); 13 GA. L. REv. 636 (1979); 47 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 965 (1979); 92
HARv. L. REV. 1538 (1979); 50 Miss. L. J. 223 (1979); 58 NEB. L. REv. 866 (1979); 10 SETON HALL
L. REV. 720 (1980); 57 Tax. L. REv. 965 (1979); 34 U. MIAMI L. REv. 159 (1979); 26 WAYNE L.
REv. 193 (1979); 1980 Wis. L. REV. 162.
173. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
174. Id. at 231. See SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
175. 445 U.S. at 230. See Koeltl & Kubek, Chiarella and MarketInformation, 13 REV. SEC.
REG. 903, 906 (1980); Morrison, supra note 172, at 215-17.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision, several commentators had argued that rule 10b-5 imposes a disclose or abstain rule only in a fiduciary context or where a fiduciary relationship is
present. Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry Into the Responsibility to Disclose
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Chiarella had no such relationship with the people from whom he
76
bought, he had not violated section 10(b) or rule lOb-5.1
Although Chiarella's conviction was reversed, the Court stated for
the first time that rule lOb-5 prohibits inside trading on an impersonal
stock market if there is a special relationship between the contracting
parties. 177 Nevertheless, Chiarella limits both Fridrich and Shapiro.
Fridrich is limited because Powell regarded the nondisclosure rather
than the trade as the gravamen of any 1Ob-5 violation. Citing Santa Fe
Industries,Inc. v. Green, 178 he emphasized that "not every instance of

financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity under § 10(b) ...
[The element required to make silence fraudulent [is] a duty to disclose
"179 Later in his opinion, he reiterated: "Section 10(b) is aptly
described as a catchall provision, but what it catches must be fraud."', 80
Although a trade may cause harm, it does not constitute fraud. To
. . ..

Justice Powell, an inside trade involves fraud only when there is non181
disclosure plus a duty to speak.

Shapiro also does not fare well under the Chiarella holding. Pow-

ell extrapolated from face to face transactions to impersonal stock market trading. If the president of a closely held corporation cannot

purchase stock from a shareholder based on material nonpublic information,"8 2 the president of a publicly traded corporation cannot do so
for the same reason. In both cases, the gravamen of the offense is the
nondisclosure, and the president has a fiduciary duty to disclose to the
shareholder. Thus, Powell's decision strongly suggests that, in stock
market inside trades as well as face to face transactions, the duty to
Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798, 815-17 (1973); Jennings, InsiderTrading in Corporate
Securities: A Survey ofHazards andDiselosure Obligations Under Rule JOb-5, 62 Nw. L. REV. 809,
815 (1968); Koeltl & Longstreth, Market Information Revisited, 11 REV. SEC. REG. 843, 846-48
(1978). See United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1373-75 (2d Cir. 1978) (Meskill, J., dissenting), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); ABA Letter, supra note 98, at 350-51. But see Brudney,supra note
34, at 354; Lipton, Market Information, in FIFTH ANNUAL IN sTITUTE, supra note 2, at 287 ("[T]he
parity of information rule may emerge as the standard."); id. at 295.
176. Justice Powell did not reach another possible basis for Chiarella's conviction, the misappropriation theory, which is discussed in text accompanying notes 185-96, 309-22 infra. Powell
concluded that the misappropriation theory had not been included in the jury instructions. 445
U.S. at 236-37. See notes 185-87 infra.
177. 445 U.S. at 230. See note 267 and accompanying text infra.
178. 430 U.S. 462. See note 80 and accompanying text supra.
179. 445 U.S. at 232.
180.

Id. at 234-35.

181.
182.

Id.
See text accompanying notes 8-11 supra.
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disclose is owed only to the party in privity with the inside trader. 18 3 In
exonerating Chiarella, Powell repeatedly emphasized that Chiarella
had no special relationship with his sellers.'84 Even if the Court were
to relax its emphasis on privity, it seems unlikely that it would have
embraced the Shapiro solution of allowing an enormous class of plaintiffs to sue.
b. Misappropriation: In its brief to the Supreme Court, the
United States advanced an alternative theory to justify Chiarella's conviction.' 85 The brief argued that, by trading, Chiarella breached his
duty to the acquiring corporations (the takeover bidders).' 86 The Court
reserved judgment on this theory because it had not been submitted to
the jury.'8 7 Both Justice Brennan's concurrence 88 and Chief Justice
Burger's dissent' 89 openly embraced this misappropriation theory, although the
two differed on whether the theory had been presented to
90
the jury.
183. Harvey L. Pitt, Esq. has independently arrived at the same conclusion. Pitt, supra note 2,
at 643, 662-63.
184. See, e.g, 445 U.S. at 231-32 ("The Court of Appeals, like the trial court, failed to identify
a relationship between the petitioner and the sellers.
...
[emphasis added]); id. at 232-33 ("No
duty could arise from petitioner's relationship with the sellers of the target company's securities
... . [H]e was not a person in whom the sellers had placed their trust and confidence. He was,
in fact, a complete stranger who dealt with the sellers only through impersonal market transactions." [emphasis added]); id. at 230 ("[Aldministrative and judicial interpretations have established that silene ... may operate as a fraud actionable under § 10o) ....
But such liability is
premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction." [emphasis added]). Contra, Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d at
173; Stromfeld v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 496 F. Supp. 1084, 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
185. 445 U.S. at 235-36.
186. See generally Koeltl & Longstreth, supra note 175, at 848 (commenting that the Second
Circuit opinion in Chiarella was justified on a misappropriation theory, but that a disclose or
abstain duty to the investing public was unjustified). One commentator has also suggested that
lob-5 insider trading liability is based on-.isappropriation from the corporation. W. PAINTER,
supra note 2, at 197.
187. 445 U.S. at 237 n.21.
In United States v. Hall, an attorney pleaded guilty in November 1980 to an indictment
charging him with buying stocks based on nonpublic information misappropriatedfrom his clients
(the issuers). [1980] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,675. See Pitt, supra note 2, at 688. Relying on
judicial precedent and earlier SEC pronouncements, one district court flatly rejected this misappropriation theory, and stated that only corporate insiders and their tippees have the requisite
special relationship creating a duty to disclose before trading. United States v. Courtois, [Current]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,024, at 91,291-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
188. 445 U.S. at 238-39 (Brennan, J., concurring).
189. Id. at 239-45 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
190. Mr. Justice Brennan found "no instruction suggesting that one element of the offense
was the improper conversion or misappropriation of. . .nonpublic information." Id. at 239
(Brennan, J., concurring). The Chief Justice, however, found that the jury was charged on the
misappropriation theory. Id. at 243-45 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
For a general discussion of the Court's treatment of the misappropriation theory, see
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In the typical misappropriation situation, an employee, perhaps a
corporate or government official, improperly utilizes information
gained from his direct or indirect employer. In all or almost all cases,
however, the employer itself could not be a rule lOb-5 plaintiff. First,
rule lob-5 applies only to fraud.' 9 ' Although misappropriation would
be a breach of fiduciary duty to the employer, it might not constitute
fraud.'9 2 Second, in almost all cases, an employer would be neither a
purchaser nor a seller and, therefore, could not sue for damages because it would lack standing under Blue Chp Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores. 3 In his Chiarela concurrence, Justice Stevens reserved the
question of whether there can be any rule lOb-5 liability when no one
Deutsch, Chiarella v. United States: A Study in Legal Style, 58 TEx. L. REv. 1291, 1294-96, 1300
(1980).
191. Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. at 471-74. See notes 80, 157-59, 178-81 and
accompanying text supra; note 310 and accompanying text infra.
192. Cf. United States v. Courtois, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,024, at 91,290
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (misappropriation theory would add a gloss on the term "fraud" quite different
from its commonly accepted meaning) (citing Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green). But see Brudney, supra note 34, at 350.
The relationship between the "deceit" requirement and breach of fiduciary duty remains unclear. Compare Healey v. Catalyst Recovery, Inc., 616 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1980), notedin 6 J. CORP.
LAW 381 (1981); Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Co. v. American Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 606
F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 933 (1980); Kidwell ex rel. Penfold v. Meikle, 597
F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979); Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,434 U.S.
1069 (1978); Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066
(1978); Merritt v. Colonial Foods, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 910 (D. Del. 1980) with Panter v. Marshall
Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 283-88 (7th Cir. 1981); Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 614 F.2d 418 (5th
Cir. 1980); O'Brien v. Continental Illinois Nat'1 Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 593 F.2d 54 (7th
Cir. 1979); Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D. Tex. 1979). See 3B
H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 2, §§ 11.01, 11.03-.09, 11.15-.17, 11.20; 5A A. JACOBS, supra note 2,
pt. 5; W. PAINTER, supra note 2, at 267-70; Anderson, Rule Ob-5: Recent Developments, in
TWELFTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 595-99 (A. Fleischer, M. Lipton, R.
Mundheim eds., conference handbook, 1980); Campbell, Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green: An
Analysis Two Years Later, 30 ME. L. REv. 187 (1979); Ferrara & Steinberg,A ReappraisalofSanta
Fe: Rule lOb-5 and the New Federalism, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 263, 272-77, 282-94 (1980); Hazen,
CorporateMismanagement and the FederalSecuritiesAct's Antiraud Provisions: A FamiliarPath
With Some New Detours, 20 B.C. L. REv. 819, 819-40 (1979); Jacobs, How Sante Fe Affects lOb.5r
Proscrotions.AgainstCorporateMismanagement, 6 SEC. Ro. L.J. 3 (1978); Jacobs, Rule lOb-5 and
SelfDealing by CorporateFiduciaries:An Analysis, 48 U. CINN. L. REv. 643 (1979); Pitt, supra
note 2, at 629-33; Ribstein, The Scope ofFederalSecurities Law Liabilityfor Corporate Transactions, 33 Sw. L.J. 1129 (1980); Sherrard, FederalJudicialand Regulatory Responses to Sante Fe
Industries, Inc. v. Green, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 695 (1978); Note, supra note 80, at 1874; Note,
Goldberg v. Meridor. The Second Circuit'sResurrection of Rule 10b-5 Liability/or Breaches of
CorporateFiduciaryDuties to MinorityShareholders, 64 VA. L. REv. 765 (1978); Note, Rule l0b-5:
The CircuitsDebatetheExclusivity ofRemedies, the Purchaser-SellerRequirement,and Constructive
Deception, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 877, 896-907 (1980); Note, LiabilltyforCorporateMismanagement Under Rule 10b-5 After Sante Fe v. Green, 27 WAYNE L. REv. 269 (1980).
193.

421 U.S. 723.
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has civil standing.1 94 Nevertheless, Chief Justice Burger's dissent contains language which suggests a way to circumvent both the fraud re-

quirement and the standing barrier. The Chief Justice would hold that

"an absolute duty to disclose or refrain from trading arises from the
very act of misappropriating nonpublic information."' 95 In other
words, the trade based on misappropriated information would trigger a
duty to have disclosed, presumably to the other party to the transac-

tion.

96

The party in privity would have standing to sue for nondisclo-

sure. This approach is strained and anomalous. The misappropriation

theory would forbid employees either to use or to disclose the nonpublic information. A rule lOb-5 duty to disclose to the party in privity

before trading would compound the misappropriation or breach of
duty to the employer. Despite this irony, the duty-triggering approach

does manage to create a civil plaintiff. The problem of identifying the
party in privity remains, however.
Of course, the majority did not reach the issue of Chiarella's crimi-

nal liability under the misappropriation theory, much less his civil lia194. 445 U.S. at 238. See Deutsch, supra note 190, at 1295-96 & n.26. One reason why a
district court dismissed a rule lOb-5 criminal indictment against an alleged tippee of a misappropriator was that the misappropriator's employer was not a purchaser or seller. United States v.
Courtois, [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,024, at 91,926 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). But see 3 W.
NEw ENG. L. REV. 99, 118 n.133 ("Contrary to Justice Steven's assessment, . . . the actual purchaser or seller requirement would not preclude an actionable violation of rule lob-5 in a suit
initiated by the SEC.").
195. 445 U.S. at 243 n.4 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
196. Contra, Deutsch, supra note 190:
The theory contained in the Chief Justice's dissent--"that a person who has misappropriated nonpublic information has an absolute duty to disclose that information or to
refrain from trading"-leaves unclear the identity of the person to whom the duty of
disclosure is owed. The words of section 10(b) identify the acquiring corporation-a
purchaser of securities-as such a person.
Id. at 1295. See Duty to Disclose, supra note 73, at 115 n.128 ("Burger's dissent is silent [on the
...). But see United States v. Courtois, [Current] FED.
question of to whom the duty is owed].
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) %98,024, at 91,295-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (assuming that a misappropriator's
duty is not to the party in privity).
Professor Dooley observes that the misappropriation theory "seems squarely inconsistent
with the majority's opinion" and that not every instance of financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity under section 10(b). Dooley, supra note 39, at 70 n.294. Dooley either neglects or
rejects the possibility of creating bootstrap fraud by holding that the trade on misappropriated
information triggers a duty to disclose to the other party to the transaction. See also Koeltl &
Kubek, supra note 175, at 906-08 (recognizing but rejecting the possibility of creating bootstrap
fraud; stating that the misappropriator's duty was not to disclose the information but to obtain
permission from the employer/source before trading; concluding that traders with the misappropriator could not demonstrate causation); Morrison, supra note 172, at 224 (treating misappropriation as a fraud on the information source; because the source typically is not a purchaser or
seller, "it could be argued that there is no damage and, therefore, no actionable violation." Morrison also either neglects or rejects the possibility of bootstrap fraud.).
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bility. Even if the full Court eventually endorsed the misappropriation
theory, however, the majority almost certainly would not hold that the
misappropriation triggers a duty to disclose to the entire world, given
Justice Powell's emphasis on a special relationship between the inside
trader and the party in privity.
c. Concludingcomments on Chiarella: Chiarella involved the reversal of a criminal conviction. Therefore, Justice Powell did not reach
the practical and theoretical problems of allowing civil recovery to the
party in privity. The special relationship requirement does not eliminate the numerous difficulties discussed earlier, 197 including the causation anomaly created when the defendant had the choice of two courses
of conduct, one illegal (trading without disclosure) and one legal (no
trading, without disclosure), both of which would have resulted in the
same harm to the plaintiff.'98 Even without demonstrating causation,
however, the party in privity might be able to rescind under Exchange

Act section 29(b). 199
By focusing on the nondisclosure rather than the trade, and by
requiring a preexisting and independent duty to disclose, Powell was
able to bring inside trading within the deceit requirement of Santa Fe
Industries,Inc. v. Green. 2° He did not define the class of civil plaintiffs
who can demonstrate causation when suing an inside trader under rule
lOb-5. However, his opinion strongly suggests that only the party in
privity can sue, and then only if a special relationship existed between
the plaintiff and defendant. The Supreme Court has yet to address the
practical and theoretical problems of allowing civil recovery only to the
party in privity.
4. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc.
After the Supreme Court's decision in Chiarella, the Second Circuit, in
Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc.,2"' addressed the two following significant issues: (1) The proper class of plaintiffs in an action against a
20 2
tipping issuer; (2) the ceiling on damages awarded to plaintiffs.
Judge Mansfield found that the chief financial officer of Liggett &
Myers, Inc., with scienter, had disclosed material adverse nonpublic in197. See text accompanying notes 67-71, 81-84 siupra.
198. See text accompanying notes 67-71 supra.
199. See notes 153-54 and accompanying text supra.
200. 430 U.S. 462.
201. 635 F.2d 156. See notes 280-82 and accompanying text infra.
202. Among the other issues in the case was whether tipping by an insider violates rule lOb-5.
See notes 280-87 and accompanying text infra.
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formation on July 17, 1972 to an analyst at Loeb Rhoades & Co., a
stockbrokerage firm. The analyst relayed that information to his firm,
and to a stockbroker who promptly sold 1800 shares of Liggett stock on
behalf of his customers.2 °3 The district court held that the proper class
of plaintiffs consisted of uninformed buyers between the time of the to
and the subsequent public disclosure. 2 ° On appeal, the Second Circuit
mentioned this same class,20 5 and did not expressly deny that the class
opened with the tip. Nevertheless, Judge Mansfield's later discussion
of damages clearly indicated that the class should open not at the time
of the tip, but at the time the tippee trades. At one point Judge Mansfield stated: "[N]o injury occurs until the information is used by the
tippee. ' 20 6 Elsewhere, he stated that there is no liability for damages
unless a tippee trades.20 7 Most important, at the end of the opinion, the
court allowed recovery to those "who bought Liggett shares during the
period from the afternoon of July 17 to the close of the market on July
18. " 208 The tippee traded between 2:00 and 3:00 p.m. on July 17.209
The tip took place in the late morning of July 17.210 By opening the
class of plaintiffs in the afternoon, the court commenced the class with
the tippee's trade rather than with the tip.
Under the Second Circuit's opinion, the class does not close until
Thus, the
there has been public dissemination of the information.
court apparently endorsed 2 2 Shapiro's broad class of plaintiffs, 21 3 and
disregarded Chiarella'sindication that only the party in privity can recover.2 14 Justice Powell's "special relationship" approach suggests that
203. 635 F.2d at 161.
204. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 123, 128-29 (1978).
205. 635 F.2d at 158.
206. Id. at 169.
207. Id. at 165. The court reserved the question whether the SEC could seek injunctive relief
against tipping that cannot be shown to have resulted in trading. Id.
208. Id. at 173 (emphasis added).
209. Brief of Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee at 14, Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc.,
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Docket Nos. 79-7497 and 79-7519; Letter
from Donald J. Cohn, Esq., counsel for Liggett & Myers, to William K.S. Wang (Feb. 24, 1981)
(copy on file with Southern Calffornia Law Review).
210. Letter from Donald J. Cohn, Esq., counsel for Liggett & Myers, to William K.S. Wang
(Feb. 24, 1981) (copy on file with Southern CaliforiaLaw Review).
211. See notes 124-25 and accompanying text supra.
For another post-Chiarellaopinion endorsing the Shapiro class of plaintiffs, see Stromfeld v.
Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 496 F. Supp. 1084, 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
212. But see Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp., 648 F.2d at 94-95 (narrowly construing both the Shapiro and Elkind class of plaintiffs as those trading "contemporaneously" with
the inside trader). See text accompanying notes 233-49 infra.
213. See notes 112-13 and accompanying text supra.
214. See note 184 and accompanying text supra. Indeed, Elkind largely ignored Chiarella.
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if an officer of a closely held or publicly held corporation tips an outsider who subsequently trades, the proper plaintiff is the person in privity with the tippee. In both the closely held and publicly held contexts,
the tippee's trade would not trigger a duty to rescue all shareholders,
much less all investors.215 Indeed, Liggett or its officers may not even
have had a special relationship with the buyer in privity with the tippee.216 This buyer might not have held any shares previously. Chiarella did not resolve the issue of whether a special relationship could be
created simultaneously with the purchase.217 Even if the Supreme
Court were to endorse the misappropriation theory, the majority would
not be likely to hold that the misappropriation triggers a duty to disclose to the entire world.218 In short, Elkind's broad class of plaintiffs is
inconsistent with the spirit, if not the letter, of Chiarella.
After erroneously creating a huge class of plaintiffs, the Second
Circuit limited recoverable damages to the amount of defendant's profits. 219 The court could have held Liggett liable to this large class of
plaintiffs under either of two theories:
1. The gravamen of the violation is the tippee's trade. Liggett is
liable to the few individuals harmed by that trade. Because these victims cannot be identified, 220 however, damages should be prorated
among a larger group, each member of which might be an actual victim.
2. The tippee's trade triggered Liggett's duty to disclose to the
world. Therefore, Liggett is liable to those who bought its stock between the time it had a duty to disclose and the time of public dissemination of the information.
The Second Circuit's only reference to the Supreme Court's opinion is in a three-sentence footnote:
The Supreme Court ruled in Chiarella that there can be no violation of § 10(b)

unless the party so charged has violated a duty arising out of a relationship of trust. A
corporate insider who tips confidential information clearly violates a fiduciary obligation, see Chiarella,supra, 445 U.S. at 229 & n.12, 100 S. Ct. at 1115 & n.12. This obligation is breached by insider selling, e.g., Shapiro, supra; cf. Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d
46, 49 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920, 71 S. Ct. 741, 95 L. Ed. 1353
(1951), as well as buying, e.g., SEC v. Texas iulfSulphur Co., supra.
635 F.2d at 165 n.14.
215. See text accompanying note 183 supra.
216. See text accompanying note 286 infra.
217. See notes 273, 286 and accompanying text infra.
218. See text accompanying notes 195-96 supra.
219. 635 F.2d at 173.
220. See Part III(B)(5)(c) supra.
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The first theory has several defects. First, as mentioned earlier,2 2 1

the trade cannot be the gravamen of the offense because the trade itself
is not deceitful, an essential element of a rule lOb-5 violation.222 Second, prorating damages among a larger group of individuals, some of
whom might be actual victims, is contrary to the winner-take-all tradition in American law.1 3 Liggett either did or did not harm a particular

plaintiff. If Liggett did not harm the plaintiff, there should be no recovery. If, on the other hand, Liggett did harm the plaintiff, the corpora-

tion is liable for the plaintiffs actual damages.
At least one commentator has criticized the winner-take-all principle and has urged court imposed compromise.22 4 It is sometimes impossible to determine which of several defendants injured a single
plaintiff, although one of the defendants must be the culprit. On rare
occasions, the courts have solved this problem by prorating liability
among defendants.2 2 5 With stock market inside trading, the defendant
is known, but it may be difficult or impossible to identify who, among a

large group ofplaintffi, has actually been harmed. In this situation, a
court might be willing to break with tradition by prorating damages
among a large group of plaintiffs. Judge Mansfield rejected this ap221. See text accompanying note 159 supra.
222. See notes 80, 157-59, 178-81 and accompanying text supra; note 310 and accompanying
text infra.
223. See Coons, Compromise as PreciseJustice, 68 CALIF. L. Rav. 250, 259-60 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Compromise]; Coons, Approachesto Court ImposedCompromise-7he Uses of Doubt
andReason, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 750, 751, 758, 787 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Court ImposedCompromise]. Cf. Wetzel v. Eaton Corp., 62 F.R.D. 22, 24-25, 28-31 (D. Minn. 1973) (involving a
defective tractor part that injured the plaintiff, with no record of whether the part was made by the
tractor manufacturer or an independent supplier); Garcia v. Joseph Vince Co., 84 Cal. App. 3d
868, 872-75, 148 Cal. Rptr. 843, 845-47 (1978) (involving an allegedly defective fencing blade
which was returned to a bag containing blades manufactured by two different companies; the
identify of the particular blade was thereby lost). These two cases involved a situation opposite to
stock market inside trading. When someone trades on nonpublic information, the defendant is
known, but it is difficult or impossible to know which of several parties is the properplaintir In
Garcia and Wetzel, the plaintiff was known, but it was impossible to know which of two parties
was the proper defendant. No one was found liable in either case. See Note, MarketShare Liability. An Answer to the DES Causation Problem, 94 HARv. L. REv. 668, 678 n.51 (1981).
224. Compromise, supra note 223; Court Imposed Compromise, supra note 223, at 752-64.
225. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980),
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 285 (1980); Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) (en banc)
(Two hunters negligently fired toward the plaintiff and were held jointly liable because it was
impossible to determine which hunter's bullet had hit the plaintiff.). In Sindell, the plaintiff could
not identify which of several companies manufactured the particular pills that injured the plaintifl. The California Supreme Court held that each defendant had the burden of demonstrating
that it could not have made the harmful pills. If a defendant could not meet that burden, it would
be liable for a portion of the judgment. The percentage of liability would be equivalent to the
defendant's share of the market for the drug.
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proach's underlying assumption that the proper plaintiff is the victim of
the trade.2 26 One reason is that the plaintiff would find it difficult or
impossible to prove any harm from the defendant's trade.227 Another
reason is that: "This causation-in-fact approach. . . allows no recovery for the tippee's violation of his duty to disclose the inside information before trading. Had he fulfilled his duty, others, including holders
of the stock, could then have traded on an equal informational basis. ''z 2 8 In other words, the tippee's trade triggered a duty to disclose to
the world. Under this theory, liability should not be limited to the tippee's profits. Rather, Liggett should be held liable for the actual damages of all those harmed by the nondisclosure.229 If Liggett owes a
legal duty, it is responsible for the consequences of the breach. Earlier
in the opinion, Judge Mansfield expressed concern about Draconian
liability, which he described as "out of all proportion to the wrong
committed . . . and grossly unfair."23 The liability is Draconian,
however, because the Second Circuit has created such a broad quasiSamaritan duty. If Liggett has the duty to rescue investors throughout
the world from buying Liggett shares, its liability inevitably will be
enormous. If this is unfair, the logical solution is to limit the extent of
Liggett's moral duty, not the damages for which it is liable. 23 1 Limiting
the "damages" all plaintiffs can recover to the profits of the tippee does
an injustice to the concept of damages. Damages are generally mea226. 635 F.2d at 171.
227. Id.
In his discussion of limiting recovery to those who can demonstrate damage from the tippee's
trade, Judge Mansfield referred only to those who bought "at or after a tippee sold." Id. The
court assumed such buyers are harmed by the general price decline caused by a tippee's trade; in
fact, this temporary decline benefts those who purchase during the decline. See Manne, supra
note 62, at 115 (Buying on inside information increases the price during the interval before disclosure; sellers during this interval may actually benefit.); text accompanying notes 62-63 supra. At
another point, Judge Mansfield referred to "victims" who bought Liggett stockprior to a general
decline caused by tippee selling. 635 F.2d at 171-72. Such buyers are not harmed, because the
price will fall anyway once the adverse news becomes public. Judge Mansfield ignored the real
victims of the tippee's trade: induced and preempted traders. See text accompanying notes 58-60
supra.
228. 635 F.2d at 171 (emphasis added).
229. See Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 472 F. Supp. at 129, 133-35, rev'd, 635 F.2d at 16872. In the words of one commentator:
[1]f all traders can recover, there is no theoretical reason to limit the recovery to the
amount of profits earned by the insider. In effect, the courts would be allowing recovery
but stopping the dollar flow when the figures become too large. Such a result abandons
any pretense of particular damages to injured plaintiffs.
Damages to Uninformed Traders,sufpra note 56, at 315.
230. 635 F.2d at 170.
231. See notes 127-29 and accompanying text supra.
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sured by the extent of the harm to the plaintiff, not by the benefit accruing to the defendant as a result of his wrongful conduct.
An analogy illustrates these points. Suppose A throws a beer can
onto the road and it causes some flat tires. Further assume that on the
road there are fifty other beer cans indistinguishable from A's. The
fifty-one beer cans cause 1000 flat tires. If it is impossible to determine
which flat tires were caused byA's can, the court might holdA liable to
all 1000 flat-tire owners under either of two theories:
1. A's throwing one can made A liable only for the damage
caused by that particular can, but because it is impossible to identify
the actual victims, the damage caused by A's can will be estimated and
prorated among all 1000 flat-tire owners. 32
2. A's throwing one beer can triggered a Good Samaritan duty to
pick up all fifty-one cans.
If the court adopts the second theory, A should be liable for the
actual damages of all 1000 flat-tire owners. IfA owes a legal duty to
rescue numerous strangers from danger, A is responsible for all the
consequences of the breach. It would not make sense to estimate the
damage caused by one beer can and spread that among all 1000 flat-tire
owners.
5.

Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp.

In one paragraph, a recent Second Circuit panel redefined the proper
class of civil plaintiffs in inside trading cases. In Wilson v. Comtech
Telecommunications Corp., 133 the plaintiff had purchased shares about
a month after the inside traders' sales but before disclosure of the nonpublic information. The court held that the plaintiff lacked standing
because:
To extend the period of liability well beyond the time of the insider's
trading simply because disclosure was never made could make the
insider liable to all the world.... Any duty of disclosure is owed
only to those investors trading contemporaneously with the insider;,
non-contemporaneous traders do not require the protection of the
"disclose or abstain" rule because they do not suffer the disadvantage
of trading with someone who has superior access to information. See
Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 326 (6th Cir. 1976) (Celebrezze,
J., concurring), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977). This court re232. In fact, the Elkind group of buyer plaintiffs may not include the victim of Liggett's tippee's sale. The injured party may be a preempted seller. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
233. 648 F.2d 88.
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cently reiterated such a limitation on the scope of liability under rule
lob-5 for insiders trading in the open market:
The knowing use by corporate insiders of non-public
information for their own benefit or that of "tippees" by
trading in corporate securities amounts to a violation of
Rule lob-5 . . . which may give rise to a suit for damages
by uninformed outsiders who trade duringaperiod of tippee
trading.
Elkindv. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 165 (2d Cir. 1980) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).23 4
This opinion does not specify the meaning of "contemporaneous."
Trading one month after the inside trade is too long; it is unclear
whether a day or even an hour also would be too long. Regardless of
the meaning of "contemporaneous," however, the opinion is contrary
to both precedent and logic.
Wilson's holding is inconsistent with prior cases in the same circuit. Although the Elkind opinion is confusing, it clearly does not
make an inside trading defendant liable to contemporaneous traders.
Indeed, the word "contemporaneous" does not appear in Elkind. Nor
does Elkind cite Celebrezze's concurrence in Fridrich. Wilson cites
Elkind's casual reference to "outsiders who trade during a period of
tippee trading. '23 5 This passage is from a section of Elkind entitled
"Tipping Liability," which deals with the class of defendants, not
plaintiffs. As noted earlier," 6 Judge Mansfield's Elkind decision never
expressly discussed when the class of plaintiffs opens and closes. Nevertheless, some comments in the opinion indicate that the class opened
with the tippee's trade and closed upon dissemination of the information. The district court had held Liggett liable to all purchasers of Liggett stock from "July 11, 1972, when inside information was tipped, to
July 18, 1972, when this situation was cured by public release of the
same information."2 37 The circuit court narrowed this class, not be234.

Id. at 94-95.

Indeed, Wilson may go further even than Judge Celebrezze's Fridrich concurrence. In dictum, Judge Celebrezze suggested that, unlike an inside trader,a tiper may be liable to all those in
the market up to the point of effective disclosure (a class much broader than "contemporaneous"
traders). Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d at 327 (Celebrezze, J., concurring). See text accompanying note 167 supra. Wilson contains no such qualifying dictum.
235. Id.
236. See notes 204-10 and accompanying text supra.
237. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 472 F. Supp. at 129. Cf. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc.,
635 F.2d at 158 (rhe district court's plaintiff class consisted of uninformed buyers of Liggett stock
between the time of the first tip and subsequent public disclosure.).
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cause only "contemporaneous" traders had a cause of action, but because the first tip, on July 10, was not material. 2 38 The second and only
other tip did not occur until July 17.239
The Wilson class is also inconsistent with the Second Circuit's earlier Shapiro opinion, which affirmed the district court opinion. The
lower court opinion in Shapiro clearly indicates that the class of plaintiffs would not close until public dissemination. 40 Indeed, Judge Tenney had this broad non contemporaneous-trader class in mind when in
his appeal he referred to certification: "all persons who during the same
period purchased securities in the same company."'241 The Second Circuit expressed no disagreement with the trial judge's broad class of
plaintiffs. In Judge Tenney's cogent words, "Had the circuit court intended . . .a grave qualification [of Judge Tenney's plaintiff class],
surely it2 would have expressed that intent explicitly and unequivo' 24
cally.
Wilson's compatibility with earlier Second Circuit decisions is
largely academic, however, because Wilson's class of contemporaneously trading plaintiffs is not consistent with the privity requirement
24 3 Wilson nostrongly suggested by the Supreme Court in Chiarella.
244
opinion.
where mentioned the Supreme Court's
Not only is Wilson contrary to Supreme Court and Second Circuit
precedent, the contemporaneous-traders class of plaintiffs makes no
sense whether the gravamen of an inside trading offense is the trade or
the nondisclosure. As indicated in the preceding discussion of Judge
Celebrezze's concurrence in Fridrich, the victims of the inside trade are
not necessarily among those trading contemporaneously. 245 In any
event, Wilson seems to assume that nondisclosure constitutes the violation.246 If the defendant's trade triggers a quasi-Samaritan duty to dis238.

635 F.2d at 166-67.

239. Id. at 161, 167-68.
240. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 353 F. Supp. at 279-80. See
Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1975-19761 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,377, at 98,877 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (same case, deciding class action motion).
241. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1975-1976] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,377, at 98,877 & n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (emphasis added).

242. Id. at 98,877.
243. See text accompanying notes 182-84 supra.
244. In dictum, Wilson also endorsed Texas GulfSulhur's broad "disclose or abstain" rule
(see text accompanying notes 108-09 supra), despite Chiarella'srepudiation of the rule. See note
267 and accompanying text infra.

245. See text accompanying notes 166-67 supra.
246. See note 234 and accompanying text supra.
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close to the entire investing public, the harm of the nondisclosure
continues until public dissemination of the news.247 Under Wilson, the
trade triggers a disclosure obligation not to the world, but only to those
trading contemporaneously. The court's only justification for this narrowed obligation is that "non-contemporaneous traders do not require
the protection of the 'disclose or abstain' rule because they do not suffer
the disadvantage of trading with someone who has superior access to
information. 2 48 This explanation is a 'non sequitur. Not every nonprivity plaintiff, including contemporaneous traders, transacts with
someone with nonpublic information. A purchaser one minute after
the inside trade is no different from a buyer one month later (like Wilson). Neither purchaser dealt with or had contact with the inside
trader. If the defendant had a quasi-Samaritan duty to rescue one
buyer, he should have the same obligation to the other.
One possible judicial solution would be to hold that the party in
privity is the only proper plaintiff but, if that party is not identifiable,
recovery should be spread pro rata among all those who might have
been in privity. Such a compromise would solve many practical
problems, but would be contrary to the winner-take-all Anglo-American legal tradition.2 49 In any event, Wilson does not mention this rationale.
In summary, Wilson's restriction of standing to contemporaneous
traders is both illogical and contrary to precedent. The Second Circuit's muddled paragraph provides no satisfactory explanation for the
ruling.
6. R§fections on the Proper Class of Plaintifs
Although the landmark decisions of Inre Cady, Roberts & Co.2 50 and
SEC v. Texas WulfSulphur Co. 25 ' paved the way for the application of
rule lOb-5 to stock market inside trading, it is surprisingly difficult to so
apply the rule.252 Following are several possible classes of plaintiffs
that might be allowed to sue an inside trader.
1. All those who traded to their disadvantage between the time of
the inside trade and public dissemination of the information (the Sha247.
248.
ing note
249.
250.
251.
252.

See text accompanying notes 96, 127-29, 228-31 supra.
Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp., 648 F.2d at 94-95. See text accompany234 supra.
See notes 223-25 and accompanying text supra.
40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
See text accompanying notes 80-97 supra.
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pfro/Elkind class). The inside trade triggers a quasi-Samaritan duty to
have disclosed to the entire world. This broad duty creates the requisite moral and legal causation.2 5 3 The absurdity of this approach is
demonstrated by the resulting possibility of Draconian liability. In addition, the ShapirolElkindclass is contrary to the privity requirement
suggested by Chiarella.
A variation would allow recovery to the Shapiro class, but limit
liability to the amount of the defendant's profit. This is the Elkind solution. One practical problem with it is that, unless the defendant's
profit is large, an attorney has little incentive to bring a class action.2 54
A legal problem with Elkind is that the defendant's profit is equal to
the direct harm resulting from the trade,2 55 which cannot be the gravamen of a rule lOb-5 offense.2 56 If the defendant had a duty to disclose
to the world, the harm of the nondisclosure would far exceed the inside
trader's profits.
Even if the trade were the gravamen of the offense, the Elkind
approach of pro rata disgorgement would be contrary to the all-ornothing Anglo-American legal tradition. Most, if not all, members of
the Shapiro/Elkind class of plaintiffs are not harmed by the trade.
2. Only those trading contemporaneously with the inside trade
(the Judge Celebrezze 257/ Wilson class). Once "contemporaneous" is
defined, this class is easily identified, but it is not a logical one. If the
gravamen of the offense is nondisclosure, no reason exists why the defendant should owe a quasi-Samaritan obligation to disclose to a plaintiff trading one minute after the inside trade but not to a plaintiff
trading one month after the trade. Neither plaintiff dealt with or had
any contact with the inside trader. Even assuming (incorrectly) that the
trade is the gravamen of the offense, the victims of the trade are not
necessarily among those trading contemporaneously. Finally, the
253. See notes 64-67 and accompanying text supra.
254. Another practical problem occurs when some of the parties in privity with the defendant
are identifiable and sue for either damages or rescission under Exchange Act section 29(b). See
notes 153-54 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of this and other practical problems
with the Elkind approach, see Damages to Uninformed Traders,supra note 56, at 314 n.130.
By itself, the disgorgement remedy provides little deterrence to inside trading. The defendant
loses only his gains and is no worse offthan if he had not traded. The inside trader, however, may
be subject to criminal prosecution and to civil liability under state law or other provisions of
federal securities law. See 5B A. JACOBS, supra note 2, § 260.03(h).
255. See notes 56-58 and accompanying text supra.
256. See note 80 supra.
257. Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d at 323-27 (Celebrezze, J., concurring). See text accompanying notes 161-69 supra.
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Judge Celebrezze/ Wilson class is inconsistent with the privity requirement suggested by Chiarella.
3. All those injured by the inside trade itself. This is the
Fridrich258 class. As discussed earlier, 259 by preempting or inducing
other transactions, an inside trade definitely harms specific individuals.
Ironically, few if any members of the enormous ShapirolElkind class
of plaintiffs are injured by the inside trade itself. The major practical
problem with the Fridrich approach is the impossibility of identifying
the victims of the trade. The legal problem is that the act of trading is
not deceitful and so cannot be the gravamen of a rule lOb-5 offense.2 60
4. Only the party in privity, and only when there is special relationship of trust and confidence between the parties. This narrow class
of plaintiffs is suggested by Chiarella. A serious practical problem is
identifying the party in privity.26t Legally, however, the approach appears sound. The gravamen of the offense is nondisclosure (not the
trade). No artificial quasi-Samaritan obligation is created.
All four alternatives have formidable practical or legal flaws,
which result from two fundamental problems. First, the offensive part
of stock market inside trading does not fit easily within the deceit requirement of rule lOb-5. The inside trade has two aspects: the trade
and the nondisclosure of inside information. Generally the trade, not
the nondisclosure, is the offensive feature; the victims of the trade are
the ones who evoke sympathy, not the victims of the nondisclosure.
Only in rare instances is the nondisclosure aspect offensive-e.g., when
the inside trader has a special relationship with the party in privity.
Second, the victims of an inside trade who evoke sympathy (the trade
victims and at times the parties in privity) are in practice difficult to
identify.
The best solution is simply to recognize that rule lOb-5 civil liability cannot be legally and practically applied to stock market inside
trading. To create a workable civil remedy, Congress would have to
enact a specific statutory provision.262
258.

542 F.2d 307 (Engel, J.). See text accompanying notes 36-59 supra.

259. See notes 56-59 and accompanying text supra.
260. See note 80 supra.
261. The Chiarella special relationship test also drastically narrows the class of inside trading
defendants who violate rule lOb-5. See text accompanying notes 266-308 infra.
262. See Damages to Uninformed Traders,supra note 56, at 316-17. Cf. Dooley, supra note
39, at 62, 71 (The SEC should have sought Congressional authority to regulate inside trading.).
For a discussion of the solution in the proposed ALI Federal Securities Code, see text accompanying notes 350-91 infra.
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DEFENDANTS

Several SEC administrative decisions and circuit court opinions have
discussed who is subject to the rule lob-5 stricture against inside trading. These opinions have been extensively discussed by commentators. 63 This Article confines itself to a discussion of the Supreme
Court decision of Chiarella v. UnitedStates,2 6 4 in which the precise is-

sue was the class of inside traders subject to rule lOb-5. Chiarella was a
criminal case, but except for "willfulness" and the burden of proof reto impose rule lOb-5 civil
quired for a verdict, the elements necessary
265
and criminal liability are the same.

1. Requirement of a Relationship of Trust and Confidence
As mentioned in the previous section, Justice Powell held for the Court
that trading on material nonpublic information is not a per se violation
of rule lOb-5. 266 There must be a duty to disclose based on a "relation'267 Alship of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction.
though Justice Powell did not elaborate on what he meant by a
relationship of trust and confidence, he did state that a corporate insider268 could not purchase shares based on material nonpublic information because the insider owed an obligation to each shareholder.269
Powell paraphrased the SEC's definition of "insider" in In re Cady,
Roberts & Co.: "The Commission emphasized that the duty arose from
263. See note 98 supra.
264. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
265. Duty to Disclose,supra note 73, at 114 n.122. See United States v. Charnay, 537 F.2d
341, 348 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976); Xaphes v. Shearson, Hayden, Stone, 508 F.
Supp. 882, 886 (S.D. Fla. 1981) ("Although that case [Chiarella] charged defendant in a criminal
"); 5B A. JACOBS, supra note 2, § 263, at
context, the same analysis applies [to a civil case] ....
11-312. Cf. United States v. Persky, 520 F.2d 283, 288 (2d Cir. 1975) (no reason to apply a stricter
construction of rule lOb-5 in a criminal action).
266. See note 174 and accompanying text supra.
267. 445 U.S. at 230. See Dooley, supra note 39, at 69-70; Pitt, supra note 2, at 643; text
accompanying notes 174-77 supra, 341-42 infra.
A recent Second Circuit panel endorsed in dictum the Texas Gulf Sulphur rule that
"'A]nyone in possession of material inside information must either disclose it to the investing
public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it.. . or he chooses not to do so, must abstain from
trading in or recommending the securities concerned while such inside information remains undisclosed."' Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp., 648 F.2d at 94 (quoting SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969))
(emphasis added). See text accompanying notes 233-49 supra Texas GulfSulphur's broad prohibition was clearly repudiated by the Supreme Court in Chiarella;however, Wilson does not even
mention the Supreme Court's decision.
268. This Article uses the term "insider" to refer to employees of a corporation or those in an
equivalent relationship. To avoid confusion insider is italicized. See note 2 supra.
269. 445 U.S. at 230.
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the existence of a relationship affording access to inside information
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose ...

.270

Because of the complexity of anonymous market transactions, Justice Powel's test may allow many insiders to escape liability. An insider can utilize nonpublic information without trading with an
existing shareholder. For example, if an insider purchases stock from a
short seller (someone who has borrowed the shares and then sold), does
the insider owe a fiduciary duty to someone who has borrowed stock
and sold it in the hope that the price of the stock will decline? Suppose
the insider buys a call 271 and the writer of the call holds no stock. Presumably the insider owes no duty to the writer of the call and, therefore, does not violate rule lOb-5. This would be true even if the writer
subsequently purchased stock in the company. On the other hand, if
the writer of the call already held at least one share of stock of the
corporation, the insider'spurchase of the call would expose him to civil
270. Id. at 227 (citing In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 912 & n.15). In order to define
"insider," a post-Chiarella district court opinion recast Powell's paraphrase: "[I]nsider status results from being an officer, director or controlling shareholder or from standing in a special relationship affording access to inside information intended to be available only for a corporate
purpose." Feldman v. Sinkins Industries, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 839, 844 (N.D. Ca. 1980) (citing
Chiarellaand Cady, Roberts). Feldman held that although one corporation, Simkins, owned more
than 14% of the shares of Fibreboard (the largest single block), it was not an "insider" for the
purposes of rule lOb-5 because Simkins was not a controlling shareholder and was not even represented on the board of Fibreboard, and the plaintiff did not contend that Simkins had access to
any nonpublic corporate information. Id. For another variation of the Cady, Roberts definition
of insider, see Xaphes v. Shearson, Hayden, Stone, 508 F. Supp. 882, 884 n.3 (S.D. Fla. 1981)
("those persons who by reason of their positions and special relationships with the corporation
have access to information not available to those with whom they are dealing"). A recent SEC
administrative opinion refused to distinguish between tips by lower level employees and top executives. In re Dirks, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 17480, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
1 82,812, at 83,948 (Jan. 22, 1981) ("The purposes served by the insider trading proscriptions are
").
just as compelling when the corporate informant is not of the highest rank ....
For a post-Chiarella discussion of the definition of insider, see 71 J. CIuM. L.C. & P.S. 474,
479 n.59 (1979). For apre-Chiarellaanalysis of the definition of insider, see 2 A. BROMBERO & L.
LOWENFELS, supra note 2, § 7.4(6)(b); 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 2, § 66.02[a]; W. PAINTER, Supra
note 2, § 5.02. For the American Law Institute's definition of insider, see note 347 infra. For
another post-Chiarella decision involving nondisclosure by a money-market broker in the "shortterm repurchase agreement" market, see SEC v. Miller, [1980] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,551,
at 97,889 (S.D.N.Y.). For a discussion of Feldman, Miller, and other decisions citing Chiarella, see
Pitt, supra note 2, at 661-69. For a discussion of post-Chiarella SEC enforcement initiatives
against inside trading, see Pitt, supra note 2, at 686-91.
271. In March 1981, a Chicago options trading firm filed a federal lawsuit alleging that certain investors (tippees of insiders) bought large amounts of call options in Amax, Inc. stock just
prior to the public announcement of a takeover offer by Standard Oil Company of California.
OptionsFirmAllegesInsiderTrading Over Socal's$4 Billion Offerfor.4max, Wall St. J., March 11,
1981, at 10, col. 3.
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and criminal liability. 272
If an insider sells stock based on material adverse nonpublic information, the buyer may not have held any stock previously. In a footnote, Justice Powell mentioned the possibility that "the director or
273
officer assumed a fiduciary relation to the buyer by the very sale."
This analysis is strained.
When an insider with nonpublic adverse news buys a put, there is
no fiduciary relationship between the insider and the writer, unless the
writer fortuitously held at least one share of the company's stock already. To minimize his risk, a put writer is likely to hold cash
equivalents 2 74 or even to short sell the stock which he is obligating himself to buy. Therefore, he probably would not hold any shares outright.
The liability of tippees is even more problematic.2 7 5 A tippee has
no fiduciary relationship with the corporation or its shareholders.27 6 In
a footnote in Chiarela,Justice Powell mentioned that a tippee conceivably could be held liable as a participant after the fact in the insider's
breach of fiduciary duty by tipping.27 7 How the insider tipper breaches
272. For a general discussion of option trading, see sources cited at note 60 supra.
273. 445 U.S. at 227 n.8. See Morrison, supra note 172, at 217. But see Dooley, supra note
39, at 70-71 (concluding that when an insider sells to an outside party, the requisite fiduciary
relationship is absent).
274. Gordon, Clothing the Naked 'ut," 14 REv. SEc. REG. 997 (1981).
275. Justice Blackmun's dissent noted: "The Court fails to specify whether the obligations of
a special relationship must fall directly upon the person engaging in an allegedly fraudulent transaction, or whether the derivative obligations of 'tippees,' that lower courts long have recognized,
are encompassed by its rule." 445 U.S. at 246 n.l (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
276. Cann, supra note 98, at 262 & n.77.
277. 445 U.S. at 230 n.12. See Xaphes v. Shearson, Hayden, Stone, 508 F. Supp. 882, 886
(S.D. Fla. 1981) (" Tippees' of corporate insiders are liable as participants after the fact in the
insider's breach of a fiduciary duty.") (dictum); United States v. Courtois, [Current] FED. SEC. L.
REP. 98,024, at 91,290 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (tippees can be liable as aiders and abettors of tippers)
(dictum); Morrison, supra note 172, at 222-23. Cf.Brudney, supra note 34, at 348 (pre-Chiarella
conclusion that receipt of information from insider taints the recipient). An SEC release analyzed
Chiarella as follows: "[The Court in its opinion clearly indicated that insiders and their toppees
continue to be liable under Rule lob-5 when they trade on material non-public inside information." SEC Release Nos. 33-6239, 34-17120, and IC-1 1336 (Sept. 4, 1980), reprintedin [1980] SEc.
REG.& L. REP.(BNA) #569 L-l, at L-2 (emphasis added). For other discussion of this release,
see notes 299, 322 infra.
Citing, interala, footnote 12 of Powell's opinion, a recent SEC administrative opinion stated
that tippees of corporate insiders are liable for utilizing or tipping nonpublic information. In re
Dirks, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 17480, [Currentl FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,812, at
83,945, 83,948 n.42 (Jan. 22, 1981). Justice Powelrs footnote 12, however, only suggested that
tippees are liable. "'Tippees' of corporate insiders have been held liable. . . . The tippee's obligation hasbeen diewed as arising from his role as a participant after the fact in the insider's breach
of a fiduciary duty." 445 U.S. at 230 n.12 (emphasis added). See note 275 supra.
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rule lOb-5 is not clear.2 78 After Santa Fe Industries,Inc. v. Green and
Chiarella itself, the insider tipper must breach a duty to disclose to
someone with whom he has a special relationship. Presumably, Powell
is suggesting that the duty is owed to the shareholder who will subsequently sell to the tippee. If the tippee does not trade, there apparently
is no rule lOb-5 violation by anyone because there was never any person to whom the tipper owed a duty to disclose.
Even with tippers of good news, this analysis is strained. When an
inside tipper transmits bad news, however, the theory breaks down
completely. The tippee may sell his shares to someone who previously
held none. At the time of the tip, the tippee's buyer was not a shareholder and was not owed a duty by the tipper. Because neither the
tipper nor the tippee has transacted with anyone to whom either owed a
fiduciary duty, there has been no rule lOb-5 violation. The only escape
from this conclusion is to hold that an insider owes a fiduciary duty to
both existing shareholders and those who will subsequently become
shareholders. The tippee then becomes a participant after the fact in
the tipper's past breach of fiduciary duty to the investor who will become a shareholder as a result of the tippee's trade. The artificiality of
this theory is obvious.
When the insider tips a nontrading tippee, who in turn tips someone else who trades, the "participant after the fact" analysis becomes
even more cumbersome. The first generation tippee is a participant after the fact in the insider's breach of fiduciary duty either to the existing
shareholders who will sell to the second generation tippee (good news),
or to those who will subsequently become shareholders when they buy
from the second generation tippee (bad news).2 79

Despite all these difficulties, in a post-Chiarella opinion, the Second Circuit applied rule lOb-5 to the defendant tipper in Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc.,280 a case discussed earlier in a different context.28t
The opinion largely ignored Chiarella, not only in determining the
278.

In In re Dirks, the SEC held that a nontrading tipper is liable as an aider and abettor of

the trading tippee. In re Dirks, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 17480, [Current] FED. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH)

82,812, at 83,945 (Jan. 22, 1981). This analysis is circular. Earlier in the same

paragraph, the SEC cited footnote 12 of Justice Powel's opinion, which suggested that a trading
tippee might be liable as a participant after the fact in the insider tipper's breach of fiduciary duty.
See note 277 and accompanying text supra. The tipper and the trading tippee cannot both be
secondarily liable; someone must be a primary violator.
279. See generally B. RIDER & H. FFRENCH, supra note 21, at 76.
280. 635 F.2d at 165-68.
281. See text accompanying notes 201-32supra (discussing Elkind's views on the proper class
of plaintiffs and on limiting damages).
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proper class of plaintiffs,28 2 but also in imposing liability on a particular defendant (Liggett & Myers). As indicated earlier, 28 3 Liggett tipped
adverse news to an analyst, who in turn passed the information along
to a stockbroker. The stockbroker sold 1800 shares on behalf of a client. 84 The court's application of Chiarella consisted of a vague threesentence footnote, 2 85 which did not discuss any special relationship between Liggett and the buyer(s) of the 1800 shares. The buyer(s) may
have held no Liggett shares previously. The Second Circuit did not
even cite the footnote in Chiarella286 which mentioned the possibility
that an insider selling directly to a nonshareholder might assume a
fiduciary relation to the buyer by the very sale. One might infer from
Powell's suggestion in this footnote 287 that a special relationship between Liggett and the buyer(s) of the 1800 shares arose simultaneously
with the 1800 share transaction. Liggett's tip would breach a fiduciary
duty to the buyer(s) of the 1800 shares with whom Liggett would later
have a special relationship. The Second Circuit did not even engage in
this cumbersome analysis, much less attempt to defend it. Citing
Elkind, another recent Second Circuit decision simply assumed that
both trading tippees and their tippers violate rule lOb-5. 8 8 The court's
brief discussion did not mention or cite Chiarella.28 9
To return to Chiarella, two kinds of tippees apparently would escape liability entirely under Justice Powell's fiduciary duty theory. The
first is the so-called accidental tippee,z9 0 who inadvertently overhears a
private conversation between insiders through no fault of the insiders.
The second type is the surreptitious tippee,2 9' who uses eavesdropping
devices to gain valuable information, again through no fault of the insiders. Because the insiders were not negligent, there has been no
breach of fiduciary duty in which the tippee can participate after the
fact. If the insiders were negligent, perhaps in talking too loudly, it is
unclear whether this negligence could be the basis of a breach of fiduciary duty on which a tippee's lOb-5 violation could be based. The insid282. See text accompanying notes 211-18 supra.
283. See text accompanying note 203 supra.
284. 635 F.2d at 161.
285. 635 F.2d at 165 n.14. See note 214 .supra.
286. 445 U.S. at 227 n.8. See note 273 and accompanying text supra.

287. 445 U.S. at 227 n.8.
288. State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
T 98,005, at 91,207, 91,209 (2d Cir. 1981).
289. Id.
290. See generally B. RIDER & H. FFRENCH, supra note 21, at 75.
291. For a reference to accidental and surreptitious tippees, see Investors Management Co.,
Inc., 44 S.E.C. 633, 641 n.18 (1971).
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ers themselves would lack scienter and would not be liable.2 92

The Powell test would also fail to reach much of the trading on

"outside" information, 29 3 ie., information not derived directly or indi-

rectly from the issuer or any of its employees or agents.294 If someone
not associated with the issuer traded on the basis of nonpublic outside

information, both the trader and his information source would lack the
requisite special relationship with the party in privity.
"Outside" information includes both "market" and "corporate"

information. "Market" information is "information about events or
circumstances which affect the market for a company's securities but
which do not affect the company's assets or earning power." 295 Examples of market information include information about a pending tender
offer or a favorable recommendation by a brokerage firm or journal-

ist. 296

"Corporate information" is information about events or circum-

292. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 689-95 (1980) (holding that scienter is a necessary
element of a violation of rule lOb-5 regardless of the identity of the plaintiff or the nature of the
relief sought); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194-214 (1976) (holding that scienter is a
prerequisite to rule lOb-5 liability in a private civil action for damages); Note, supra note 154, at
270-79 (discussing Aaron).
293. See Pitt, supra note 2, at 656-67. Cf.[1980] SEc. REG. & L. REP.(BNA) #579 A-4, at A5 (November 11, 1980) ("If one reads the words in Chiarella,it is certainly possible to construct a
number of theories under which outsiders in possession of outside information could conceivably
be held liable under Rule lOb-5. If one reads the music of Chiarella,it appears that this is not an
acceptable category of liability unless there exists a specific, concrete, and affirmative duty to
disclose.") (remarks of Harvey L. Pitt, Esq. at PLI Twelfth Annual Institute on Securities Regulation).
294. See Koeltl & Kubek, supra note 175, at 904; ABA Letter, supra note 98, at 348-49. This
terminology is not universal. For a different classification of nonpublic information see 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 2, § 66.02[b], at 3-338. See also Koeltl & Longstreth, supra note 175, at 844
(describing the ambiguous use of the term "market information" to refer to either information
which affects the market for a company's securities but not the company's assets or earning power,
or information emanating from a source other than the issuer). For examples of "outsiders" who
might trade on nonpublic information, see text accompanying note 363 infra.
295. Fleischer, Mundheim, & Murphy, supra note 175, at 799; Koeltl & Kubek, supra note
175, at 904. See also 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 2, § 66.02[b], at 3-336 n. 11;Koeltl & Longstreth,
supra note 175, at 844; Pitt, supra note 2, at 652-54.
In reversing Chiarella's conviction, Justice Powell noted that "the 'market information' upon
which [Chiarella] . . .relied did not concern the earning power or operations of the target company, but only the plans of the acquiring company." 445 U.S. at 231. This statement could be
viewed as disdain for liability based even on inside market information, e.g., a president purchasing stock of his own company in advance of a tender offer by the issuer itself. Pitt, supra note 2, at
652. Nevertheless, Justice Powell later emphasized the "special relationship" test. Presumably, he
would impose liability on an insider trading on inside, market information. See Id at 642.
296. Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979), noted in 29 DE PAUL L. REV.287
(1979); 19 WASHBURN L.J. 382 (1980); 26 WAYNE L. REV. 1021 (1980). Zweig involved a financial
columnist's duty to disclose conflicts of interest to his readers. That duty was triggered by the
publication of the column, not by his purchase of stock prior to its recommendation through his
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stances which affect the company's assets or earning power.2 97
"Outside corporate information" is information about the company's
assets or earning power not derived directly or indirectly from the issuer or any of its employees or agents.
One example of outside corporate information is a government official's knowledge that a major federal suit will be settled favorably to a
corporate defendant. 291 Conceivably, a government official or an individual with some other special status has a fiduciary duty to the world,
but this seems contrary to the spirit of Justice Powell's requirement that
there be a special relationship of trust and confidence between plaintiff
and defendant.299 Significantly, no Justice endorsed the Second Circolumn (known as "scalping"), although the prior purchase was one of several conflicts of interest
which the columnist failed to disclose to his readers. 594 F.2d at 1268. See Feldman v. Simkins
Indus., Inc., 492 F. Supp. 839, 846 (N.D. Cal. 1980) ("Zweig is a case of active market manipulation and conflict of interest, not mere nondisclosure."). But see Brudney, supra note 34, at 369
("The opinion in the Zweig case indicates an antiscalping obligation running to public investors
). But f Koeltl & Kubek, supra note 175, at 907 (suggesting that Zweig's
under rule lob-5 ....
finding that the reporter has a duty to disclose may be inconsistent with Chiarella'sholding that a
duty of disclosure cannot arise simply because of access to or possession of market information);
Pitt, supra note 2, at 660 ("[G]iven Ninth Circuit's candid admission that no fiduciary relationship
existed between the plaintiff and the joumalist/defendant, Zweig may be inconsistent with
Chiarella, unless an alternative manipulation approach is taken."); Duty To Disclose,supra note
73, at 116 ("[A]fter Chiarella,it is unclear whether scalping would violate Rule lob-5.").
Earlier the SEC had proceeded against the same defendant on two theories: (I) that the
column should have disclosed the earlier purchases; and (2) that the columnist's earlier purchases
triggered a duty to disclose his intent to recommend. SEC v. Campbell, [1972-1973 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,580, at 92,703 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (summary of complaint
requesting injunctive relief) (discussed in Fleischer, Mundheim, & Murphy, supra note 175, at
827-32). For a general discussion of scalping, including a useful distinction between an analyst's
or columnist's advance purchases on corporate information and similar purchases on market information (the former being justified, the latter not), see Brudney, supra note 34, at 368-71.
297.

FIFTH ANNUAL INsTITuTE, supra note 2, at 287-88 (remarks of Martin Lipton).

For a discussion of "outside market" information, see Fleischer, Mundeim, & Murphy, supra
note 175, at 807 & n.36.
298. For a discussion of the use of inside information by government officials, see H. MAjnN,
supra note 20, at 171-89 (opposing such trading); Fleischer, Mundheim, & Murphy, supra note
175, at 821-24; Note, The Government Insiderand Rule 10b-5. A New Applicationforan Expanding

Doctrine, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 1491 (1974).
299. But see Morrison, supra note 172, at 221, quoting the following passage from Powell's
opinion in Chiarella: "[The Second Circuit held Chiarella liable] although . . . he received no
confidential information from the target company [and] [m]oreover, the 'market information'...
did not concern the earning power or operations of the target company, but only the plans of the
acquiring company." 445 U.S. at 231 (emphasis added). In Morrison's opinion, this language
"suggests a difference where the nonpublic information is corporate in nature." Morrison, supra
note 172, at 221. It is not clear whether Morrison is referring only to inside corporate information
or to both inside and outside corporate information. Powell probably would not distinguish between inside corporate and inside noncorporate (market) information, or between outside corporate and outside noncorporate (market) information. His special relationship test is affected not
by the type of information but by the duty of the trader to the other party to the transaction. The
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cuit's holding that Chiarella owed a duty to disclose to all investors

because of his status as someone who regularly received material nonpublic information." °
Another example of trading on outside corporate information
would be the purchase by Sears Roebuck of the stock of a supplier

prior to awarding it a large contract. Although some pre-Chiarella
commentators have suggested that an issuer's major or sole supplier or
customer may be considered an insider for the purposes of rule lOb5,301 such inside traders might not meet Chiarella'srequirement of a
special relationship to the issuer's shareholders.
On the other hand, certain securities professionals, like broker-

dealers, may be precluded from trading on "outside corporate information" or "outside market" information because they owe a fiduciary
duty to all those with whom they deal in securities. °2 Specialists and
market-makers have a special status that may create conflicting obligaSEC is also of the opinion that the Chiarella decision did not distinguish between corporate and
market information:
The Court in Chiarella did not distinguish between corporate and market information
where there exists a duty to disclose such information or abstain from trading. Nor does
the Commission believe that any such distinction is appropriate, since both corporate
and market information may be material to an investment decision. Moreover, Section
10(b) and Rule lob-5 by their terms do not distinguish between corporate and market
information.
SEC Release Nos. 33-6239, 34-17120, and IC-11336 (Sept. 4, 1980), rrinted in [1980] SEC. RHO.
& L. REP. (BNA) #569 L-1, at L-2 n.12 (Sept. 10, 1980). For other discussion of this release, see
notes 277 supra and 322 infra. Cf. Koeltl & Kubek, supra note 175, at 904 (no reasonable basis for
distinguishing between inside corporate and inside market information).
300. Justice Powell, however, believed that Blackmun's dissent expressed a "view . . . not
substantially different from the [Second Circuit] Court of Appeals' theory." 445 U.S. at 235 n.20.
301. 2 A. BROMBERG & L. LowENFELS,supra note 2, § 7.4(6)(b), at 181 & n.171; 5 A. JACOBS,
supra note 2, § 66.02[a], at 3-286 & n.60; Solomon & Wilke, SecuritiesProfessionalsandRule lob.
5: Legal Standards, Industry Practices,Preventative Guidelines and Proposalsfor Reform, 43
FoPs4 M L. REv. 505, 528-29 (1975).
302. Brudney, supra note 34, at 349; Solomon and Wilke, supra note 301. See 3A H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 2, § 9.20[5]; Fleiseher, Mundheim, & Murphy, supra note 175, at 847. See
generally SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963) (registered investment
adviser has duty to disclose relevant trading facts regarding his own account); Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 1978) (stockbroker owes a fiduciary duty to customer);
Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1943) (fraud and
overreaching found for selling securities at prices above the market value); M.S. Wein & Co., 23
S.E.C. 735 (1946) (manipulation of the over-the-counter securities market and fraud in the repurchase of securities); 3 L. Loss, supra note 49, at 1482-93 (shingle theory: fraud for a dealer to sell
securities to a customer at a price not reasonably related to the current market); 1 S. GOLDBERO,
FRAUDULENT BROKER-DFALER PRACTICES ch. 8 (1978); Cohen and Rabin, Broker-DealerSelling
PracticeStandards: The ImportanceofAdministrativeAdjudication in Their Development, 29 LAW
& CONTEMP. PRoB. 691, 694-710 (1964); Knauss,A4 Reappraisalofthe Role of Disclosure, 62 MIcH.
L. REv. 607, 635-43 (1964) (disclosure duties of broker-dealers and investment advisers); Note,
Conflicting Duties of BrokerageFirms, 88 HAsv. L. REv. 396 (1974); Comment, Current Problems
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tions. One duty is to treat customers fairly and possibly to disclose

material nonpublic information to them. Another responsiblity, however, is to maintain an orderly and efficient market.3"3 In order to perform the latter function, these intermediaries may be allowed to exploit
market information, subject to restrictions imposed by the SEC and
self-regulatory bodies. 3° A footnote in Justice Powell's opinion in
Chiarella hints that under certain circumstances securities professionals
who "contribute to a fair and orderly marketplace"30 5 might be allowed
some latitude to utilize outside market information. 0 6
In short, the disclosure obligations of market-makers and specialists are unclear. Suppose that a brokerage firm like Merrill Lynch buys
for its own investment account a security in which it does not make a
market. Merrill Lynch may owe a fiduciary duty to its own clients, but
not to strangers (e.g., other securities firms). If that were so, there
would conceivably be situations in which Merrill Lynch could trade on
nonpublic outside information with strangers, but not with someone
who was coincidentally a client.3 °7
This example raises the interesting issue of inadvertent violations
of rule lOb-5. Suppose, for example, government officials do not owe a
fiduciary duty to the world. Further suppose that when trading in a
security in which it does not make a market, Merrill Lynch owes a
in Securities Regulation, 62 MICH. L. REV. 680, 730-43 (1964) (potential broker-dealer conflict of
interest with brokerage fiduciary duty to customer).
303. See sources cited in note 49 supra.
304. Brudney, supra note 34, at 363-64; Fleischer, Mundheim, & Murphy, supra note 175, at
847-5 1; ABA Letter, supra note 98, at 350; Morrison, supra note 172, at 218-19; Pitt, supra note 2,
at 656. See Bunch, supra note 98, at 754-56.
305. 445 U.S. at 233 n.16.
306. Justice Powell noted that a broad rule of insider trading liability would contrast with
Congress' careful action in an area such as
Section 11 of the 1934 Act [which] &enerally forbids a member of a national securities
exchange from effecting any transaction on the exchange for its own account.. . . Congress has specifically exempted specialists from this prohibition. . . . The exception is
based upon Congress' recognition that specialists contribute to a fair and orderly marketplace at the same time they exploit the informational advantage that comes from their
possession of buy and sell orders. Similar concerns with the functioning of the market
prompted Congress to exempt market makers, block positioners, registered odd-lot dealers, bona fide arbitrageurs, and risk arbitrageurs from § 1l's prohibition on member
trading.
445 U.S. at 233-34 n.16 (citations omitted).
On the basis of this language, one commentator concluded: "The Court's analysis. . . leaves
the impression that it created an 'implied' exception to Rule lob-5 for market professionals.'
Morrison, supra note 172, at 221.
307. When trading on nonpublic "outside information," Merrill Lynch should also avoid
trading with someone in a special relationship with the source of the outside information. Otherwise, Merrill Lynch might be a participant after the fact in the source's breach of fiduciary duty.
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fiduciary duty only to its clients. Assume that a government official
reveals nonpublic outside information about Acme Corporation to
Merrill Lynch. Merrill Lynch does not make a market in Acme. On
the basis of the information, Merrill Lynch attempts to locate an institution which is not a Merrill Lynch client and is willing to sell a block
of Acme. Amherst College fits both categories, and it sells Acme stock
to Merrill Lynch. Unbeknownst to the trading department of Merrill
Lynch, however, Amherst has an old inactive account with the Springfield, Massachusetts branch of Merrill Lynch. Assuming that this account qualifies Amherst as a client of Merrill Lynch and that Amherst
has the requisite special relationship with Merrill Lynch, the question is
whether Merrill Lynch should be exonerated because it believed that it
had no special relationship with Amherst and thus lacked the requisite
element of scienter.3 °8
In summary, before imposing rule lOb-5 liability, Justice Powell
required a relationship of trust and confidence between the inside
trader and the plaintiff. The latter must apparently be the other party
to the transaction. Powell noted that a corporate insider would have
the requisite special relationship with each corporate shareholder. If a
corporate insider buys shares from an existing shareholder, a special
relationship between the parties unquestionably exists. If an insider
sells to a new shareholder, a special relationship can be found, but the
analysis is strained. If the insider buys shares from a short seller, or if
the insider purchases puts or calls, the insider may not have a relationship of trust and confidence with the party in privity. The special relationship requirement may also allow tippees, particularly inadvertent
and surreptitious tippees, to escape liability altogether. Finally, the
Powell test would fail to reach much, if not all, trading on outside information.
2. The MisappropriationTheory
As mentioned earlier in this Article,3" 9 the Court did not reach the issue
of Chiarella's liability for trading in breach of his duty to his indirect
employers, the takeover bidders. Justice Powell expressly reserved
comment on the misappropriation theory, which would impose rule
lOb-5 liability on those who trade on material nonpublic information in
breach of a duty to the information source, and possibly on those who
trade on information obtained through a tort against the information
308.

See note 292 supra.

309. See text accompanying notes 185-96 supra.
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source. For those who oppose trading by corporate insiders on nonpublic information, one advantage of the misappropriation theory, is
that it could be used to impose criminal and civil liability not only on
an insider who trades in stock but also on one who buys puts or calls
based on nonpublic information. The insider's purchase of an option
based on misappropriated information could trigger a duty to have disclosed to the option writer. The insider would be liable both criminally
and civilly for the nondisclosure.
When the inside or outside misappropriator tips rather than trades,
both the tipper and the tippee may be liable under rule 10b-5. The
tippee could be liable on the following basis. If a tippee receives and
trades on information whose ultimate source is a misappropriator, a
duty to have disclosed to the other party to the transaction is imposed.
The tipper might be indirecly liable as a co-conspirator of the tippee, a
participant before the fact.
Imposing direct liability on the misappropriator/tipper is more
difficult. As mentioned earlier, the misappropriator's tip is a breach of
fiduciary duty to his employer, but rule 10b-5 liability requires deceit.310 For deceit to be present, the tip must have triggered a duty to
disclose. The tipper's duty to disclose might run to the party with
whom the tippee will trade in the future. Under this theory, if the tippee does not trade, the tipper has not violated 10b-5, because there was
never any person to whom the tipper owed a duty to disclose.
A misappropriator, however, could tip someone who does not
trade but tips someone else who does trade. The nontrading tippee
may have no relationship to the employer of the misappropriator, but
may be jointly liable with his own trading tippee and/or the misappropriator. The possible theories are conspiracy, co-venture, or aiding
and abetting.31
The above discussion assumes that the tippee received the information as a result of a deliberate tip from the tipper. Tippees may also
gain information surreptitiously or inadvertently.31 2 Chief Justice Burger broadly defined misappropriation as obtaining an informational
310. See notes 80, 157-59, 178-81 and accompanying text supra.
When a misappropriator trades (rather than tips), deceit can be created by a holding that the
trade based on misappropriated information triggered a duty to have disclosed to the party in
privity. See notes 192, 195-96 and accompanying text supra.
311. See generaly ITT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980); In re Carter, SEC Release
34-17597 (Feb. 28, 1981); Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of
1934, 69 CALiF. L. Rav. 80 (1981); 45 U. CM. L. REv. 218 (1977); 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 862 (1978).
312. See notes 290-91 and accompanying text supra.
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advantage "by some unlawful means. 313 Therefore, even a surreptitious tippee's trade based on unlawfully obtained information would
trigger a duty to disclose to the other party. 314 On the other hand, an
inadvertent tippee does not acquire information illegally and has no
fiduciary relationship with the information source. The inadvertent
tippee thus may not be covered by the misappropriation theory. In
short, the misappropriation theory may be used to impose liability on
most tippers and tippees, but in many instances only with great difficulty-although applying the misappropriation theory is no harder
than applying the special relationship rule.
Another problem with the misappropriation theory is its dependence on employer prohibition of trading on nonpublic information. If
the employer permits such trading, no misappropriation occurs. If,
however, the employer bans such transactions, the misappropriation
turns a violation of a company rule into a federal crime. Employers
might choose to rescind their3 1personnel
rules against inside trading to
5
avoid such drastic sanctions.
The misappropriation theory would fail to reach a great deal of
trading on information not derived from a corporate source. An example of trading on such outside information discussed earlier was the
purchase by Sears of common stock of a supplier before awarding it a
large contract.316 If the corporate source of outside information (ie.,
Sears) itself trades, there can be no misappropriation of the information. Moreover, if an employee of the outside corporate source
purchases stock, there is no improper conversion of information unless
the employer itself planned to purchase and the employee usurped a
corporate opportunity, or the employer had prohibited such transactions. Therefore, if the employer plans to trade on inside information
313. 445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
314. But cf Koeltl & Kubek, supra note 175, at 906 (Chief Justice's standard is too broad if it
covers all information obtained by unlawful means; under majority's opinion, rule lOb.5 forbids
only trading on fraudulently obtained information, not on information obtained through, say,

theft.). This focus may be erroneous. The fraud may not be the acquisition of the information but
the breach of the duty to disclose triggered by the use of the misappropriated information. See
notes 195-96 and accompanying text supra.
315. But see Ross, DisclosureRegulation in FinancialMarkets: Implicationsof Modern Finance
Theory and Signaling Theory, in IssuEs IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 177, 184 (F. Edwards ed.

1979) (arguing that stockholders will not permit managers to trade on inside information, not
because of any moralistic attitudes, but to avoid overcompensation that would frustrate the incentive system). Cf Lehman Bros. Issues Warning to Traders,Syndicate Personnel,Wall St. J., Feb.
26, 1981, at 48, col. 4 (Lehman Brothers gave employees stern warning against trading on inside

information from firm's investment banking activities.).
316.

See text accompanying note 301 supra.
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and bans competing trades by employees, the misappropriation theory
aids the firm in taking advantage of less informed investors. If, however, the employer has a policy of not trading on nonpublic information, it is not harmed by employee trades in the stock of third parties.
Nevertheless, an employer might still choose to forbid such transactions for public relations or other reasons.31 7
Prior to prohibition by the SEC, many takeover bidders had selectively tipped institutions so that the target's stock would be in friendly
318
hands at the time of the tender offer. This is the "warehousing"
mentioned in the opinions of Justice Powell and Chief Justice Burger. 319 Had Chiarella planned to tender his stock, the takeover bidders
probably would have been pleased by his advance purchases. 320 Even
though Chiarella sold immediately after the tender offers were announced, his shares were probably ultimately held by risk arbitrageurs
who subsequently tendered.32 ' Indeed, even if both Powell's fiduciary
duty and Burger's misappropriation theories were adopted, it would be
possible under rule lOb-5 for a tender offeror to compensate its printer,
attorneys, depository, or other agents by allowing them to purchase in
advance of the takeover bid.
The depository accepts tendered shares and holds them on behalf
of the offeror. Even if the depository does not make use of advance
notice of the offer, it could use information about the amount of stock
tendered to outguess the risk arbitrageurs as to whether and to what
extent the tender offer will succeed. Because the tender offeror does not
care whose shares it buys and because it is foreclosed by rule lOb-13
from making market purchases during the offer, it might give the depository permission to trade on the basis of this information.32 2
317. To the extent that the Federal Government prohibited inside trading by its employees,
the misappropriation theory would forbid the inside trading by federal officials that might be
permitted by the special relationship theory. See note 298 and accompanying text supra.
318. See B. RIDER & H. FFRENCH, supra note 21, at 87-88; Dooley, supra note 39, at 53-54 &
n.229; Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 175, at 811-15; 92 HARV. L. REv. 1538, 154648 (1979); 1980 Wis. L. REV. 162, 191 & nn.113 & 116. Warehousing is now prohibited by SEC
rule 14e-3. See note 322 infra.
319. 445 U.S. at 234 (Powell, J., for the Court); id. at 242-43 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
320. See Dooley, supra note 39, at 53-54 & n.228. But cid
at 52 (offeror may be concerned
about maintaining secrecy so as not to forewarn target).
321. See generally Henry, Activities of Arbitrageurs in Tender Offers 119 U. PA. L. REV. 466
(1971); Comment, Should Tender Offer Arbitrage be Regulated, 1978 DuKE L.J. 1000; G. WyserPratte, Risk Arbitrage (New York University Business School monograph, 1971).
322. Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976), gives the
SEC authority to regulate fraud, deception, or manipulation in connection with tender offers.
Recently, the Commission adopted rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1980), which prohibits indi-
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Blackmun's Chiarella Dissent

Justice Blackmun did not rely on the misappropriation theory in his
dissent. Instead, he stated he would impose liability on Chiarella "even
if he had obtained the blessing of his employer's principals before embarking on his profiteering scheme. 3 23 Blackmun twice quoted with
approval 32 4 the SEC opinion in In re Cady,Roberts & Co., which based

the "disclose or abstain" obligation in part on whether the information
utilized was "intendedto be available only for a corporale purpose and
not for the personal benefit of anyone. ' 325 By referring to corporate
intent, Blackmun undercut slightly his earlier refusal to rely on the misappropriation theory.
The thrust of his dissent, however, is "that persons having access
to confidential material information that is not legally available to
others generally are prohibited by rule lOb-5 from engaging in schemes
to exploit their structuralinformational advantage through trading in
affected securities. 32 6 Blackmun further explained that he would per-

mit advantages resulting from diligence or acumen, but forbid those
viduals from trading on the basis of material information about an impending tender offer if they
know or have reason to know the information is nonpublic and comes from the target company,
the acquiring company, or the agents of either. The rule also forbids tipping when it is foreseeable
that the tip is likely to result in a violation of the rule. There are specific exceptions to the prohibitions against both trading and tipping. The rule was announced in SEC Release Nos. 33-6239; 3417120; and IC-11336 (Sept. 4, 1980), 45 Fed. Reg. 60,410 (1980). The rule and release are reprinted in [1980] Sac. REG. & L. REP.(BNA) #569, at L-1. Rule 14e-3 is also reprinted in 3 FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 24,297, and the release in [1980] FED. SEc. L. RaP. (CCH) T 82,646. See
Pitt, supra note 2, at 692-701; 3 WHrIER L. REv. 129, 148-51 (1981).
Although the release emphasizes that rule 14e-3 is a "disclose or abstain" rule, the text of the
rule suggests that the gravamen of the offense may be the trade itself. Clause (a) provides: "[I]t
shall constitute a fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act or practice... topurchaseor sell...
unless within a reasonable time prior to any purchase or sale such information and its sources are
publicly disclosed by press release or otherwise." (emphasis added).
If the gravamen of a rule 14e-3 violation is the trade itself, and ifthe meanings of fraud,
deception, and manipulation in section 14(e) are the same as in section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5, rule
14e-3 may exceed the Commission's authority. For the somewhat similar problem in rule lOb-5,
see notes 80, 157-59, 178-86, 191-92, 310 and accompanying text supra. Cf. Peloso & Krause,
supra note 98, at 947-48 (discussing rule 14e-3's inconsistency with Chiarella). According to one
commentator, however,
section 14(e) is somewhat broader [than section 10(b) of the 1934 Act]. It [section 14(e)]
empowers the Commission not only to adopt rules designed to prevent deceptive, manipulative or fraudulent acts or practices in connection with tender offers, but also to dfne
a "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance."
3 WHrrrER L. REv.129, 150 (1981) (emphasis in original). In any event, rule 14e-3 does not
broaden liability under rule lOb-5, the subject of this Article.
323. 445 U.S. at 246 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
324. 445 U.. at 249, 252 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
325. 41 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
326. Id. at 251 (emphasis added).
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resulting from "manipulation of confidential connections or resort to
stealth."3 27

One problem with Justice Blackmun's test is the difficulty of differentiating between permitted and prohibited trading. An enormous
gray area exists between information obtained through superior ability
or effort and that which is obtained through stealth or confidential connections. 328 If an analyst or journalist is the first to discover a conspiracy like Equity Funding,3 2 9 luck, diligence, and employment status
330 Are either or both of the
may all have played a role in the discovery.
331
first two factors tainted by the third?
327. 445 U.S. at 252 n.2.
328. Justice Blackmun attempted to distinguish between parity of information and parity of
access. Id. This is analogous to the elusive distinction between equality and equality of opportunity. Cf. 4 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note 2, § 12.2, at 267-68 (discussing rule lOb-5
in terms of egalitarian theory).
329. For a discussion of Ray Dirks' discovery of the Equity Funding conspiracy, see In re
Dirks, SEC Release No. 34-17480 (Jan. 22, 1981) [1981] FED.SEC. L. REP.(CCH) 82,812; 3A H.
BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 2, § 9.20[8]; R. DiRKs & L. GROSS, THE GREAT WALL STREET SCANDAL-INSIDE EQUITY FUNDING (1974); H. KRiPKE, supra note 34, at 295-96; Herman, supra note
37; Scott supra note 39, at 813.
In the SEC administrative opinion of In re Dirks, the Commission commented: "Despite the
utility of the analyst's role, such professionals have no special license to ignore the insider trading
proscriptions of the federal securities laws." In re Dirks, supra, at 83,945.
For a discussion of investigative work by another analyst, see Market is No Mystery, Analyst
Says, If Firm Uses Good Detective Work, Wall St J., Feb. 3, 1981, at 6, col. 1.
330. Cf Lone, supra note 28, at 820-22 (A skillful analyst may be able to deduce from a
collection of facts important conclusions which could not be drawn by a less skillful analyst. Also,
discovery may be a result of either private initiative or abuse of privileged position.).
331. Blackmun's standard is similar to one advanced recently by Professor Brudney, whose
article Blackmun cited. 445 U.S. at 251-52 (citing Brudney, supra note 34). See Bloomenthal,
IntroductorySurvey to SEc. L. Rnv.-1980, at xxxiv ("Justice Blackman's opinion... in some
respects comes close to the Brudney view.
...
). The Brudney article utilized efficiency and
fairness principles to determine what forms of inside trading should be permitted. In Brudney's
opinion, the search for relevant corporate and economic information is a valuable service to society because it enables the market to function efficiently in the allocation of savings to more profitable enterprises. Brudney, sufpra note 34, at 341. This valuable search should be encouraged by
allowing at least certain types of outsiders to trade on nonpublic information, as long as such
trading does not violate other overriding principles. Id. at 341-43.
Professor Brudney divided inside traders into three categories: (I) those who owe a fiduciary
duty to those with whom they trade, such as the issuer, issuer's management, issuer tippees, and
investment advisers and broker-dealers, id. at 343-53; (2) those not in class one who gain information through an unerodable informational advantage, one that public investors may not lawfully
overcome regardless of their diligence or resources, id. at 353-67; and (3) those in neither class
one nor class two, id. at 368-76. In his view, by legislative history and traditional law, inside
trading by class one violates the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. Id. at 343-53.
Inside trading by those in class two should be prohibited because of the inherent unfairness of
such trading. Id. at 353-67. Members of class three should be permitted to trade on nonpublic
information.

HeinOnline -- 54 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1299 1980-1981

1300

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:1217

4. Reflections on the ProperClass of Defendants
Following are several possible classes of inside traders who might violate rule lOb-5:
1. No one.
2. Those who trade with someone with whom they have a fiduciary relationship based on some other body of law. This is the Powell
special relationship test, and is based on the relationship with the other
party.
3. Those who trade on information in breach of a duty to the
information source, or trade on information obtained through a tort
against the source. This is the Burger/Brennan misappropriation test
and is based on the relationship of the trader to the source of the information.
4. Class three, plus tippees of those in class three.
5. Those who trade on information obtained through a structural
informational advantage, the Blackmun test, or an unerodable information advantage, the Brudney test.3 32 These tests are based on how
the information was obtained.
6.

Class five, plus tippees of those in class five.

7. Those who regularly receive material nonpublic information,
the Second Circuit Chiarella test.3 33 This test is based on status.
8.

Class seven, plus tippees of those in class seven.

9. All corporate insiders, including those directly or indirectly
employed by the issuer.33 4 This test is also based on status, and differs
from class two. An insider who purchases puts and calls, for example,
would fall into this class, but not necessarily into class two-unless a
fiduciary relationship was found between the option-writer and the in-

sider. This class also does not fit wholly within class three-some issuers might not prohibit inside trading by employees.
10.

Class nine, plus tippees of class nine.

11. Those who trade on the basis of corporate information (information that will affect the issuer's earning power or assets). 335 This
332. See note 331 supra.
333. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1365.
334. See 4 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note 2, § 12.4; Pitt, supra note 2, at 624-25,
646-47.
335. See text accompanying notes 297-98 supra.
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class is based on the type of information and excludes "market" information (information that will affect the market for a security).3 36
12. Some combination of the above classes, for example, class ten
(all corporate insiders and their tippees) plus class eleven (all those who
trade on corporate information). This combined class is based on both
status and type of information. Insiders would be liable regardless of
whether they traded on corporate or market information. Outsiders
would be liable only if they traded on corporate information, rather
than market information.
13.

Everyone.3 37

This Article discusses the individual harm brought about by stock
market inside trading. 338 As illustrated below, the inside trade enriches
the inside trader, T, at the expense of a victim, V, in the course of a
dealing with a party in privity, P. The victim, V, is a preempted or
induced trader.
trades with
P (who may have
T (possibly breaching
a special
(preempting or
a duty to S)
relationship
inducing V)
to 7)
There may be a special relationship between T and P. The use of the
nonpublic information may be a breach of a fiduciary duty to, or a tort
against, a source, S. Neither S nor V necessarily falls into the category
of those protected by rule lOb-5. Typically, S would not even be an
investor. Although V would be an investor, he might not be a trader
and would probably not be the party in privity.
The offensive features of inside trading are the harm to V and the
intended, undeserved, and possibly improper windfall received by T
Rule lOb-5, however, requires more than outrageous conduct; it requires fraud.3 39 Classes three through thirteen above focus on these
offensive features, and use various aspects of them to trigger a duty to
disclose-presumably to P, but perhaps to a larger class. The deceit is
the breach of the triggered duty to disclose.
The argument in favor of class thirteen (imposing liability on all
336. See text accompanying notes 295-96 supra.
337. Cf. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d at 236 ("i'V]nyone
in possession of material inside information must either disclose it to the investing public, or...
' (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 848 (en bane))
abstain from trading ...
(emphasis added); Pitt, supra note 2, at 625-26, 649.
338. See notes 55-63 and accompanying text supra.
339. See note 80 supra; notes 178-81 and accompanying text supra.
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inside traders) is the inherent unfairness of unequal access to information.340 The same argument applies to the other smaller classes, al-

though trading by many of these classes is more offensive because the
members probably are able to trade on a steady stream of inside infor-

mation. Transactions by classes five and six seem especially unfair because the investing public could not discover the information through
diligent search.

The counterargument to imposing liability on classes five through
thirteen is that taking unfair advantage does not constitute deceit. A

similar counterargument can be made against class three liability. Misappropriation may be a breach of fiduciary duty to S, the source; how-

ever, it does not constitute fraud, especially against P the party in
privity, or V the victim of the trade. In fact, the triggering of a quasiSamaritan duty on members of classes three through thirteen is an artificial means of creating deceit in situations where it is absent.
Justice Powell escaped this criticism by expressly rejecting defendant classes thirteen and five through eight, implicitly rejecting classes
nine through twelve, and taking no position on class three. By imposing liability when there is a special relationship between T and P (class
two), he held a stock market inside trader liable for the same reason
that the defendant would be liable had he dealt face to face. The duty

to disclose is grounded not on an artificial quasi-Samaritan obligation
but on an independent fiduciary relationship between the parties, pre" ' If the president of a closely
sumably based on state common law.34

held company violates rule lOb-5 by trading with a shareholder without disclosing material information,3 4 2 the president of a publicly held

340. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 847-48; 4 A. BROMBERO & L. LowENFELS, supra note 2, §§ 12.2, 12.5; 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 2, §§ 6.03, 6.04, 6.07; Dooley, stpra note
39, at 30; Koeltl & Kubek, supra note 175, at 905; Pitt, supra note 2, at 623; Scott, supra note 39, at
804 ("The. . . common view. . . that the rule is principally intended to serve the ends of fairness
and equity. . . [is] the Fair Play or 'fair game' concept of the rule."); Id. at 805-06. Cf. Morrison,
supra note 172, at 212, 225 (In Chiarella "[t]he Court rejects the idea that all traders are equal,
refusing a proffered parity-of-information rule.").
341. See Pitt, supra note 2, at 640-41. For a discussion of the state common law of inside

trading, see H. HENN,

HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUsINESs ENTER-

PRISES § 239 (2d ed. 1970); Brooks, supra note 91, at 405-10; Duly to Disclose, supra note 73, at 96100; Re-Evaluation,supra note 45, at 916-20; 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 1013, 1015 (1980).
342. For an early face to face inside trading civil case in which rule lob-5 was applied, see
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa.
1947), discussedin Ratner, supra note 98, at 948-49.
Rule lOb-5's adoption was prompted by the story of a corporate president who acquired the
stock of his company at a low price by telling potential sellers that the company was doing poorly
when in fact it was doing extremely well. 22 Bus. LAW. 922 (1967) (remarks of Milton V. Free-
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corporation also violates the rule when purchasing on the stock exchange without disclosing to the shareholder with whom he deals. In
both cases, the parties in privity are harmed by the president's breach
of a duty to disclose. With the stock market inside trade, however, to
determine whether the party in privity is really harmed, the causation
anomaly discussed earlier must be addressed.3 43 Powell might use a
bootstrap conclusive presumption or triggered duty to overcome the
causation problem. 3" Given the special relationship between the parties, however, such a solution involves only minor difficulty.
If a prospective stock market inside trader had a special relationship with the party in privity, the prospective trader would be forced to
disclose to the world before trading, for two reasons. First, the party in
privity is usually not identifiable in advance. Second, selective revelation to a potential party in privity might itself violate rule lOb-5, especially if the tippee subsequently traded on the information.34 5
Powell's approach could still be a subterfuge to circumvent the deIf his real concern is T's enrichment and V's loss,
requirement.
ceit
Powell can be criticized for fabricating a duty to disclose to P in order
to bring the stock market inside trade within rule lOb-5. On the other
hand, Powell's opinion is not a subterfuge if his motive for imposing
liability on T is concern for PA to whom T owes a fiduciary duty. If
Powell's concern is for P however, the decision is an extremely narrow
one; unequal access to information is irrelevant in this case.
This Article notes that Powell's test would fail to reach much stock
market inside trading. 4 6 His reply presumably would be that such
trading may be immoral and unfair, but.it is not deceitful and therefore
does not violate rule lOb-5. The conflicting principles in defining the
proper class of defendants are the supposed unfairness or impropriety
of inside trading, and the deceit requirement of rule lOb-5. The stricter
the adherence to the deceit requirement, the lower the amount of unfair
or improper inside trading prohibited. The greater the amount of unfair or improper inside trading forbidden, the greater the disregard of
the fraud requirement. Chiarella indicates that the Court has decided
man). Presumably, the SEC intended the rule to apply even when the president bought the stock
without disclosing material information.
343. See notes 68-72 and accompanying text supra.
344. Id.
345. See notes 81-82 and accompanying text supra. See also notes 108-09, 278, 280-89 and

accompanying text supra.
346. See text accompanying notes 271-79, 290-308 supra.
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to adhere closely to the fraud requirement at the cost of allowing much
inside trading to escape liability.
D.

THE APPROACH OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSITUTE'S
FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE

1. Defendants." Insiders, Outsiders,and Their Tpees
The American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code section 1603
codifies the substantive application of rule 1Ob-5 to insider trading,347
defining the liability of corporate insiders and their tippees.
347.

INSIDERS' DUTY TO DISCLOSE WHEN TRADING
SEC. 1603. (a) GENERAL.-It is unlawful for an insider to sell or buy a security of
the issuer, if he knows a fact of special significance with respect to the issuer or the
security that is not generally available, unless (1) the insider reasonably believes that the
fact is generally available, or (2) the identity of the other party to the transaction (or his
agent) is known to the insider and (A) the insider reasonably believes that that party (or
his agent) knows the fact, or (B) that party (or his agent) knows the fact from the insider
or otherwise.
(b) INSIDER.-For purposes of section 1603, "insider" means (1) the issuer, (2) a
director or officer of, or a person controlling, controlled by, or under common control
with, the issuer, (3) a person who, by virtue of his relationship or former relationship to
the issuer, knows a fact of special significance about the issuer or the security in question
that is not generally available, or (4) a person who learns such a, fact from a person
within section 1603(b) (including a person within section 1603(b)(4)) with knowledge
that the person from whom he learns the fact is such a person, unless the Commission or
a court finds that it would be inequitable, on consideration of the circumstances and the
purposes of this Code (including the deterrent effect of liability), to treat the person
within section 1603(b)(4) as if he were within section 1603(b)(1), (2), or (3).
ALI CODE supra, note 2, § 1603 (1980).
For general discussions of § 1603, see lIA E. GADSBY, supra note 49, § 10.06[3]; Note, The
Codofcation ofRule 10b-5 PripateActions in the ProposedFederalSecurities Code, 33 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1615, 1623-29 (1979). The Reporter notes that § 1603(b)(4) is broad enough to cover surreptitious tippees, who learn information from wiretapping, industrial espionage, or other methods
without the insider's knowledge. ALI CODE, supra note 2, § 1603, Comment (7).
"Fact of special significance" is defined in § 202(56). The concept of materiality is defined
"somewhat more strictly" here than the general "reasonable person" materiality definition of
§ 202(92). ALI CODE, supra note 2, § 202(56), Comment (I).
To win SEC endorsement, the Code was amended in September 1980. See note 379 and
accompanying text infra. Sections 1603(a) and (b) were amended as follows:
§ 1603 (Insiders' Duty to Disclose When Trading)
Substitute:
Sec. 1603 (a) GENERAL.-It is unlawful for an insider to sell or buy a security
of the issuer, if he knows a material fact with respect to the issuer or the security that is
not generally available, unless(1) the insider reasonably believes that the fact is generally available;
(2) the identity of the other party to the transaction (or his agent) is known to
the insider and (A) the insider reasonably believes that the party (or his agent) knows
the fact, or (B) that party (or his agent) knows the fact from the insider or otherwise; or
(3) the insider proves that the fact is not a fact of special significance, except
that this defense is not available in an action or proceeding by the Commission under
section 1809, 1810, 1811, 1812, 1815, or 1819(a).
COMMENT: (1) In the introductory portion "material fact" has been substituted for "fact of special significance." But new § 1603(a)(3) affords a defense, except in SEC injunctive and disciplinary actions, in terms of the Official Draft's
language. That is to say the plaintiff need allege and prove only materiality, after
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The provisions proscribe insider buying or selling,34 8 in addition,
349
the prohibition is waived under certain enumerated circumstances.
Nowhere in section 1603(a) is there a reference to fraud, deceit, nondisclosure, or disclosure. Apparently, the provision makes the trade itself,
rather than nondisclosure, the gravamen of the violation. This apparently eliminates the effect of SantaFe Industries,Inc. v. Green,3 50 which
held that only conduct involving manipulation or deceit is reached by
section 10(b) or rule lOb-5. Nevertheless, the Reporter's comments to
section 1603 are replete with references to "duty to disclose, '3 51 "misrepresentations or fraudulent acts, '352 and "'fraud' or 'deception.' -353

Indeed, the comment referring to fraud or deception specifically states:
"[T]he Code is not overruling Santa Fe Industries . . . by specifically
endorsing the reading that a number of commentators gave
Schoenbaum v. Firstbook. . . .",5 Schoenbaum355 concerned "new
fraud," the application of rule lob-5 to management's liability to the
corporation for unfair self-dealing securities transactions.356 In short,
the language of section 1603(a) suggests that the trade itself is the gravamen of a violation, but the comments suggest that nondisclosure is
actually the gravamen.
Section 1603 does not prohibit tipping, 35 7 although it clearly covers tippees.358 Another provision, section 1724(c), creates liability for a
which (except in SEC injunctive and disciplinary actions) the burden of going forward will shift to the defendant to show lack of special significance.
§ 1603(b)(3) (Insider)
Change fact of special significance IQ material fact.
COMMENT: This is incidental to the revision of § 1603(a), supra.
ALI CODE, supra note 2, § 1603(a) and (b), reprintedin,[1980]Sac. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 571, F1 at 7, 8 (Sept. 24, 1980). See SEC Supports Proposed Securities Code Clarfying Some Laws,
ChangingOthers, Wall St. J., Sept. 19, 1980, at 5, col. 2.
348. ALI CODE, supra note 2, § 1603(a).
349. Id.
350. 430 U.S. 462. See note 80 supra.
351. ALI CODE, supra note 2, § 1603, Comment 2(h).
352. Id Comment 2(l).
353. Id Comment 3(b).
354. Id. For a discussion of Santa Fe Industries, see note 80 supra.
355. 405 F.2d 200, rey'd en banc, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906
(1969).
356. Id.
357. See note 347 supra.
358. ALI CODE, supra note 2, § 1603(b)(4) (tippee may be liable as an "insider" under the
Code "unless the Commission or a court finds that it would be inequitable... to treat the [tippee
as if he were an insider]"). See note 347 supra. For a discussion of the Code's application to
tippees of insiders, see ALI CODE, supra note 2, § 1603, Comments (3)(e), (7); W. PAINTER, supra
note 2, at 161-64.
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tipper to the same extent as a tippee unless the tipper discloses for a
proper purpose and in a proper manner and reasonably believes that
the tippee will not use the fact in a manner that would create liability.35 9 The Reporter also noted that section 1603(b)(3) is broad enough

to cover surreptitious tippees and their subtippees 60 Section 1603
361
does not cover quasi-insiders with nonpublic outside information,
i e., information not derived from the issuer. 62 Examples of quasiinsiders would include:
(i) judges' clerks who trade on information in unpublished opinions,
(ii) Federal Reserve Bank employees who trade with knowledge of
an imminent change in the margin rate ....
(iii) printers of tender
offer literature who buy the target company's stock . . . , [and]

(iv) [independent] persons who are about to give profitable supply
contracts to [the issuer].363
The Reporter noted that "a sufficiently egregious or shocking or offenmight be covered by
sive case" 364 of trading on outside information
365
Federal Securities Code Section 1602(a)(1):
SEC. 1602(a) GENERAL.-It is unlawful for any person to engage in a

fraudulent act or to make a misrepresentation in connection with
or buy a security,
(1) a sale or purchase of a security, an offer to sell
366
or an inducement not to buy or' sell a security.

The Reporter concluded that "this area must be left to further judicial
development. ' 367 In short, the Federal Securities Code leaves trading
on outside information in a state of uncertainty.3 61 In possible contrast
to section 1603, the gravamen of an inside trading section 1602 violation would be nondisclosure, rather than the trade itself.
2. Defining the Class of Plaintiffs
a. The distinction between fortuitous/market transactions and
nonfortuitous/nonmarkettransactions: The civil liability provisions of
359.

ALI CODE, supra note 2, § 1724(c); see note 68 supra.

360. ALI CODE, supra note 2, § 1603, Comment (7) (stating that § 1603(b)(3) is broad enough
to cover tippees who learn information from wiretapping, industrial espionage, or other methods,
or who merely find an insider's papers).
361. Id. Comment (3)(d).
362. See notes 293-94, 301 and accompanying text supra.
363. ALI CODE, supra note 2, § 1603, Comment (3)(d).
364. Id.
365. Id. The Reporter commented that § 1602 "is as broad as Rule lOb-5 is today," and that
... Id.
"§ 1602(a)(1) is as broad as anything in existing law.
366. Id., § 1602(a). For a discussion of this section, see Note, supra note 347, at 1617-23.
367. ALI CODE, supra note 2, § 1603, Comment (3)(d).
368. See Brudney, supra note 34, at 353 n.102.
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the American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code distinguish between so-called "market" and "nonmarket" transactions.36 9 Market
transactions are those "effected in a manner that would make the
matching of buyers and sellers substantially fortuitous. ' 370 A person
who violates either Code section 1602(a)(1) (the broad antifraud provision equivalent to the present rule lOb-5) 37 1 or Code section 1603(a)
(the codification of corporate insider liability for trading on nonpublic
information) 372 in a fortuitous/market transaction is not liable for rescission3 73 but is liable for damages to all those who buy or sell "during
the period beginning at the start of the day when the defendant first
unlawfully sells or buys, and ending at the end of the day" when the
' 374
information becomes "generally available.
This classification is roughly equivalent to the Shapiro or Elkind
class of plaintiffs.3 75 The defendant has the burden of demonstrating
lack of causation.3 76 Damages are reduced to the extent that the de377
fendant proves that the violation did not cause the plaintiff s loss.
369. ALl CODE, supra note 2, § 1703. See E. GADSBY, supra note 49, § 10.07, at 10-126; W.
PAINTER, supra note 2, at 212.
370. ALl CODE, supra note 2, § 1603(a).
371. See notes 365-66 and accompanying text supra.
372. See note 347 and accompanying text supra.
373. Compare ALI Code § 1703(a) (in a transaction not effected in the markets, violator is
liable to his buyer or seller for rescission or damages) with § 1703(b) (in a transaction effected in
the markets, violator is liable for damages). ALI CODE, supra note 2, § 1703(a), (b).
374. Id § 1703(b).
375. See notes 110-13, 203-13 and accompanying textsupra. ContraWilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp., 648 F.2d at 94-95. See note 212 and text accompanying notes 233-49, 257
supra; text accompanying notes 401-03 infra.
376. ALI CODE, supra note 2, § 1708(b)(2). See Note, Limiting the PlaintiClass:Rule 10b-5
and the FederalSecurities Code, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1398, 1427 (1974).
377. ALI CODE, supra note 2, § 1708(b)(2).
The ALI Code defines causation generally in § 202(19): "A loss is 'caused' by specified conduct to the extent that (A) the conduct was a substantial factor in producing the loss, and (B) the
loss was of a kind that might reasonably have been expected to occur as a result of the conduct."
The Reporter states that this definition requires both causation in fact (or but for cause) and legal
cause (based on policy considerations). ALI CODE, supra note 2, § 1603, Comment (2)(p); id.
§ 202(19), Comment 5. See W. PAINTER, supra note 2, at 207-08; Note, supra note 376, at 1426.
This Article almost always discusses causation in terms of but for cause. See note 4 supra.
This Article discusses ALI Code §§ 1603(a) and 1602(a) and suggests that the gravamen of an
inside trading § 1602(a) violation apparently is nondisclosure, while the gravamen of a § 1603(a)
violation is either the nondisclosure or the trade. See notes 348-54, 364-68 and accompanying text
supra. If the gravamen of § 1603 is the trade, and of an inside trading § 1602 violation is nondisclosure, a stock market inside trading defendant might be liable for damages under § 1602 but not
§ 1603. To illustrate, suppose that the president of a mining company calls a press conference and
announces a major mineral discovery. Immediately after the announcement, the president gives
his broker a market order to buy 1000 shares. The order is transmitted to the New York Stock
Exchange. When the president's broker reaches the specialist's booth, the specialist is asking 101/
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The potential harshness of these provisions is mitigated by a ceiling on
the defendant's liability. The Official Draft approved by the American
Law Institute limited the defendant's liability to the damages which
would be imposed if "all the members of the class. . had bought (or
sold) only the amount of securities that the defendant had sold (or
bought).3 78 At the request of the SEC, the Code has been amended to

give courts the discretion to raise the ceiling to 150% of the amount of
the inside trader's profits. The court's decision is to be based on the
circumstances of the case and the purposes of the Code, including the
deterrent effect of liability.379 Section 1711 of the Code provides a pro-

cedure for bringing all the claimants into a single forum and prorating
or otherwise disposing of the amount recovered. 8 0

In short, the Code distinguishes between "substantially nonfor(offering to sell at 101 ) and bidding 10 (offering to buy at 10). (For the sake of simplicity, it will
be assumed that there are no limit orders.) No one else is near the booth. Fortuitously, another
broker arrives with a market order to sell 1200 shares. The president's broker buys 1000 at 10Y8.
The specialist buys the remaining 200 at 10. Before any further transactions take place, the Dow
Jones Broad Tape announces the mineral discovery. The specialist changes his quotations to 14
asked, 138 bid.
Presumably, the ALI Code would classify the president's transaction as fortuitous. Under
§ 1703(b), he would be liable at least to all sellers on the day of his trade. Under § 1708(b)(2),
however, the president can reduce his liability to the extent that he proves that his violation did
not cause a plaintiffs loss. A court's § 1723(e) discretion to vary damages is expressly subject to
the limitations of § 1708(b)(2).
If the gravamen of the § 1603 violation is the trade, the president would be able to prove that
the trade did not harm any sellers. The victim of the president's trade is the specialist, a preempted buyer. See text accompanying note 59 supra. Had the president not traded, the 1200
share market order to sell would have been executed entirely with the specialist. The specialist
would have held 1000 more shares at the time the Dow Jones Broad Tape announced the mineral
discovery. The seller of the 1200 shares is not harmed, because his order would have been executed in any event, either entirely with the specialist or partly with the specialist and partly with
the president. By proving that his trade did not cause harm to any seller, the president would be
able to reduce his § 1603 damages to zero.
Under § 1602 (the general antifraud provision), the gravamen of an inside trading offense
presumably is the nondisclosure. See text accompanying notes 364-68 supra. If, under § 1602, the
president had a duty to disclose to the party in privity, the latter would be able to recover. Ironically, the president would be liable under the general antifraud stricture of § 1602 rather than the
specific prohibition of § 1603.
For a general discussion of how the stock market operates, see notes 49-54 and accompanying
text supra.
378. Id. § 1708(b)(3).
379. ALI COD, supra note 2, § 1708(b)(4)(C) (Supp. 1980), reprintedin [1980] SEc. Rio. & L.
REP. (BNA) #571, F-10. See SEC Supports ProposedSecurities Code, supra note 347. See generall, W. PAINTER, supra note 2, at 216 (questioning whether an inside trader would be deterred if
all he could lose civilly is his profits).
380. See 11A E. GADsBY, supra note 8, § 10.07[7]; Patrick, Some PracticalQuestions Concerning the Effect of the ProposedFederalSecurities Code on Civil Litigation, 32 VAND. L. REv. 551,
560-70 (1979).
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tuitously matched" ("nonmarket") and "substantially fortuitously
matched" ("market") transactions. With the latter, compensation may
be abandoned if impracticable. Deterrence and avoidance of unjust
enrichment are then the principal purposes of damages. 38 1 The de-emphasis on compensation permits the Code to (1) grant recovery to a
class of plaintiffs, all or most of whom are not harmed by the defendant's trade, and (2) limit and prorate damages in such a way that those
actually harmed by an inside trade will recover only a small fraction of
their actual damages.
b. Practicalproblems of distinguishing between fortuitous and
nonfortuitous transactions: In practice, the fortuitous/nonfortuitous
distinction will sometimes be difficult to apply. The line-drawing
problems result from three factors: (1) significant fortuity exists in
many face to face transactions; (2) many impersonal market transactions might not be considered particularly fortuitous; (3) fortuity is a
matter of degree and not of kind. The Code's comments provide little
assistance in defining fortuitousness. Section 1703's fortuitous/nonfortuitous distinction is also made in section 1702, which deals
with illegal sales and purchases. Section 1702(a) concerns nonfor382
tuitous transactions and section 1702(b) deals with fortuitous trades.
In the comment to section 1702(b), the Reporter explains the difference:
[O]ver-the-counter transactions fall on both sides of-the line; and, of
course, the technology and practice are rapidly evolving. Indeed,
even with respect to stock exchange transactions, many institutional
trades are negotiated offboard and "crossed" on the floor. Those will
fall within [§ 1702(a)] rather than [§ 1702(b)]. Contrariwise, a transaction with a marketmaker will normally fall within § 1702(b) even
though his identity becomes known before the transaction is completed.3 83
This explanation is puzzling. The phrase "even though his identity becomes known" suggests that the distinction is between face to
face and impersonal transactions. This impression is reinforced by the
titles of sections 1702(a) and (b): "Transactions Not Effected in the
Markets" and "Transactions Effected in the Markets. 3 8 4 Yet some
face to face transactions could be "effected in a manner that would
381.

ALI CODE,supra note 2, § 1711, Comment (7)(a).

382. Id § 1702(a), (b).
383. Id § 1702(b), Comment (4).
384. Id § 1702(a), (b).
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make the matching of buyers and sellers substantially fortuitous."385
Suppose a firm lets it be known that it has a 10,000 share block to sell,
and one buyer immediately snaps up the block. Within a half hour, ten
other prospective buyers telephone the seller. It might be considered
fortuitous that one particular buyer found out about the block first and
decided to call immediately. Similarly, ifA wishes to sell his house and
gives his realtor written instructions to wait in an open house and accept the first bid equal to or greater than the asking price, it might be
considered "substantially fortuitous" that one buyer got to the house
before another.38 6

On the other hand, impersonal transactions might not be considered substantially fortuitous. Suppose an inside trader gives his broker
a "market order" 387 to buy 1000 shares of stock listed on the Boston
Stock Exchange. If the stock is inactively traded, and the 1000-share
order is executed with the specialist, that trade might not be considered
"effected in a manner that would make the matching of buyers and
sellers substantially fortuitous." Suppose the trade was the only one
that hour, day, or week. Suppose that the stock is active only infrequently. Is it fortuitous that the stock is quiet during the hour, day, or
week when the inside trade is executed with the specialist? Does it
make any difference whether the inside trader knows whether trading
in the stock
is active or inactive at the particular time when he
388
trades?
The problem is that fortuity is a matter of degree and not of kind.
Suppose4 owns a toy store and suspects that a certain toy is dangerous. No one else has this knowledge. If A is the only retailer in town
selling this toy, he cannot argue that any particular purchase was fortuitous. The more stores that sell the toy, however, the stronger4's claim
that a purchase of the toyfrom A was fortuitous. Even if only a few
stores sell the toy, A could argue that it was substantially fortuitous
that the buyer transacted with him rather than with another retailer.
Despite the problem of demarcating the border between fortuitous
and nonfortuitous transactions, most stock market transactions will be
385. See note 370 and accompanying text supra.

386. For similar examples, see text accompanying notes 71-72, 74-75 supra.
387. For a discussion of how the stock market functions, see text accompanying notes 49-54
supra.

388. In the landmark state law case of Goodwin v. Agassiz, 282 Mass. 358, 186 N.E.2d 659
(1933), the plaintiff was able to match his 700 share sale of Cliff Mining Company stock with the

purchase of the defendant, the president of the company, even though the transaction took place
on the Boston Stock Exchange. Presumably, trading in Cliff stock was relatively inactive.
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clearly fortuitous. Although it is not perfect, the Code's fortuitous/nonfortuitous distinction is workable.
3. Reflections on the Approach Proposedby the Code
Section 1603 specifies the obligation of insiders to abstain from-trading
on nonpublic information. This provision is nonexclusive, however,
and the general issue of who are proper defendants is not resolved.
The American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code does provide a definite solution to the legal problem of determining the proper
class of plaintiffs and maximum liability of defendants. The Code does
not compensate the victims of the inside trade, but they were not identifiable anyway.389 Although the fortuitous/nonfortuitous distinction
may sometimes be difficult to apply, the Code's approach successfully
accomplishes a number of objectives. It eliminates the problem of
identifying the party in privity. It avoids bestowing a large windfall on
the party in privity by spreading the windfall among numerous plaintiffs; in fact, the attorney bringing the class action may get the bulk of
the recovery. The Code deprives the defendant of his unjust profit. It
deters inside trading by threatening potential liability equal to 150% of
profit. It encourages civil suits against inside traders by private attorneys general. Unless the defendant's profits are large, however, lawyers
still may not find it worthwhile to bring a class action. Perhaps in inside trading suits the Code should permit the court to order the defendant to pay the plaintiffs legal costs.
V.

SUMMARY

3 90

A stock market inside trade 39 1 has two aspects: the trade and the nondisclosure of information inducing the trade. Each aspect has different
victims who would have been better off but for the trade or the nondisclosure. The trade harms specific investors, but not necessarily the
party in privity. If there has been a purchase of an existing issue of
securities, someone has less of that issue; if there has been a sale of an
existing issue, someone ends up with more of that issue. This Article
labels this phenomenon "The Law of Conservation of Securities."
With an inside trade, this law can work in two ways. The inside trade
could induce opposite-type transactions which otherwise would not
have occurred, or it could preempt same-type trades which otherwise
389. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
390. Summaries and reflections appear throughout the Article. See Table of Contents; text

accompanying notes 250-62, 332-46, 389.
391.

For this Article's definition of "inside trade," see note 2 supra.
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would have occurred. Those harmed by an inside trade fall into at
least two categories: those who would not have made disadvantageous
purchases or sales but for the inside trade, and those who would have
made advantageous purchases or sales but for the inside trade. In addition, an inside trade may induce changes in theprices of transactions
in the same security. Both sellers who receive less and buyers who pay
more are worse off. In practice, it is impossible to recreate the hypothetical universe that would have existed had there been no inside
trade. The inside trade directly or indirectly changes the inventory of a
specialist or market-maker. There is no way of knowing how this
change alters the intermediary's price quotations, and how these quotations affect the behavior of public investors. Therefore, the victims of a
stock market inside trade cannot be identified.
As opposed to an inside trade, the nondisclosure of material beneficia! nonpublic information harms sellers who would not have sold had
the beneficial information been disclosed, and sellers who would have
received higher prices had the beneficial information been disclosed.
The nondisclosure of material adverse information harms buyers who
would not have bought had the adverse information been disclosed,
and buyers who would have bought at a lower price had the adverse
information been disclosed. Whether someone with material nonpublic information can be said to have morally or legally caused harm to
these investors depends on whether the information possessor has a
quasi-Samaritan duty to rescue total strangers. Even assuming such a
duty exists, if the duty is contingent on some act by the information
possessor, a causation anomaly may arise. The information possessor
may claim that his relevant choice was between two courses of conduct,
one illegal and one permissible, both of which would result in the same
harm to the plaintiff. Therefore, the illegal course of conduct arguably
did not cause harm to the plaintiff.
Rule lOb-5 liability requires fraud or manipulation. The latter is a
term of art not relevant to inside trading. Therefore, to violate rule
lOb-5, inside trading must be fraudulent. A stock market inside trader
has no contact with the other party to the transaction. For an inside
trader to violate rule lOb-5, he must have a duty to disclose. This duty
could be owed to: (1) the party in privity, (2) the individual to whom
the party in privity sometimes transmits the harm of nondisclosure
when the party in privity regains his original position, (3) the victims
of the trade itself, or (4) the world. All four alternatives create practical and theoretical problems. If the potential inside trader were to dis-
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close only to a potential party in privity or a potential victim of a
contemplated trade, the potential inside trader might have violated rule
lOb-5 if the recipient traded on the information. Ironically, by seeking
to comply with the rule, the potential inside trader could run afoul of it.
If the inside trader trades without disclosing, he is potentially liable to
those to whom he had a duty to disclose. If the duty is owed to the
party in privity, that party might be able to recover even if it was not
damaged by the trade itself. This recovery is arguably an undeserved
windfall.
The above discussion assumes that it is possible to identify:
(1) the actual or potential party in privity with a stock market inside
trader, (2) the individual to whom the party in privity sometimes transmits the harm of nondisclosure, and (3) the actual or potential victim
of a stock market inside trade. In practice, such identification generally
is impossible. Even if the victims of an inside trade were identifiable,
and even if a duty to disclose were owed to them, many victims would
have difficulty recovering. The victims of an inside trade are either
induced or preempted traders. Preempted traders lack standing to sue
under Blue Chp Slamps v. Manor Drug Stores.3 92 Even if the Blue
Chp civil standing problem were ignored, a preempted trader, E,
would not be able to demonstrate harm from the nondisclosure. If the
information was revealed only to E, he probably could not trade without violating rule lOb-5. If the information was publicly announced, a
wave of new buyers or sellers would be attracted, and E might still be
preempted. Even if E were able to trade, the price would accurately
reflect the new information. Since the harm of the inside trade was the
loss of opportunity to trade at an advantageous inaccurate price,
neither individual nor public disclosure would have made E better off;
the nondisclosure did not cause harm to E. E could recover damages
only if both the Blue Chip standing and the causation requirements
were waived.
An unresolved issue is whether a defendant can be liable criminally when there is no one with standing to sue civilly. If the duty to
disclose is owed to victims of the trade itself, and if rule lOb-5 is not
violated when the victims are preempted traders, and if it is impossible
to identify the type of victim, then it is impossible to know whether a
rule lOb-5 violation has occurred.
The duty to disclose may be owed to the world, rather than to the
392. 421 U.S. 723.
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party in privity or the potential victims of the trade. If an inside trader
breaches a duty to disclose to the world, both the potential number of
plaintiffs and the potential liability are gigantic.
All four alternative duties are subject to criticism. Despite the theoretical and practical obstacles, however, courts have been willing to
apply rule lOb-5 to inside trading on the stock market. Four circuit
court decisions have dealt with the class of plaintiffs who can demonstrate causation when suing for damages from a stock market inside
3 93
trader: Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Penner & Smith, Inc.,
Fridrich v. Bradford,3 94 Elkind v. Liggett & Myers Inc.,3 95 and Wilson v.

Comtech Telecommunications Corp.396 All four opinions are overshadowed by contrary dictum in the Supreme Court's recent decision in the
criminal case of Chiarella v. United States.397 The outline below analyzes the positions of these five cases on the proper class of plaintiffs.
1. Shapiro/Elkind
Gravamen of the offense: Nondisclosure.
Class ofplaintiffs allowed- All those who traded to their disadvantage between the time of the inside trade and dissemination of the information. The inside trade (in these two cases the tippee's trade)
triggers a quasi-Samaritan duty on the part of both tipper and tippee to
disclose to the entire investing public. Once this broad duty is created,
the requisite moral and legal causation automatically follows. The defendant's breach of his duty to disclose "caused" moral or legal harm to
all actual traders who would have transacted at a better price or not at
all had they known the information.
Theoreticalproblems: The Shapiro/Elkind obligation is not in accord with general moral principles, which base duties to rescue on
proximity. The inside trader has no contact with other investors. The
broad quasi-Samaritan duty is also contrary to American legal norms,
which impose no civil or criminal liability for failure to save the life of
a stranger in obvious peril. Furthermore, there is no logical reason why
such an immense quasi-Samaritan duty should depend on the existence
of a trade by the defendant. The trade does not create any relationship
393. 495 F.2d 228.
394. 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976) (Engel, J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
395. 635 F.2d 156.
396. 648 F.2d 88.
397. 445 U.S. 222.
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with the investing public. The absurdity of the approach is demonstrated by the Draconian liability that it logically compels.
Legalproblems: This approach is incompatible with the privity
requirement strongly suggested by Chiarella. Surprisingly, although
the Second Circuit decided Elkind more than one year after the
Supreme Court handed down Chiarella, Elkind almost completely ignored the Supreme Court decision.
Elkind's ceiling on liability: To avoid Draconian liability, Elkind
limited all plaintiffs' recovery to the defendant's profits. This ceiling is
illogical. If the defendant had a duty to disclose to the world, the harm
of the nondisclosure far exceeds the inside trader's profit. A legal problem is that defendant's profit is equal to the direct harm resulting from
the trade,398 which is not deceitful and cannot be the gravamen of a
rule lOb-5 offense. 399 Even if the trade were the gravamen of the ofbe confense, the Elkind approach of pro rata disgorgement would still
4
trary to the winner-take-all Anglo-American legal tradition. 00 Most, if
not all, members of the ShapirolElkind class of plaintiffs are unharmed
by the trade.
2.

t / Wilson
Celebrezze4°

Gravamen of the offense (Wilson): Nondisclosure. (Celebrezze):
In theory, the trade; as an expedient, the nondisclosure.4 °2
Class ofplaintiffs allowed: Those trading contemporaneously with
the inside trader.
heoreticalproblems: If the gravamen of the offense is nondisclosure, a plaintiff trading one minute after the inside trade cannot be distinguished logically from a plaintiff trading one month later. Both
plaintiffs neither dealt with nor had any contact with the inside trader.
If the defendant had a quasi-Samaritan duty to rescue one plaintiff, the
defendant should have the same obligation to the other.
Even assuming, incorrectly, that the gravamen of the offense were
the trade, the contemporaneous trader class of plaintiffs does not make
sense, because the victims of the trade are not necessarily those trading
398.
399.
400.

See text accompanying notes 56-58 supra.
See notes 157, 159, 178-81 and accompanying text supra.
See note 223 and accompanying text supra. But see notes 224-25 and accompanying text

supra.

401. Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d at 323-27 (Celebrezze, J., concurring). See text
accompanying notes 161-66, 257 supra.
402.

542 F.2d at 326. See notes 161-63 supra and accompanying text, note 246 supra.
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contemporaneously. 403
Legalproblems: The contemporaneous trader class is inconsistent
with the broader class of plaintiffs allowed by the earlier Second Circuit decisions Shapiro and Elkind. More important, it is incompatible
with the privity requirement strongly suggested by Chiarella.
4
3. Fridrich O4

Gravamen of the offense: The inside trade itself, rather than the
nondisclosure.
Class ofplaintffs allowed: All those injured by the act of inside
trading; ie., those investors whose transactions were preempted or induced by the inside trade.
Practicalproblem: It is impossible to identify the victims of the
trade. Fridrich did not reach the issue whether the party in privity
might be able to rescind under Exchange Act section 29(b), which
makes voidable any contract made in violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or a rule promulgated thereunder, including rule
lOb-5.
Legalproblems: This rationale is incompatible with Santa Fe Industries,Inc. v. Green,4 °5 which requires deceit for rule 10b-5 liability.
As mentioned above, a stock market inside trade is not itself deceitful
and cannot be the gravamen of a rule lOb-5 violation. In addition,
Fridrich apparently does not impose the privity requirement 40 6 strongly
suggested by Chiarella.
4. Chiarella (relationship of trust and confidence)
Gravamen of the offense: Nondisclosure.
Class ofplaintiffs allowed: Party in privity (strongly suggested in
dictum). Chiarella was a criminal proceeding in which the defendant's
conviction was reversed. Nevertheless, the Court stated that a stock
market inside trader would violate rule lOb-5 when he had a relationship of trust and confidence with the party on the other side of the
transaction. This statement indicates that the proper plaintiff in a civil
suit would be the party in privity with the inside trader.
403. See text accompanying notes 166-67, 245 supra.

404. Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (Engel, J.). See text accompanying notes 136-59
supra.

405. 430 U.S. 462. See notes 157-59 and accompanying text supra.
406.

See text accompanying notes 146-52 supra.
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Practicaiproblem: Identifying the party in privity will often be
impossible.
Legalproblem: With regard to the class of plaintiffs, Chiarella's
legal position is difficult to attack. The gravamen of the offense is nondisclosure, yet no artificial quasi-Samaritan obligation is created.
5. Chiarella (misappropriation)
Chiarellareserved judgment on the issue of whether the defendant violated rule lOb-5 by misappropriating information from his indirect employers, the takeover bidders. This theory was not submitted to the
jury. Because the Court did not reach the misappropriation theory, the
analysis below is speculative.
Gravamen of the offense: Nondisclosure.
Class ofplaintiffs allowed: Possibly the party in privity. The trade
based on misappropriated information would trigger a duty to have
disclosed to the other party to the transaction. The majority almost
certainly would not hold that the misappropriation triggers a duty to
disclose to the entire world.
The inside trader's employer would not be a proper civil plaintiff.
First, the employer usually would not have bought or sold and therefore would lack standing to sue for damages under rule lOb-5. 4 7 Second, the inside trader's breach of fiduciary duty to his employer would
not involve deceit.
Theoreticalproblem: Generally, the employer would forbid both
utilizing and disclosing the information. Ironically, a rule lOb-5 duty
to disclose (before trading) would compound the employee's breach of
duty to his employer.
All five approaches have practical, theoretical, and legal flaws.
Two fundamental factors create this predicament. First, the trade, not
the nondisclosure, is usually the offensive feature of stock market inside
trading, and the trade generally does not meet the deceit requirement
of rule lOb-5. (One rare instance in which the nondisclosure is offensive is when the inside trader has a special relationship with the party
in privity.) Second, the victims who evoke sympathy, the trade victims
and sometimes the party in privity, are difficult to identify in practice.
These basic problems can be solved only legislatively, not judicially.
In Chiarella,the actual issue before the Court was not the class of
407. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723.
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private plaintiffs who can sue an inside trader, but the proper class of
criminal (or civil) defendants, ie., those inside traders subject to rule
lOb-5. Except for the requirement of willfulness and the burden of
proof, however, the elements necessary to impose rule lOb-5 civil and
criminal liability are the same.4 °8 As discussed above, the Court required a relationship of trust and confidence between the inside trader
and the other party to the transaction to impose liability. Speaking for
the majority, Justice Powell noted that a corporate insider40 9 would
have the requisite special relationship with each corporate shareholder.
If a corporate insider purchases shares from an existing shareholder, a
special relationship unquestionably exists. If an insider sells to a new
shareholder, a special relationship can be found only with difficulty. If
an insider buys puts or calls, or purchases shares from a short seller, the
insider may lack the requisite relationship with the party in privity,
who may own no shares. This special relationship requirement may
also permit tippees, especially accidental and surreptitious tippees, to
escape liability.410 The Powell test also fails to reach most or all trading on outside information-information not derived directly or indirectly from the issuer.
The Court reserved judgment on whether misappropriation of information could violate rule lOb-5. Although the misappropriation approach can impose liability on corporate insiders who buy puts or calls,
the principle cannot easily be applied to tippers and tippees. Another
weakness of the theory is that it depends on employer prohibition of
trading on the nonpublic information. Finally, the principle would fail
to reach a great deal of trading on outside information.
The class of stock market inside traders who violate rule lOb-5 can
be legally defined narrowly or broadly. Following is a partial list of
41
possible classes of violators: '
A. No one.
408. See note 265 and accompanying text supra.
409. For this Article's definition of insider, see note 2 supra.
410.

The post-Chiarellaopinion ofElkind v. Liggett & Myers imposed rule lob-5 liability on

an issuer for tipping adverse news to an analyst, who in turn passed the information on to a
stockbroker. 635 F.2d at 165 n.14. The stockbroker sold 1800 shares on behalf of a client. The
Second Circuit ignored the numerous problems of finding a special relationship between the defendant issuer and the buyers of the 1800 shares. A special relationship is especially difficult to

find if these particular buyers had held no shares previously. See text accompanying notes 280-87
.npra.

411.

For a comprehensive list of thirteen possible classes, see text accompanying notes 332-37

supra.
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Those who trade with someone with whom they have a fiduciary relationship based on some other body of law.
C. Those who trade on information in breach of a duty to the
information source (or trade on information obtained through
a tort against the information source).
D. Those who trade on information based on information obtained through a structural and/or unerodable informational
advantage.
E. Those who regularly receive material nonpublic information.
F. All corporate insiders (those directly or indirectly employed
by the issuer).
G. Those who trade on the basis of "corporate" information (information that will affect the issuer's earning power or assets),
as opposed to "market" information (information that will affect the market for a security).
H. Everyone.
The various classes are defined by the defendant's special relationship
with the party in privity, how the defendant obtained the information,
his special status, or the type of information he utilized.
B.

The offensive aspect of the inside trade is the unfair or improper
enrichment of the trader, T, at the expense of a victim, , in the course
of a transaction with a party in privity, P. The persistent problem is
that this misconduct does not constitute deceit. Most of the tests defining the defendant use certain improper or unfair conduct by the inside
trader to trigger a duty to disclose, presumably to P, but possibly to a
larger class. This is an artificial means of circumventing the rule lOb-5
deceit requirement in situations where it is absent. In Chiarella, Justice
Powell escaped this criticism by expressly rejecting defendant classes
D, E, and H; implicitly rejecting classes F and G; taking no position on
class C; and endorsing only class B. Justice Powell definitely would
find a violation only when there is a special relationship between T and
P based on some other body of law. He would impose liability on a
corporate president buying through the stock exchange for the same
reason that the corporate president would be liable if he had dealt face
to face.41
412. A certain causation anomaly is more likely with a stock market inside trade, however,
than with a face to face trade. The stock market inside trader could argue that had he done

nothing, the party in privity would have traded with someone else anyway. In other words, the
inside trader could contend that his relevant choice was between two courses of conduct, one legal
(doing nothing) and one illegal (inside trading), both of which would have resulted in the same
harm to the party in privity. This harmless error defense could be overcome through a bootstrap
conclusive presumption or triggered duty. See text accompanying notes 68-72, 343-44 supra.
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The two conflicting principles in defining the proper class of defendants are (1) the supposed unfairness or impropriety of inside trading, and (2) the deceit requirement of rule lOb-5. The stricter the
adherence to the fraud requirement, the lower the amount of unfair or
improper inside trading prohibited. The greater the amount of unfair
or improper inside trading prohibited, the greater is the disregard of the
deceit requirement. Chiarella indicates that the Court has decided to
adhere closely to the fraud requirement at the cost of allowing some or
most inside trading to escape liability.
The American Law Institute's proposed Federal Securities Code
provides a statutory solution to the stock market inside trading problem. Section 1603 codifies the liability of corporate insiders and their
tippees. Left in a kind of limbo is the liability of "quasi-insiders," such
as those with nonpublic "outside" information. If sufficiently offensive,
such quasi-insider trading might violate section 1602(a)(1), a broad antifraud provision equivalent to the present rule lOb-5. To define the
class of plaintiffs who can sue an inside trader under either section 1603
or section 1602(a)(1), section 1703 of the Code distinguishes between
"substantially nonfortuitously matched" ("nonmarket") and "substantially fortuitiously matched" ("market") transactions. With the latter,
the Code expediently abandons compensation as a goal, and adopts
instead deterrence and deprivation of unjust enrichment. The class of
allowable plaintiffs is all those who buy or sell during the period beginning at the start of the day when the defendant unlawfully trades and
ending at the end of the day when the information becomes generally
available. The defendant is permitted to demonstrate lack of causaby a
tion. The harshness of the enormous plaintiff class is mitigated
41 3
ceiling on liability of 150% of the inside trader's profits.
The practical problem with the Code's approach is in drawing the
line between fortuitous and nonfortuitous transactions. Many
nonmarket face to face transactions are significantly fortuitous, and
market transactions are often nonfortuitous. Despite this minor problem, the Code's approach of prorated and limited damages is a satisfactory statutory solution to the problem of providing a workable civil
remedy for stock market inside trading.
413. As originally approved by the American Law Institute, the Codes ceiling was 100% of
the inside trader's profits. To win SEC endorsement of the Code, New Code § 1708(b)(4)(c) was
added. This provision gives courts the discretion to raise the ceiling to 150% of the inside trader's

profits. See notes 378-79 and accompanying text supra.
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CONCLUSION
Legally determining the proper classes of inside trading plaintiffs and
defendants is difficult. The problem is created by the tension between
the deceit requirement of rule l0b-5 and the desire to use the rule to
combat unfair and unethical stock market transactions. A stock market
inside trade has two aspects: the trade and the nondisclosure. The
trade always benefits the inside trader and harms other specific investors. This result is offensive, but involves no deceit. Occasionally, an
inside trade may also be a breach of fiduciary duty to the trader's employer. Only with a strained analysis can this breach be considered
fraudulent. The nondisclosure aspect of an inside trade clearly involves
deceit but is offensive only if the inside trader has a relationship of trust
and confidence with the other party to the transaction. With much inside trading, especially option transactions and outsider or tippee trading, no such special relationship exists. Holding that an inside trader
has a duty to disclose to the world is absurd, as illustrated by the logically compelled Draconian liability that would result from such a duty.
The Supreme Court's recent Chiarella decision severely restricts
the class of inside trading defendants and suggests a drastic restriction
of the class of civil plaintiffs. This narrowing is the inevitable consequence of the Court's correct decision to adhere closely to the deceit
requirement of rule lOb-5. Fraud is no longer in the eyes of the beholder.4 14 In the cogent words of the majority, "Section 10(b) is aptly
'4 15
described as a catchall provision, but what it catches must be fraud.
Under the Law of Conservation of Securities any particular inside
trade clearly harms other investors. For this reason alone, an inside
trader should be forced to disgorge his gains, and this type of misconduct should be deterred. Only Congressional action, however, can provide the necessary weapon to eliminate stock market inside trading.

414. This observation is a paraphrase of the title of Cox, FraudIsin the Eyes of the Beholder:
Rule 1Ob-5" Application to Acts of CorporateMismanagement, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 674 (1972).
415. 445 U.S. at 234-35.
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